Following what Volodymyr Zelensky called “productive” telephone calls with Donald Trump, the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents will be meeting in Washington on Friday. We can assume that Zelensky will be wearing something akin to a suit and that the agenda will involve more than pleasantries.
Since meeting Trump in Alaska, Vladimir Putin has made a mockery of the president’s attempts to broker a peace deal. Russia’s offensive in the Donbas grinds on, and Russia recently changed the law to allow reservists to perform “defensive tasks” in Ukraine, a provision that will undoubtedly be interpreted broadly. Despite denials from Havana, it appears that some thousands of Cubans have followed North Korea’s lead and have joined the fighting. Russia has a far larger population than Ukraine, and these latest moves only underline its ability to fight a war of attrition.
Russian missile and drone attacks hit new records in September (in part, probably, to compensate for Russia’s lack of progress on the ground). These have been directed at civilian, military, and strategic targets and include an intensified onslaught on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, a tactic designed to damage the country’s economy, defense capabilities, and, with winter fast approaching, morale.
Moscow has also ratcheted up its anti-Western operations in the “gray zone” that falls short of acts of war. These are typically covert — sabotage, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and the like — and usually deniable, if implausibly. In recent weeks, however, a mass incursion of drones into Poland was followed by sightings of their kin as far west as Munich, Copenhagen, and maybe even over Norway. In all likelihood, they were designed to test Western defenses and to send a threatening message.
Frustrated by the contempt with which Putin has treated his Alaska overture and doubtless well aware that the risk of a wider confrontation is increasing, Trump appears to be concluding that something more dramatic is needed to bring Putin to the negotiating table. According to some reports, the U.S. has been stepping up the technical support that it gives some Ukrainian drone flights deep into Russian territory. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s drones have inflicted severe damage on Russian oil and gas facilities, a blow to an economy that after holding up fairly well in recent years may now be sliding into stagflation. Economic troubles will not dethrone Putin, but they may be enough to push him closer to entering into serious peace negotiations.
When it comes to U.S. support, Zelensky is hoping for more than the preservation of what Ukraine is already getting. He will ask for additional air-defense equipment, a request that, given the current post-Alaska surge in Russian airborne attacks, should be easy to agree to.
Zelensky’s other likely request — for Tomahawk cruise missiles — is more momentous. Tomahawks, which Kyiv has wanted for a long time, can travel deep into Russia (up to 1,500 miles), far enough to hit Moscow from Ukraine. That’s well beyond the capabilities of the ATACMS (maximum range 190 miles) that the U.S. has currently supplied to Kyiv. The value of such missiles to Kyiv is obvious, but selling them to Ukraine (the Europeans would probably pay for them) will obviously be considered an escalation by Moscow. Similar concerns have kept Germany from furnishing Ukraine with its Taurus cruise missiles, which have a range of up to 300 miles.
Trump is now publicly considering whether the U.S. should hand over these missiles (“I might say, ‘Look, if this war is not going to get settled, I’m going to send Tomahawks.’”). This thinking aloud is clearly meant to deliver a message that the Tomahawks will be on their way if Russia does not sit down to serious talks soon. For such a message to be effective it will have to be clear that the decision to send the missiles could come at any time, certainly within weeks, not months. There has been speculation that Trump may link any decision by the U.S. to send Tomahawks to Ukraine to one by Germany to do the same with its Tauruses. That seems reasonable both militarily (there may not be that many Tomahawks to spare) and strategically as a symbol of NATO unity.
If the threat of supplying the weapons isn’t enough to change Russia’s calculus, the U.S. should actually provide the missiles to Ukraine, albeit with conditions. Their use should be confined to clearly defined military or infrastructural targets. But Moscow, which routinely hits targets deep in Ukraine, shouldn’t be held harmless from attacks on its fuel depots, air bases, military production facilities, and the like that happen to be beyond the reach of Ukraine’s current capabilities.
So far, blandishments haven’t worked with Putin, and threats of sanctions and tariffs haven’t worked, either. Changing the dynamic on the battlefield might have an effect, though, and even if it doesn’t, we should want Ukraine to fight as effectively as possible against the Russian aggressor.
A lesson of the Gaza deal is that the beginning of diplomatic wisdom is backing our ally to the hilt, and Trump should do the same here.