In his latest New York Times column, David Brooks responds to the election results by pointing to what he conceives of as a crisis of “respect.” Over the past 40 years, policy-makers have prioritized the interests of college-educated Americans at the expense of blue-collar workers: “That great sucking sound you heard was the redistribution of respect. People who climbed the academic ladder were feted with accolades, while those who didn’t were rendered invisible.” Policy-makers shrugged at the shuttering of factories and the despair of communities left behind. Hence, the rise of populism.

While Brooks’s analysis shows far more introspection than the “America hates democracy now” cope that has suffused many think pieces about the 2024 election, I think there are a few further points worth considering. The first is that “respect” is not simply reducible to performative empathy on the part of elites: donning a Carhartt jacket and saying, “I feel your pain, you bitter-clingers, . . . I mean, you who are the salt of the earth.” Instead, it’s about taking the economic and social concerns of these Americans seriously. I might rephrase Brooks slightly and say that this gulf of respect is itself a symptom of the broader breakdown of the civic compact. And restoring that compact involves questions of political economy. Brooks rightly observes the gulfs in life outcomes between Americans with a college degree compared to those without one, and redressing some of those disparities in part means doing things to improve economic outcomes for non-college-educated Americans.

Brooks says that “the Biden administration tried to woo the working class with subsidies and stimulus, but there is no economic solution to what is primarily a crisis of respect.” This is a common response among the center-left regarding the Democrats’ political quandary: that they tried blue-collar economics under Biden, but it didn’t work to win over those voters. However, that diagnosis may be incomplete. It’s true that Biden engaged in some industrial-policy efforts and boosted some subsidies for working families. But I might argue that other economic factors — most notably inflation and the breakdown at the border — were so severe that they overwhelmed any benefits those policies might have produced.

Moreover, working families don’t want to feel as though they are reliant on subsidies to get by. They want a sense of agency in building a life for themselves, so efforts to tighten the labor market and reduce costs for those families would seem an important part of economic renewal. This might be a reminder for some on the “new right,” too — that pro-family economics cannot be reduced to subsidies. While increasing the child tax credit, for example, might be part of a pro-family agenda, it needs to be bundled into a much bigger program for economic uplift and self-determination. Doing more for vocational education, tightening borders, restoring the defense–industrial base, and driving down energy costs could all be part of this broader economic project.

The ideological capture of many elite institutions contributed to a breakdown in pluralism and a sense of a loss of agency among average Americans. It’s a sign of the times that many late-night comedians felt obliged last night to issue some statement of mourning about the results of the election. While Johnny Carson tried to be a comedian for all Americans, many elite media institutions are more sectarian now. Though some of this goes beyond policy, the stewards of American culture might need to seriously think about how they can escape their increasingly constricted cocoons — or risk a greater reckoning.

Viewing Americans simply as fungible units of economic activity or as warriors on the “right” or “wrong” side of history is a woefully incomplete political vision. Seeing them as fellow human beings — with their own pressing interests, passions, and dignity — is necessary for building a more resilient public square.