The White House Council of Economic Advisers, probably reacting to reports that Donald Trump wants to increase presidential involvement in monetary policy if he returns to the White House, is making the case for central-bank independence as a means of fostering low and predictable inflation. The case is strong, up to a point. We don’t want to enable presidents to create an inflationary boom in time for an election, with the worst consequences deferred until afterward.

But monetary policy is one of the most important things government does — inescapably so, unless we took the radical step of privatizing money — and cordoning it off from politics is hard to square with representative and accountable government. The CEA hints at a possible answer to the problem:

Governing bodies (typically national legislatures) legitimately dictate the goals or mandates of central banks, which, in the U.S. case, are maximum employment and price stability. But [central bank independence] requires that the Federal Reserve’s operational activities to achieve its dual mandate occur without political pressure or interference.

The legislative guidance is vague enough, though, that it does not do much to constrain Fed policy. But the guidance could be made more specific. Congress could, for example, mandate that the Fed seek to achieve its goals for employment and prices (and moderate interest rates, the often-forgotten part of its existing statutory mission) by aiming to keep spending growing at a steady rate. It could further specify that the Fed regularly report on how well it is achieving that goal and, if it has failed, why it erred and how it plans to correct for it.

The Fed can be made more politically accountable while also being free from presidential interference if Congress gives clearer guidance. Which, admittedly, would have to be done carefully.