The Pentagon’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, is set to retire at September’s end. Whatever credit he deserves for serving the inharmonious presidencies of Donald J. Trump and Joe Biden and backing material support for Ukraine against an international war-crime syndicate in Russia cannot overshadow how Milley effected the orders of fools.

Promoted just before (and possibly the reason for) the resignation of Jim Mattis, Trump’s defense secretary, Milley can be seen as much as a jab in the eye toward Mattis, who had recommended the Air Force’s David Goldfein for the position while suggesting Milley an excellent fit for U.S. European Command (the eastward-facing watch station). But Trump wanted the “brash” Milley because he wanted a pugnacious “yes” man, a command master sergeant-type who was deferential to his superiors and exactive toward his subordinates. During the Trump administration, his acquiescence to imprudence manifested during the George Floyd riots.

The Washington Post summarizes:

In May 2020, after the police killing of George Floyd inspired racial justice protests in cities across the United States, Trump called for putting active-duty troops on America’s streets. But Milley and other senior defense officials saw great peril in any attempt to invoke the Insurrection Act, arguing instead that any violence should be addressed by law enforcement, not the military.

The general, wearing his camouflage fatigues, broke off from the group shortly after Trump departed the White House, and later said that the situation came together so quickly that he did not initially realize what was happening. But the damage was done. Photographs of the spectacle caused a furor, with critics asserting that Trump had exploited the U.S. military to threaten the American people.

In the case of the White House protest, the D.C. National Guard is, unfortunately, exempted from the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids American troops from meddling in domestic affairs. However, the unnecessary and vindictive use of the Guard then and after January 6 exhibits the intent of the Act — presidents should not have the power to activate troops against Americans. Milley was wrong to sanction Trump’s decision with his presence, and the chairman’s attempts to unwind his association with the event indicate he knew it was ill-advised from the start.

Trump then loses the 2020 election, and Joe Biden assumes office. Milley gets a new boss whom he privately cautions about the plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Biden ignores his top general and proceeds, leading to chaos and the deaths and abandonment of dozens of U.S. servicemen and nationals. No one is fired. No one takes responsibility.

When asked about the events in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Milley says, “My assessment was, back in the fall of ’20 and remained consistent throughout that we should keep a steady state of 2,500 — and it could bounce up to 3,500 — or maybe something like that.”

Senator Tom Cotton (R., Ark.) further pressed him about why Milley hadn’t resigned, to which the general replied that the U.S. “doesn’t want generals figuring out what orders we’re going to accept.”

False. You, sir, are the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If you knew something to be foundationally errant (FUBAR), say or do all within your power to prevent the event — and call leaders to account in the aftermath. Remember, the status quo of a small, consistent presence was acceptable. You don’t need the job, sir — a dozen board positions with General Dynamics or BAE have your placard engraved. The former secretary of defense showed you what a principled exit looked like. The pension is there — a home on Coronado beckons. The only reason remaining to remain is ego; Lord, preserve us.

Milley let his pride win at a critical juncture and then spent his remaining time as chair little more than a lapdog for the administration, pushing Covid vaccines in the ranks and defending CRT and transgenderism in military academies to legislators on the Hill. All the while, recruitment deficits expanded, and American confidence in the military waned to two-decade lows. Mark Milley accepted personal tactical victories while suffering strategic and operational institutional defeats.

Pyrrhus, how fare thee?