Prominent science journalists and columnists are responding to the revelations about the Department of Energy’s analysis of the Covid-19 origin by contending, “we should be talking much more about lab safety and gain-of-function research,” or calling for “an ‘all of the above’ strategy: ensure laboratory biosafety, prevent further zoonotic spread and improve global cooperation.”

And that’s fine, but it all dances around the real problem: researching contagious deadly viruses is more dangerous when it is conducted in an autocratic or oppressive country than when it is done in a free society.

All scientists are human beings, which means they’re all capable of making mistakes. U.S. labs have had plenty of accidents and leaks — needle sticks and other through the skin exposures from sharp objects; dropped containers or spills and splashes of liquids containing pathogens; bites or scratches from infected animals; pathogens manipulated outside of a biosafety cabinet or other equipment designed to protect exposures to infectious aerosols, you name it. But thankfully, those mistakes haven’t turned into global pandemics.

The good news is that most lab accidents are minor and their consequences are easily and quickly contained. But one of those reasons those consequences are quickly contained is that the U.S. and most free societies created a culture where the top priority is addressing the problem, even if acknowledging the problem might create some embarrassment or criticism of the institution and it leaders. (At least, most of the time.) An open society, a spirit of free inquiry, an independent media, whistleblower protections and other factors make a serious and consequential mistake more likely to be quickly recognized, exposed and addressed.

Diffusion of power makes everyone in society accountable to someone else in some form or fashion. We may argue that various people in society, including research scientists, lab managers, or government health officials aren’t held accountable enough. Our system isn’t perfect; labs basically inspect themselves. But it would be very difficult to successfully cover up a catastrophic lab leak here in the U.S., or in most free societies.

If a virus like SARS-CoV-2 mysteriously emerged just down the road from the Jean Mérieux-Inserm Laboratory in Lyon, France, the response from the French government would be different than how the Chinese government responded to Covid-19. No matter how flawed the French government is, it likely would not spend three to six weeks insisting there is no evidence of human-to-human spread while doctors were catching it from their patients.

But in a laboratory run by the Chinese government, you’re largely only held accountable by the person in authority above you. Secrecy is a high priority and there is enormous cultural pressure to not “lose face” – that is, avoiding embarrassment by never admitting mistakes or failure. In September 2021, Wuhan Institute of Virology deputy director Yuan Zhiming contended that since its founding, the WIV “has never seen any laboratory leaks or human infections.” Considering the rate of accidents at other institutions – and accidents involving SARS at other Chinese state-run laboratories! – that is very hard to believe.

In autocratic states, admitting a mistake or failure is basically asking for the autocratic regime’s secret police to punish you and your family, particularly if you reveal that mistake or failure to the broader public. Autocratic regimes cannot tolerate any admission of any mistake in institutions they run or oversee; any concession of fallibility could trigger the ruled public to ask why they put up with an autocrat if the autocrat can’t even deliver competence alongside the oppression.

Is gain-of-function research worthwhile? It sure seems to offer a big risk – in fact, a potentially catastrophic risk — for a not-so-obvious benefit. I can completely understand why someone would want a complete, total, global blanket ban on research that takes existing viruses and, in the aim of understanding them better to prevent pandemics, makes them more virulent and contagious.

But if somebody’s going to do this kind of research, I trust the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s high-containment laboratories more than I trust the Wuhan Institute of Virology. When the UNC labs make mistakes, we learn about it because lab officials are required to file a lot of paperwork about what happened and why. We can argue about whether the public is informed quickly, whether reports are detailed enough, and whether those who make mistakes are held accountable enough. But the current system of management and oversight gives us, the public, at least some sense of what’s being done in those labs and the level of risk.

But we have little to no idea what goes on behind the walls of the Wuhan Institute of Virology – and it’s unlikely that we know everything going on in the 15 or so biosafety level four labs in Russia. (Every now and then those Russian labs storing smallpox and Ebola have explosions, but I’m sure that’s nothing to worry about.) Or the Pyongyang Bio-Technical Institute in North Korea, or Iran’s biological research facilities. Remember, a lot of biological research is “dual use” – meaning it can be legitimate efforts for how to fight diseases, viruses, and bacterial infections, and it can simultaneously be useful in an effort to develop biological weapons. Note the Wuhan Institute of Virology insisted it had no connections to any secret biological weapons program and nothing nefarious was going on – while simultaneously incessantly warning employees to be on the lookout for foreign spies.

Should there be tougher rules for laboratories? Sure, but I’m not that worried about the next terrible pandemic starting because a U.S. laboratory is sloppy, reckless, negligent, or megalomaniacal. Most, but not all, of the BSL-4 laboratories in the world are located in free societies, with cultures and government structures that prioritize truth and accountability. But not all of them. How confident are we about the safety protocols, staffing, and practices in Belarus? Saudi Arabia? South Africa?

I am more worried about some autocratic regime making some catastrophic mistake while researching viruses and bacteria – and we know most autocratic regimes have few moral qualms about researching and developing biological weapons.

Should there be tighter regulation and monitoring of wet markets? Sure. even if Covid-19 didn’t originate from a wet market, it doesn’t mean that some other contagious virus won’t emerge from there. Virologists warned about the high risk of animal-to-human virus transfer at wet markets for years before the Covid pandemic. But the Chinese government only briefly closed one of the country’s many wet markets, which I think indicates how seriously they believe the wet market theory for Covid. If a U.S. flea market had accidentally unleashed a disaster that killed 1.1 million people at home and at least 6.8 million around the globe, you would see either a ban or tight regulations and monitoring of flea markets.

The world thinks the Chinese government should regulate and monitor wet markets more closely. But the world also thinks the Chinese government should cooperate with the World Health Organization’s investigation into the origin of Covid, stop oppressing and killing the Uighurs, stop enforcing a brutal crackdown in Hong Kong, stop threatening to invade Taiwan, stop supporting the maniacal regime in North Korea, and stop flying spy balloons over their territory. Xi Jinping is an experienced world-class expert at ignoring what the rest of the world wants him to do. That’s why calling for “global cooperation” is mostly happy talk, until someone can determine a way to get the Chinese government to do things it doesn’t want to do.