The loss of its Syrian outpost would seriously hamper the Kremlin’s ability to influence events in the Middle East and beyond.
Depending what comes after it, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime may not be an undiluted boon to peace and security in the Middle East — though no one anywhere will be shedding a tear for the Butcher of Damascus or his entourage. There’s no doubt, however, that the pulling up of Assad’s decade-long welcome mat for the Russian military in Syria is in the U.S. interest.
When the surprise offensive led by the rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) dislodged the Assad regime in early December, the Russian military began a hasty evacuation of its naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus and its nearby Hmeimim air base. The Russian military does not appear at this time to have completely withdrawn from either site — and to be clear, it’s possible that the Kremlin will make some sort of arrangement with the new master of Syria, HTS’s Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, who is no friend of America or Israel — but open-source intelligence observers have reported the removal of important air-defense assets from the air base and the withdrawal of personnel and heavy equipment toward the port at Tartus.
Moreover, the piers at Tartus are stacking up with Russian military equipment, while a Russian freighter is loitering offshore awaiting permission to dock and load cargo.
Now, it appears that the Kremlin has ordered the Kilo-class diesel-electric attack sub Novorossiysk and its tender Alexander Shabalin, both of which had been based in Syria, out of the Mediterranean and back to home waters in the Baltic.
On Sunday, NATO Maritime Command tweeted photos of Portuguese naval vessels NRP Álvares Cabral and NRP Setúbal tracking the Russian warships as they transited the Strait of Gibraltar and sailed into the open Atlantic.
The geopolitical ramifications of this move are significant. If the Kremlin loses control of and access to its Syrian outpost, it will seriously hamper Russia’s ability to influence events in the Middle East and sow mischief in North Africa and the Sahel. The Russian Navy, which had reestablished a permanent warm-water presence in the Med after the start of the 2012 Syrian Civil War, will no longer have a comfortable location to call home that sits bestride the trade routes that run from Europe through the Suez Canal and beyond.
As the pressures on Pax Americana grow, especially across the peripheries of Eurasia, Americans will need once again to become acquainted with the maritime chokepoints and naval strategies that have allowed the Anglo-American powers to prosper for 200 years in relative peace and security. A Russian naval withdrawal from the Mediterranean, even if it is temporary, is undoubtedly something that the Western world should cheer.