It may seem like a deal is ready to be made. But making it stick is another matter.
T he Trump administration is obviously working toward what it hopes will be an enduring cease-fire and a diplomatic settlement to the war in Ukraine. The administration has publicly dressed down Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky. It has had initial talks with Russian officials and has initiated its rare-earth-minerals deal with Ukraine, which President Trump views as an effective, if unofficial, security guarantee and a way of recovering American investment in the conflict. With Zelensky having already signaled that his government may exchange some territory for peace, it may seem like a deal is ready to be made. And it may be made soon.
But making it stick is another matter. There are several factors working against it.
The parties begin with little trust.
The Budapest Memorandum, which facilitated the movement of Soviet-era nuclear weapons out of Ukraine to the Soviet successor government in Russia, obliged all signing partners to respect the sovereignty and political independence of Ukraine. This began breaking down under the pressure of Russia’s coercive diplomacy and then American involvement in the Maidan Revolution. The memorandum did not oblige anyone to defend Ukraine in the case of a breach. Then there were the Minsk Accords, negotiated in tandem with France and Germany, which were never seriously executed by either of the main parties. Ukraine did not alter its constitution to commit the nation to neutrality or grant the eastern regions promised political autonomy. Russia did not stop supporting covert operations in Ukrainian territory. François Hollande and Angela Merkel have both admitted that the negotiations were not meant to solve the conflict, but to freeze it until Ukraine could be armed to the teeth. If many in the West feel Vladimir Putin is untrustworthy, how much more do Ukrainian nationalists? They have already banded together in Parliament to legally forbid Zelensky from negotiating with Putin. And on the Russian side, senior diplomats like Sergei Lavrov have deemed America “agreement non-capable.” He will not forget the implacable hostility of much of America’s political class, especially when Trump is limited to one term.
Russia may still think it can win more in attritional battle.
Russia has been disciplined in keeping to a strategy of losing at a slower pace than the Ukrainians. It is highly unlikely that Russia would try to conquer the entire territory of Ukraine. Doing so would require swallowing the porcupine of Western Ukraine, where ultra-nationalists would put up tremendous irregular resistance with or without the assistance of a functioning government in Kyiv. But Russia may yet hope to break through the lines of contact decisively and move to swallow the entire coastline of Ukraine, including Odessa, with territory stretching all the way up the Dniepr.
No popular Ukrainian government is likely to sign on to deals Trump negotiates.
The Ukrainian government may be ready to acknowledge the exhaustion of their nation in the war. They may be anxious for a time of reprieve and rebuilding, of mourning what was lost and celebrating their heroes. And theoretically, they may be willing to trade some pieces of territory. But the enormity of Ukraine’s blood sacrifice will make any agreement difficult. The exhilarating and transfiguring feelings of nobility that flow through nationalistic hearts, when fighting for their just cause, make the compromises that inevitably come in peace negotiations with a powerful neighbor seem like betrayals, if not like blasphemy, against fallen national saints. Wars of liberation or independence are often followed by a civil war (Finland, Ireland) litigating the compromises made.
An unstable Ukrainian state may provoke others to action.
Ukraine has not been a stable state since 2004. There are times when it seems not to have a monopoly on the use of force within the territory it controls. Even before the war, there have been times when Zelensky has had serious trouble controlling the actions of ultranationalist paramilitaries. A Ukrainian government that signs a peace deal that falls short of Ukraine’s felt sacrifices will quickly lose democratic support. Political entrepreneurs — whether remaining oligarchs, militia commanders, or others — may see an opportunity to win over the country to their hard-bargaining position. A divided Ukraine that cannot implement pieces of a negotiated settlement may provoke Putin to send more subversive “little green men” or to declare the agreed settlements dead and reignite full-scale war.
Wars are easy to start, and they are often hard to end. This is something the U.S. should also take into account as it carves out its own role in peace talks.