Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin doesn’t appear to agree with the Trump administration’s assumptions about what’s in Russia’s interest.

The key to understanding the Trump administration’s strategy in its negotiations with Russia is that it believes that a cease-fire is in the interest of the United States, and of Ukraine, and of Russia.

That’s why Andy McCarthy’s point bears repeating: Contrary to the Trump administration’s assumptions, a cold-blooded analysis of American interests suggests that we should continue supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia because it would be to our benefit, whatever the short-term humanitarian advantages afforded by an end to the conflict.

The national interests of the United States are to degrade the threat posed by our Russian enemy and to make clear that we will never accept — as in never formally endorse the results of — an aggressor state’s unprovoked invasion of another recognized nation, annexation of its territory, butchery of civilians, kidnapping of children, and rampant violations of the laws and customs of war.

The Trump administration and its “restrainer” supporters, of course, take a different view. Their concerns are founded, not entirely unreasonably, on the burden on the U.S. taxpayer, the need to focus on Communist China’s ambitions, the downside risk that the continued support for Ukraine could lead to direct U.S. involvement in a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia, and, yes, the tragic loss of life on both sides.

I think there are good answers to all of these points that ought to lead to a dispassionate acceptance of the proposition that it’s in the U.S. interest to support Ukraine, rebuild our military industrial base, bleed an aggressive, adversarial Russia, take a stand against those who would redraw Europe’s borders by force, and deter Beijing via our continuing action and our support for our friends on the other side of Eurasia.

But Trump and his negotiators disagree. Again, in their view, peace is in America’s interest, in Ukraine’s interest, and in Russia’s interest. 

It shouldn’t be surprising to us that Ukrainians are skeptical that just any negotiated peace is in their interest — they’re keenly interested in the details of just what exactly is being negotiated.

But what’s interesting — and often ignored here in the U.S. — is that Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin doesn’t appear to agree with the Trump administration’s assumptions about what’s in Russia’s interest. Oh sure, the Russians would take a cease-fire if they needed one, or if they thought a temporary halt to hostilities would work to their advantage down the road, or if a negotiated deal gave them everything they wanted. (Trump’s proposed deal is not too far off from the latter.)

But Putin hasn’t gone in for peace, and it’s worth asking: “Why not?”

Obviously, Putin believes the war has so far, on balance, worked to his benefit. Famously, the Russians began the war slowly, and shambolically, in traditional Russian style. But now, three years on? 

The Russians understand that the U.S. government’s policy toward the war since January 2025, and Donald Trump’s growing frustration, has brought into view the possibility that the war could end with Russia achieving something it was never able to across the eight decades of the Cold War and its aftermath: the withdrawal of the United States from European security commitments.

Lord Ismay, the first NATO secretary general, is often credited with saying that the raison d’être for NATO was to “Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”

The mere possibility of an eventuality that leads to the failure of the first and second of those goals for NATO has certainly helped keep Russia in the war on the chance that the Kremlin’s patience might lead to a dramatic result.

One hopes that the Trump administration’s negotiators are considering such a dynamic.