The cable guys appear to have been back in action yet again.
The cable guys appear to have been back in action yet again, this time celebrating Christmas in their own way, with a mysterious ship apparently being responsible for slicing an electricity cable (Estlink 2) and a couple of communications cables between Finland and Estonia. The damage to the electricity cable will take some months to repair and is significant enough to mean that electricity prices there may rise in the next few months. Estonia has stepped up its protection of a second cable, Estlink 1.
In addition to being another example of now-routine harassment, the sabotage may come with an extra objective. All three Baltic states are detaching themselves from BRELL, the Soviet-era grid that covers Russia and Belarus, and joining the Western European network through Poland (LitPol), Sweden (NordBalt), and the two Estlinks in February. Lithuania has held off doing this for two years in order that the Baltic trio can leave together. They too are sending a message. This switch will, of course, also bolster their energy security. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, it can be accelerated if necessary, a process in which the Estlinks would be used. Was that what those cutting the cable wanted to disrupt?
Finnish investigators say they have found a seabed trail stretching almost 100km (about 60 miles) around the site of an underwater electricity cable that was damaged on Christmas Day in a suspected act of Russian sabotage.
The ship under suspicion of causing the damage, a vessel called the Eagle S flying the flag of the Cook Islands, is believed to be part of Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, used for transporting Russian oil products subject to embargos after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. . . .
An oil tanker flying the Cook Islands flag, traveling between Russia and Egypt. A crew made up of Georgians and Indians. The ship is probably owned by a single-vessel company in Dubai. Deniability, it’s a thing, however unconvincing.
The Finns are saying that it will take a while to prove whether the damage was deliberate, but a senior Estonian official told the Guardian,“If you’re dragging an anchor, it can’t be that you don’t notice it, because the ship would go off course. . . .”
Who would be behind such a thing? Well. . . .
The Eagle S was boarded by the Finnish authorities (dropping, heavily armed from helicopters), and went voluntarily or not (accounts vary), to Finnish waters off the Porkkalanniemi peninsula, which, somewhat ironically, was occupied by the Soviets between 1944-56.
In addition to the Eagle S, a Honk Kong flagged cargo ship, Xin Xin Tian 2 turns out to have been nearby. The Xin Xin Tian 2 is a sister ship, the Daily Telegraph noted, of Newnew Polar Bear, which was “was linked to damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline” in October 2023. An accident, said the Chinese authorities.
A Finnish-Estonian undersea gas pipeline was also damaged in October after a Chinese cargo ship reportedly dropped its anchor.
And in mid-November two data cables, one running between Finland and Germany, and another between Lithuania and Sweden were severed, with the Chinese vessel Yi Peng 3 suspected of involvement.
China being China and not the Cook Islands, it refused to allow the lead Swedish prosecutor to investigate the vessel, although Swedish, Danish, German, and Finnish representatives were present as observers when Chinese investigators boarded the Yi Peng.
The EU Commission has talked about taking action, perhaps sanctions, against this shadow fleet (which is not in the best of shape, adding an environmental threat to the problems it poses, although some of its ships, including the Eagle S, do appear to be unusually well-equipped with communication equipment). However ramshackle this fleet may be, it is growing and is roughly a fifth the size of the global tanker fleet.
The Finnish prime minister has said that such incidents (I’ve written about them here, here, here, here, here, here, and here) need to be brought to an end. NATO is reinforcing its presence in the area. Sweden’s opposition Social Democrats have called for consultations under NATO’s Article 4. The country’s foreign minister replied that nothing is ruled out.
Article 4 provides for a formal consultation process “whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” It doesn’t provide for any particular course of action. It has only been invoked seven times since NATO was founded.
Lauri Läänemets, Estonia’s interior minister, emailed the New York Times:
“We know about Russia’s shadow fleet operating in our area, and we know Russia is systematically conducting hybrid warfare against its neighboring NATO/EU countries…It’s time to drop the illusions and face it.”
The problem with much of hybrid warfare and, more specifically, gray zone actions, is that they typically fall somewhere short of being outright acts of war, leaving it difficult to know how to respond even when it can be proved who was really responsible. Sooner or later, however, it seems inevitable that a stand-off in the Baltic is coming, either involving a specific ship, or if NATO takes tougher steps to police access to the Baltic, when Russia shoves back.