If you’ve listened to a talk or been to an event where conservatives talk about religion, you’ve probably heard about the rise of the “nones” — those Americans who hold no affiliation with a particular religious faith. For decades, it’s been an oft-repeated lament among right-wingers that the “nones” are the fastest growing religious demographic.
Yet it might finally be time for conservatives to take a deep breath: Researcher Ryan Burge has a fascinating analysis recently posted to his Substack suggesting that we might be past peak-none.
Burge’s analysis draws on data from the 2023 Cooperative Election Study, published in early May. He notes:
In 2008, the share of Americans who were non-religious in the Cooperative Election Study was 21%. Five years later, it had increased to 30%. That’s a massive shift in such a short window of time — really stunning for anyone who studies demographics. Between 2013 and 2018, the nones rose from 30% to 32%. Just two points in five years. Then, there was a significant bump in 2019 to 35%. That’s notable and shouldn’t be overlooked.
But then something interesting happened beginning in 2020: the share of “nones” stopped noticeably rising. It fell a percentage point to 34 percent in 2020, rose to 36 percent in 2021, and again fell a percentage point in 2022 before returning to 36 percent in 2023. Burge notes that “it has become crystal clear to me now: the share of non-religious Americans has stopped rising in any meaningful way.”
Most fascinating is the picture painted by the generational data. While the share of “nones” continues to increase among the Silent Generation and the Boomers, that growth is essentially entirely offset by a massive decrease in the share of “nones” among Gen Z. In 2020, 45 percent of Gen Z were “nones.” That rose to 48 percent in 2022. But in 2023, the number fell to 42 percent. And this is not an issue with the sample size; Burge notes that the 2023 survey contained over 4,000 respondents from Gen Z. He adds that this decline is “the biggest year to year drop in the nones that I can find in the CES data.”
And the CES data is not an outlier. Data from Pew and the General Social Survey all support the same conclusion. As Burge describes it: “The rise of the nones may be largely over now. At least it won’t be increasing in the same way that it did in the prior thirty years. . . . This really may be the end of an era in American religious demography.”
What are the implications? I’m adding my own analysis to Burge’s more focused post, but it seems obvious that the rise of wokeness was correlated with the decline in American religiosity. It makes sense that the religious outlook of Americans would influence their views on politics and culture. While it’s difficult to measure the intensity of wokeness among the adherents it does claim, Burge’s analysis lends statistical support to the anecdotal feeling — by myself and others — that things are starting to feel slightly less woke. Assuming the correlation between secularism and wokism, Burge’s data suggests that it is likely (though certainly not conclusive) that fewer members of Gen Z are woke today than a year or two ago.
For conservatives, this is cause for cautious optimism. It’s unclear if the Right’s losing of culture-war battles in the 21st century was a cause or effect of changing religious demographics. Either way, for the first time in many years, the change in those demographics does not suggest a future in which conservatives will continue to lose ground. And it’s particularly comforting to see declining secularism in Gen Z. If Burge is correct, and we have entered a new era in American religious demographics, the outlook for social conservatives might be relatively sunny.