Speaking at a press conference in Washington on Monday, Donald Trump said that he was “going to Russia on Friday” to talk to Vladimir Putin. Anyone can misspeak (the two will meet in Alaska), but the president should have been more careful. Putin casts a covetous eye on any territory that was once Russian, as Alaska was until 1867. Russia originally claimed Alaska in 1741, four decades before it first annexed Crimea and even longer before today’s Odessa fell into Moscow’s hands.
Moscow later handed Crimea to Soviet Ukraine, before re-annexing it in 2014, eventually along with a swath of the Donbas. In 2022, after eight years of intermittent fighting in Ukraine’s east, Russia initiated a full-scale invasion, with the aim of reducing a rump Ukraine to a satrapy. Putin has given no indication of renouncing that ambition or of abandoning his broader goal of restoring Moscow’s sway over much of the former Soviet or tsarist empires, including the Baltic states and other nations to Russia’s west.
Any “deal” between Trump and Putin (and the U.S. president, who has more recently referred to a “feel-out” meeting, is clearly downgrading expectations) will, given the Kremlin’s longer-term objectives, never be enough. The best that can be hoped for is an armistice with an underpinning firm enough to deter Russia from resuming its war when it is ready. That will mean reiterating Western support for Ukraine and stipulating that the U.S. will participate in that effort, even as Western Europe assumes — as it must — a greater share of responsibility for helping Ukraine out.
Ukraine is not a member of NATO and does not enjoy the benefit of any NATO guarantee, but simply abandoning Kyiv to its fate would not only reward Russian aggression (which would not go unnoticed in Beijing) but would also destabilize the Atlantic Alliance. Some NATO members, aware that Moscow’s ambitions do not end with Ukraine, would begin to wonder whether it was time to make nice with the Moscow-Beijing axis. Some already are. The president has been right to insist that NATO’s free riders should pay up (and his pressure is already yielding results), but he should also restate the U.S. commitment to NATO, an alliance that has served this country very well, in unambiguous terms.
Ukraine is not going to join NATO in the foreseeable future, and there is no point in pretending otherwise. Nevertheless, handing Russia a veto over Ukrainian membership of NATO is unacceptable. Ukraine is a sovereign nation, with the right — however theoretical — to make the alliances it wishes. Ukraine’s Western partners must also be free to continue to supply it with weaponry — a disarmed Ukraine is a doomed Ukraine — and to work toward Ukrainian membership in the EU.
The president has floated the possibility of some land swaps. These, if they were to occur, would probably amount to little more than some tidying up around the front line. It is no coincidence that the Russians have lately stepped up their progress in the Donbas, with some success. When it comes to the fine print of any deal, possession will be nine-tenths of the “law.”
Some local horse-trading apart, the U.S. should reject any attempt by Russia to extend its gains. Nor, in the absence of Ukraine’s agreement, should it extend de jure recognition to any of the territorial gains made by Russia at Ukraine’s expense. The U.S. refused to recognize the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states for half a century. If necessary, that is the precedent to follow. For its part, Ukraine must, however reluctantly and unfairly, accept that the existing front line will, absent fresh hostilities, be the de facto border with Russia. The armistice that ended the Korean War was signed in 1953. If any Russo-Ukrainian armistice lasts as long, Ukraine will flourish.
Some other provisions, such as prisoner exchanges and the return of stolen Ukrainian children, ought to be fairly straightforward. Further incentives for Russia to agree to a deal should involve a gradual lifting of some sanctions in exchange for good behavior, perhaps starting with secondary sanctions, especially those on India, which may even be counterproductive anyway. But any relaxation of sanctions, or tentative steps toward some kind of thaw, should be cautious and unillusioned: Russia’s long-term goals will not change.
Finally, the president needs to remember three things. The first, as he must surely know by now, is that Putin’s word is worth very little. The second is that if he comes to an understanding with Putin on terms that would not realistically or reasonably be acceptable to Ukraine, and which Ukraine then rejects, he will have fallen into Putin’s trap. The Kremlin would then portray Kyiv as warmongers, unworthy of U.S. support. The third comes from The Art of the Deal: “Know when to walk away from the table.”