After five decades of failure, a rubber-stamp renewal of UNIFIL is no longer acceptable.
T he United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, is up for a renewal of its mandate in the United Nations Security Council this August. The United States should oppose renewal and end a costly 47-year program with a price tag of over $12 billion, a quarter of which has been borne by the U.S. taxpayer. Here’s why.
In 1978, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) orchestrated the Coastal Road Massacre terrorist attack that killed 38 Israelis, including 13 children. Until the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas on the Nova music festival, this was Israel’s worst terrorist attack. Israel, then in the midst of peace negotiations with Egypt, invaded Lebanon to uproot the Palestinian terrorists and prevent future attacks. In response, the U.N. Security Council created UNIFIL “for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.” To date, that has not occurred.
Evidence of UNIFIL’s failure wasn’t long in coming, as terrorist attacks continued apace from Lebanon. The collapse of a cease-fire in June 1982 resulted in the First Lebanon War. And while Israeli military action ultimately forced the PLO and some 20,000 terrorists from their perch in Lebanon, with claims and counterclaims about blame, one thing was clear: UNIFIL played a limited to nonexistent role in preventing terrorist operations and maintaining peace in southern Lebanon.
Israel maintained a security corridor in southern Lebanon through 2000 during which a newer adversary, Hezbollah (Party of God), a proxy of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, launched increasingly aggressive terrorist attacks. In 1993 and 1996, Israel launched two major operations inside Lebanon aimed at rooting out Hezbollah, disrupting its supply lines from Iran through Syria and into Lebanon, and ending persistent attacks launched from Lebanese soil into Israel. Four years later, Israel withdrew from Lebanon to the U.N.-designated “blue line” in the vain hope that in withdrawing, the Beirut government might extend its writ and UNIFIL might fulfill its mission.
Instead, the withdrawal became an opportunity for Iran and Syria to launch a massive Hezbollah buildup, transferring tens of thousands of missiles, advanced guidance systems, and IRGC advisers onto Israel’s northern border. Under UNIFIL’s watch, which the U.N. Security Council continued to rubber-stamp, Hezbollah would eventually grow into the world’s best-armed terrorist organization, a veritable extrajudicial army within the State of Lebanon, never answering to the Beirut government.
Inevitably, Hezbollah overstepped. In July 2006, a cross-border attack killed several Israeli soldiers, with additional rocket fire killing Israeli civilians; two injured soldiers were kidnapped and subsequently died of their injuries. The attack provoked what is referred to as the Second Lebanon War, and for the first time also spurred the Security Council to action. Israel demanded new rules of engagement for UNIFIL, and with a new Security Council resolution, UNSCR 1701, the peacekeeping force was expanded to more than 10,000 troops, and its remit grew to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in disarming Hezbollah.
UNSCR 1701 instructed UNIFIL to “take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind,” and reemphasized “the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords.”
But UNSCR 1701 was effectively ignored. Hezbollah rearmed with over 100,000 short- and long-range missiles, including precision-guided munitions. Miles of reinforced tunnels were built, some directly backing onto UNIFIL positions. Hezbollah developed a new, elite military force — the Radwan Force — focused on the Israel-Lebanon border and, like Hamas’s Nukhba forces that carried out the October 7 massacre, prepared to commit a mass-casualty terrorist attack on Israeli civilians. All of this took place under UNIFIL’s proverbial nose.
Over nearly half a century, UNIFIL’s accomplishments are almost impossible to pinpoint. Repeated Lebanese and Iranian violations of Security Council resolutions have been excused. Outrageously, the United Nations has refused to designate Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist army, as a terrorist organization.
UNIFIL does not merit continued U.S. support. However, the Trump administration may be swayed by pleas from Europeans and the Beirut government to extend its mandate yet again. If the U.S. agrees to renew, it should do so only with significant conditions, including: a reduced force of 1,000; a narrower mandate to verify that Lebanon is preventing arms-smuggling and maintaining an area free of unauthorized armed groups between the Blue Line and the Litani River; a financial commitment from supporting governments to share one-third of the mission’s costs; explicit recognition of Israel’s right to defend itself and occupy threatened areas should Lebanon fail to maintain control; and the listing of Hezbollah and its leadership on the U.N. Security Council’s terrorism sanctions list.
After five decades of failure, a rubber-stamp renewal of UNIFIL is no longer acceptable. The U.N. cannot or will not enforce peace and disarmament in southern Lebanon. That task must fall to the government of Lebanon. And the focus of UNIFIL renewal, if it happens, must be on increasing the likelihood of peace.
Danielle Pletka is a distinguished senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the host, with Marc Thiessen, of the podcast What the Hell Is Going On? and the related Substack. Brett Schaefer is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute focusing on the United Nations and international organizations.