I am on assignment and will doubtless have much more another day on the reasoning and the inter-justice drama of today’s surprising decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote for all six conservative justices in ruling that universal injunctions are beyond the equitable powers of district courts. The three key words in that sentence are “universal,” “equitable,” and “district.” Universal injunctions are those that apply beyond just the parties to the case, such that (as Barrett observed) the defendant (typically the federal government) can be held in contempt of court for violating the “rights” under the injunction of people who were never before the court. But courts can properly bring a nationwide class of parties before a district court using class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That takes time, and requires satisfying the rigorous rules of Rule 23 — if the district courts comply with the law. (Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence warns that this route needs to be policed, as does the effort of some parties such as states to expand third-party standing.) Second, equitable injunctions are those that arise from the inherent powers of courts, which they possess because Article III grants them “the judicial power.” But courts can also exercise powers explicitly granted to them by Congress. One, as Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurrence notes, is that the Administrative Procedure Act empowers courts to “set aside” agency action (not presidential executive orders, however). So, decisions under the APA are apt to continue producing nationwide orders. Third, as Kavanaugh also notes, whatever the scope of district court powers, the Supreme Court can still issue rulings that in practical legal effect settle a question on a nationwide basis. That, too, takes time, although today’s decision probably stems some of the flood of emergency applications that Barrett in particular has found objectionable as a deviation from the regular, law-bound, deliberative process by which the Court customarily decides things.