


Apparently, the national security rationale for restricting China’s access to sophisticated U.S. technology proved uncompelling.
When Trump took the oath of office for a second time, political observers expected that he would reverse most of Joe Biden’s policies — but perhaps not all.
“While it is not entirely clear what Mr. Trump’s policy toward Beijing in his second administration will be,” the New York Times reported in December 2024. But the Times also noted that Trump had surrounded himself with “China hawks” who could presumably be counted on to look favorably on the few Biden-era initiatives designed to check China’s influence.
For example, the last administration’s restrictions on the sale of sensitive electronics to Beijing and the assets under CCP control — in particular, high-end processors, semiconductors, and chips — would probably find stewards in the Trump administration. At least, that was the speculation.
At first, that seemed like a reasonable bet. “What we want to do is, we want to keep it in this country,” Trump said of research into artificial intelligence at a media event in the first week of his second term. “China is a competitor, and others are competitors,” he continued. “I’m going to help a lot through emergency declarations, because we have an emergency. We have to get this stuff built.”
Apparently, the national security rationale for restricting China’s access to sophisticated U.S. technology proved uncompelling. All it took to convince the administration to reverse its stance was to offer the U.S. Treasury a cut of the action.
On Sunday, reporters discovered that the export controls covering the advanced AI chips produced by Nvidia and AMD would once again become available to Chinese purchasers, but only if these firms kick 15 percent of the profits they make from those ventures up to Uncle Sam.
“There are few precedents for the Commerce Department agreeing to grant licenses for exports in exchange for a share of revenue,” the New York Times reported. It cited sources familiar with the deal, for which export licenses have already been issued, who said the arrangement transforms the federal government into a “partner” with Nvidia and AMD’s “business in China.” The Wall Street Journal confirmed the Times’ reporters’ assumptions. “It is unusual for companies to essentially pay for export licenses,” its dispatch read. “Access to semiconductors is one of the biggest priorities for the Chinese and advantages for the U.S.”
The professionally muted terror screaming out from the subtext of these reports can be misleading. These dispatches make the Trump administration’s maneuver sound like an unconventional business arrangement, but the same could be said of racketeering.
Unfortunately, this may be just the beginning. Back in June, trade reporters expressed confusion and alarm over the Trump administration’s signals that previously non-negotiable security-related export controls would be on the table in talks with Beijing. White House National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett singled out Nvidia by name as a firm that could be once again allowed to sell sensitive electronics to Chinese buyers. As the Wall Street Journal subsequently reported, “jet engines and related parts, which China needs to make its own commercial aircraft,” could be next. But that’s not all. Software, ethane and other volatile chemicals, and a variety of “dual use” components that have commercial as well as military applications are also likely to once again be on the negotiating table.
If the reports indicating that the U.S. is once again selling the Chinese the instruments of our destruction prove accurate, it is a tragedy. If the allegation that Trump has reversed course in exchange only for a 15 percent sweetener, it’s a disgrace.