The last thing that the U.S. should want to see are doubts about the value of its guarantee.
There cannot be much doubt that the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Kabul sent out a dangerous signal of weakness, something that no great power can afford to do, especially at a time when the world has been looking more dangerous since the Cold War. And while the shambles in Kabul would not by itself have triggered Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine (for example, Vladimir Putin’s notorious pseudo-history of Russo-Ukrainian relations was published in July 2021, some weeks before the fall of Kabul), it could only have reinforced the Kremlin’s conviction that it could get away with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
One of the most senior Russian security officials questioned Washington’s commitment to Ukraine in light of its rushed exit from Afghanistan, forecasting on Thursday that it would one day abandon its Ukrainian allies in a similarly abrupt fashion.
The remarks by Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, are likely to fan fears among some Western politicians that nation state adversaries like Russia and China will be emboldened by what they see as the West’s spectacular defeat in Afghanistan to test its resolve elsewhere.
Patrushev was reportedly a key figure in the decision-making process that led to the invasion of Ukraine the following February.
Under the circumstances, it is to be hoped that reports that the recent negotiations between the U.S. and Russia included discussions on the U.S. withdrawing from (or not deploying) its troops in countries that joined NATO after 1990 were either wrong or that talk on that topic was concluded with a prompt American declaration that such a withdrawal was out of the question.
The Trump administration wants Europe to do more for its own defense. That’s reasonable. But to take one example, American allies in north-eastern Europe have been increasing their military spending for some time and already have an important role to play in defending NATO’s eastern frontier. Poland, a country with a history that leaves no room for illusions, will soon be spending 5 percent of GDP on defense. Estonia is small, to be sure, but it has forgotten neither its history nor its geography and is already spending 3.2 percent of GDP on defense, a total that will increase to 4 percent in 2026 and 5 percent thereafter.
Together with Poland, Finland, and Sweden, the Baltic states form part of a valuable defensive bloc in a strategically vital area. To reward those efforts with an American troop withdrawal and/or a promise not to deploy in their territory in future is not only a betrayal of good allies but also risks tempting Russia to try its luck in a region that is already at the wrong end of Moscow’s hybrid warfare.
Accepting (humiliatingly) that the U.S. could not deploy its troops in sovereign nations that are willing to host them would also tie Washington’s hands in the event of some future crisis with Russia. One way of deescalating tensions can be a show of force. If the U.S. is prohibited from deploying troops to, say, Poland in the event of crisis, that will, by encouraging Russia to prod a bit further, risk just the sort of catastrophe that NATO has, over the decades, done so much to head off.
For the U.S. to agree that post-1990 NATO members were off limits for its forces would also inevitably raise deeper questions about the value of the security guarantee that is meant to come with NATO membership. Such questions could destabilize those countries — particularly in Europe’s east — that benefit the most from that guarantee. Destabilization will be an opportunity that Russia will be sure to exploit, once again increasing the risk of a broader conflict.
More generally, the last thing that the U.S. should want to see are doubts about the value of its guarantee. A deterrent will only work so long as it is believed. Taking actions that threaten its credibility makes conflict more likely than less. Quite where such a conflict would end is anyone’s guess. To assume it could be “safely” confined to Europe would be a mistake, not least as China will be watching these events very carefully.
And so, incidentally, will those smaller countries across the world wondering whether America is the better bet after all.
Reassuringly, Poland’s President Duda has said, after meetings with Defense Secretary Hegseth and Keith Kellogg, the special presidential envoy to Ukraine, that:
“We have been assured . . . that there are absolutely no American intentions to reduce activity here in our part of Europe, especially in terms of security, reducing the number of American soldiers.”
Those reassurances must be honored. Rebalancing responsibilities within NATO for European defense will be complex and is going to take time. For the U.S. to keep up the pressure on its allies to get this done is reasonable, so long as that pressure is itself reasonable. Leaving them in the lurch would be neither reasonable nor wise. It would also wreck any chance that a peace deal in Ukraine could hold.