The U.S. has levied higher tariffs on steel and aluminum since March 2018. The tariffs were initiated by the Trump administration through executive action, and they have mostly remained in place under the Biden administration. The tax rates are 25 percent for most imported steel and 10 percent for most imported aluminum.

Ed Gresser of the Progressive Policy Institute looks at the results after almost six years of protectionism. He judges the policy by its proponents’ own definition of success. “In sum, the administration’s hope and prediction was that the U.S. would be producing more metals,” Gresser writes, referencing reports from the Department of Commerce in 2018 supporting the tariffs.

Compared to 2017, American aluminum production was about the same in 2023. Steel production was slightly lower.

The tariffs “worked,” in the sense that they reduced steel and aluminum imports. Gresser writes:

Steel imports fell from the 36 million tons mentioned in the Commerce report to 25 million tons in 2019, quite close to their 23-million-ton goal. Aluminum imports went down from 6.2 million tons in 2017 to 5.3 million tons in 2019. Both declines seem to have lasted, though with some volatility and fluctuation; 2023 imports were 25 million tons for steel and 4.8 million tons for aluminum.

But that didn’t translate into a sustained increase in U.S. production of those metals. The U.S. International Trade Commission found a brief increase in metal output in 2020 and 2021, but that increase of $2.2 billion was overwhelmed by a $3.5 billion decline in output by metal-consuming industries. “So overall, ITC’s estimate was that between 2017 and 2021, the tariffs had increased the metals production relative to a no-tariff scenario, but left the overall U.S. manufacturing sector a bit smaller,” Gresser writes.

Since then, U.S. steel and aluminum consumption has declined even though the economy has grown. “From 2012 to 2017, the U.S. economy used an average of 100 million tons of steel and 5.23 million tons of aluminum per year,” Gresser writes. “The 2023 U.S. economy, though about 10% bigger in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars than that of 2017, used only 93 million tons of steel and 4 million tons of aluminum — respectively 7% less and 20% less than before.”

The kicker from Gresser: “Though imports remain close to the levels the Commerce Department’s 2018 reports envisioned, U.S. metal production has fallen back to pre-tariff levels.”

This is a perfect illustration of the inanity of protectionism. The reduction in imports suggests that the tariffs “worked” as planned and were properly calibrated to achieve their designers’ intentions. It would be hard to say they were sabotaged by evil free-traders: These tariffs were implemented through unilateral action by the executive branch under the direction of a protectionist president and trade representative. Yet even under those ideal conditions from the protectionist point of view, the tariffs still haven’t increased domestic production as promised. Instead, Americans just have less access to steel and aluminum than they did before the tariffs were put in place.

The case for protectionism can be framed as the government making you a little poorer for your own good. The problem is that the “making you a little poorer” part usually happens, and the “for your own good” part usually does not.