Tehran bends to pressure. In the absence of pressure, we should expect no bending.
The United States wants Iran to cease all uranium enrichment, dismantle its enrichment capabilities, and ship its existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium abroad. Iran does not want to do those things. After five rounds of direct and indirect talks, this impasse seems insurmountable.
Both Washington and the regime in Tehran have been (relatively) consistent in their red lines. Last week, the United States presented Iran with a formal written proposal outlining the basic terms of a new nuclear agreement that the Trump administration would accept. We don’t know what was in that proposal, but officials told the New York Times that it called “for Iran to cease all enrichment of uranium and proposes the creation of a regional consortium to produce nuclear power that would involve Iran; Saudi Arabia and other Arab states; and the United States.”
There is a lot for proponents of nuclear nonproliferation to worry about in a plan that creates a regional uranium-enrichment “consortium.” The West’s goal should be to limit access to enrichment capabilities and technologies in the region. We should be just as discomfited by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear breakout as we would if the Saudis developed the infrastructure to build a fissionable device, despite the pro-Western orientation of the current regime in Riyadh.
If little else, the letter is indicative of the administration’s sincere desire to avoid a military confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program. But the overtures have failed to persuade Iran.
“Iran is drafting a negative response to the U.S. proposal, which could be interpreted as a rejection of the U.S. offer,” said a “senior diplomat” described by Reuters as being “close to Iran’s negotiating team.”
“In this proposal, the U.S. stance on enrichment on Iranian soil remains unchanged,” the source continued, “and there is no clear explanation regarding the lifting of sanctions.” The unnamed diplomat called the American proposition “completely one-sided” and a “non-starter” from Tehran’s perspective. In sum, Trump’s Iran deal is a “bad deal.”
Tehran’s formal response to the administration’s proposal is likely to restate what we’ve heard from so many sources with links to the regime. Iran will not verifiably dismantle its ability to produce weapons-grade fissile material. If Tehran won’t budge, Trump’s will be the next move.
As Elliott Abrams, former deputy national security adviser and the first Trump administration’s point person on Iran, noted on NRO, the fact that there are negotiations at all, given the Iranian regime’s intractable posture, is cause for alarm. “What’s left to negotiate?” he asked. Despite Iran’s weakened position, Abrams fears that it will be the Trump administration that blinks first, consenting to a temporary “interim” deal that allows Iran to retain its enrichment capabilities and rewards it for its false cooperation by relaxing sanctions.
Abrams’s concerns are justified and prudent, but the administration hasn’t caved yet. Its members deserve credit for sticking to what should be the foremost objective in any American diplomatic engagement with Iran: eliminating its potential to break out as a nuclear power.
The Trump administration may be surprised by Tehran’s recalcitrance, but it shouldn’t be. In much the same way that it approached Moscow, offering carrot after carrot in lieu of sticks, it provided Tehran with incentives to cooperate up front. Iran seems likely to rebuff the offer for reasons similar to those that led Moscow to pocket its concessions without reciprocity. Moscow doesn’t want peace. It wants Ukraine. Likewise, Iran does not want to be reintegrated into the community of nations. It wants the bomb.
Tehran bends to pressure. In the absence of pressure, we should expect no bending. If the Trump administration is serious about preventing an Iranian breakout, it will take the opportunity provided by Iran’s forthcoming formal rejection of America’s terms to recalibrate its approach. If it wants a deal only for the sake of being able to say the word “deal,” the scenario Abrams fears is easy to envision. We will know which way the wind blows very soon.
Update: No sooner was this published than Axios reporter Barak Ravid revealed the previously unknown details of the proposal U.S. negotiators sent to Tehran.
The proposal would reportedly “allow limited low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian soil for a to-be-determined period of time,” contradicting the administration’s (again, relatively) consistent public posture of opposition to indigenous Iranian enrichment. In addition, Iran would have to “dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium.” It is not clear if the deal allows Iran to maintain some of its existing centrifuges, but the terms on offer from Trump would allow Iran “to develop domestic enrichment capabilities” as long as they were “necessary for civilian purposes.”
This is precisely what opponents of Barack Obama’s Iran deal sought to avoid. The distinction the JCPOA attempted to draw between civilian and military enrichment programs was illusory then, and it’s just as misleading now. If the technology necessary to boost enrichment levels is in place, all that’s necessary to bring fissile materials to weapons-grade is time.
The deal proposed by Trump’s team would also compel Iran to de-enrich its uranium stockpiles to a “concentration of 3” percent – not, as has been reported, to surrender its stockpiles to outside organizations. And even then, only for a “period” that will be “agreed upon in negotiations.” Moreover, “Iran’s underground enrichment facilities will have to become ‘non-operational’ for a period of time agreed by the parties.”
This looks strikingly like Obama’s nuclear deal. If the modest amendments Trump’s team made to the JCPOA framework are enough to compel Iran to object to this framework — formally or otherwise — the prospects for a deal that satisfies the West’s concerns are next to nil.