Donald Trump has been Tariff Man for decades. To him, international trade is mostly a zero-sum game — Adam Smith be damned. Instead, inspired by a vision of Gilded Age protectionism with little resemblance to historical reality, Trump would rather use high tariff walls to attract investment, not caring, apparently, that such a regime — and the favoritism integral to picking and choosing the protected — will deepen the swamp he once undertook to drain. To be sure, tariffs will raise some cash, but ideas that they will one day replace the income tax are a pipe dream.

It has been a herky-jerky ride, but 25 percent tariffs are currently being imposed on imports from Canada and Mexico. A 10 percent rate applies for potash and Canadian crude oil. However, tariffs on imports of goods compliant with USMCA (NAFTA 2.0) have been paused until April 2. This merits a qualified welcome, mainly in the hope that it is an early sign of a broader easing of the proposed levies, above all (but not only) on autos. The crisscrossing of components across the Canadian and Mexican borders could mean cumulative tariff bills pile up quickly. On some calculations, the price of a pick-up could increase by as much as $8,000.

This would be grim news for U.S. carmakers, already weakened by the enormous cost of their investments in the production of electric vehicles (EVs), a class of car that has attracted far fewer buyers than once expected and may attract fewer still if drivers are no longer bribed or bullied to go electric.

Concerns over tariffs are already damaging the economy and will add to automakers’ woes. One reason for the pause was to enable Ford, GM, and Stellantis to move some supply lines into this country (in a month?). Overall, however, car manufacturers are likely to be investing less, not more, in the U.S. Uncertainty encourages consumers and companies to cut back, not spend (consumer confidence fell by the most in nearly four years last month).

Trump has also imposed a total of 20 percent in additional tariffs on Chinese goods, meaning that total tariff increases (assuming the pause ends) will be the largest since the Second World War. The average tariff will be 11 percent, the highest in decades, and over 40 percent of imports into the U.S. will be affected. There will be even more tariffs to come, including on all imports of steel and aluminum, and a 25 percent tax on all imports from the EU.

Trade wars are not one-sided. Beijing has already retaliated, slapping tariffs on a wide range of goods, including agricultural products (in other words, Midwestern farmers who voted for Trump), as has, more modestly, Canada. Other countries will follow suit. Retaliation will hurt the profitability of the affected businesses and thus their willingness to hire. So much for the worker-friendly GOP.

Trump’s tariff wave may also wash away the last remnants of trust between Washington and NATO’s European members. It would be ironic were this to happen just as the Europeans finally seemed set — as Trump has long, quite reasonably, demanded — to assume much more responsibility for their own defense. Despite what followed Smoot-Hawley, a dramatic American tariff hike need not lead to a reprise of the 1930s, but, if the trade war that is approaching dissolves the bonds that still hold NATO together (not least because it will slow growth in European economies and weaken their ability to pay their fair share), the consequences could be catastrophic.

Trump’s aggressive tariffs may undermine another of his objectives — countering the dangers posed by a (largely) undefended Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory, at a time when China and Russia are taking an increasing interest in the Arctic. Burdening Denmark (a member of the EU and NATO) with heavy tariffs would add injury to the insult of a proposed annexation. Similarly, it’s obvious that angering Canada with tariffs and “51st-state” taunts will not make it easier to expand the U.S. presence in the far north.

So, what to do? Put aside the on-again-off-again threats against Canada and Mexico and renegotiate the USMCA next year when it is up for review in an orderly fashion. As for the EU, apply a case-by-case approach to its tariffs but also come down hard on its non-tariff barriers. These include abusing antitrust to hobble or loot American high-tech companies and, before long, could also encompass deployment of the bloc’s climate policy for protectionist ends with measures such as Brussels’ Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. When it comes to Beijing, a hostile power, adopt a tough line, but one balanced by the recognition that not all goods are relevant to national security, and tennis rackets and bedsheets should not be treated the same as sensitive electronics and airplane parts.

Midterms are less than two years away. Many economists maintain that price rises caused by tariffs are not (technically) inflationary (Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent talks of a “one-time adjustment”), but voters won’t care, especially as the “regular” inflation of the last few years has not yet quite been tamed. Companies such as Target and Best Buy are warning of tariff-driven price rises ahead. Throw in weak stock markets and recent data warning of an economic slowdown, from slower job creation to downbeat snapshot GDP numbers from the Atlanta Fed, and this is no time for a disruptive trade policy.

“Tariff” is not a beautiful word for the state of our economy or our strategic relationships.