Why should the West continue to underinvest in its commitments?

Michael writes: “The problem was not the fact that we could not deliver on the implicit promises we made to Ukraine. The problem was that we made these implicit promises without ever thinking seriously about whether we could live up to them.”

I think that is a fair criticism of the Biden administration, which routinely talked itself out of its own commitments. That is a reversible condition that the Trump administration should get to work reversing.

If, however, Michael means to suggest that the United States does not possess the wherewithal to live up to its commitments — that it is limited by material resource deficiencies, which prevent it from effectively opposing the Russian military’s irredentist project — I disagree. I rejected the argument when JD Vance made it in the pages of the New York Times last spring, and I still reject it.

Indeed, the campaign’s secondary effects undermine the argument that America lacks the defense-industrial base to meet its objectives in Ukraine. Among these effects is the revitalization of the U.S. defense-industrial base, as defense firms ramp up production — sometimes on spec — basing their investments on the sound assumption that the deteriorating threat environment abroad will yield returns.

What I don’t understand is why Michael’s criticism of the West for not contributing to the cause in Ukraine commensurate with our rhetorical commitments to Kyiv’s sovereignty — an argument that I can get behind — somehow requires us to continue to underinvest in our commitments. That is less a critique than a self-fulfilling prophecy.