


Xi and Putin continue to reaffirm the closeness of their alliance.
Jim writes:
Xi and Putin have some major differences. But they both see themselves as leaders of unjustly maligned once-great empires that are destined to return to global supremacy. I understand why certain Americans love the idea of re-running the Nixon playbook and splitting the two, turning China against Russia, or vice versa. If it could ever work, great. But in the end, that’s unlikely to ever work consistently because Putin and Xi see the world too similarly: Might makes right, the strong dominate the weak, and U.S. allies like Taiwan and Ukraine and perhaps other countries of Asia and Europe had better just get used to it and start bowing and scraping.
Like Jim, I don’t doubt that Xi and Putin see the world similarly. However, I think there’s a more concrete reason that the Trump administration will find pulling a “reverse Nixon” — drawing Moscow close to Washington to isolate Beijing — so difficult: The Chinese and Russian dictators believe that the Sino-Russian alliance is mutually beneficial. They think that it’s in their interest to form a united front against the American-led free world.
It’s hard to see how they’re wrong.
Outside of each other, neither country has many friends, especially among the great and powerful. Besides Moscow, who is China’s most important ally? North Korea? Pakistan? Besides Beijing, who are the Kremlin’s most important friends? Belarus and Iran? Xi and Putin find themselves in the unenviable position in which they can only count on each other for consistent diplomatic support on the world stage.
We should always remember that both Xi and Putin want to break — or at the very least rebalance — the postwar international order, which gives pride of place to the United States. They are not likely to walk away from that design easily. And there’s very little that could convince them that the best way to unseat the United States would be to align themselves with the United States by throwing the other overboard. It’s not for nothing that Xi and Putin have declared a “no limits” partnership between their two countries.
Beyond that, these two countries are intertwined in extremely important economic mechanisms: Russia sells huge amounts of raw materials and energy to China in exchange for hard currency and manufactured goods. Is this arrangement in the long-term interest of Russia? Probably not. But in the short to medium term, as the Kremlin pursues its ambitions thousands of miles away in Europe, the exchange is undoubtedly worth it.
Theorists may ponder the possibilities of a “reverse Nixon.” But today’s geopolitical situation is very different from that which prevailed during the Sino-Soviet split of the late ’50s and ’60s. Especially in the latter period, as a general matter, the Soviets under Khrushchev were looking for ways to lower tensions with the West after the turmoil of the Korean War, the 1958 Berlin Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets were also in their de-Stalinization period. Khrushchev wanted to focus on rebuilding after the devastation of the Second World War. The Chinese under Mao, on the other hand, were in the heat of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. They wanted ideologically tinged confrontation with the West.
The two sides were in a very real zero-sum contest over who would be the true leader of Marxism-Leninism on the world stage. Before Kissinger and Nixon made their moves, the two communist giants had nearly fought an open war in 1969 following armed clashes on their border.
Today, neither China nor Russia wants or needs the other to become a problem. The Sino-Russian border is 2,615 miles long and is the world’s sixth-largest. Neither country wants this border to become a flash point or require a much larger defensive commitment. The Russians would prefer to continue to focus on reclaiming their lost empire in Eastern Europe. Beijing is focused on its south and east, towards the teeming metropolises that border the South and East China Seas — not the steppes and forests to China’s north. Why fight Russia for the resources in Siberia when Chinese industry can simply buy them? (And at a discount.)
Geopolitical calculations can change, of course. The Russians could begin to worry about Chinese encroachments on their empire in the Far East. There could be a black swan incident that sets the two countries at odds. Xi and Putin could leave the scene and be replaced by leaders of a very different sort.
It’s true, as Jim writes, that if the United States could somehow split Russia and China, that would likely be in our interest. But, as it stands today, as Xi and Putin declare and reaffirm the closeness of their alliance, there is little reason to believe that a “reverse Nixon” is possible anytime soon.