I ran is closer to developing nuclear weapons than many realize. Few are planning for what happens when it does.

In May, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran has enriched enough weapons-grade uranium to produce multiple nuclear bombs in a matter of days. Recent reports also suggest that Iran may have already begun advanced work on “weaponization,” which involves computer modeling and the acquisition of key parts to build deployable warheads.

Of course, Iran may be even further ahead than Western intelligence indicates — North Korea shocked the world in October 2006 when it completed an underground nuclear test. Iran already has a robust arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles on which to deploy a warhead, a capability North Korea achieved only in 2017, eleven years after nuclearization.

Despite these worrying developments, an unnamed Biden official recently swore that “Iran will never get a nuclear weapon.” Given Biden’s record in the Middle East since taking office — especially since October 7 — consider the jury unconvinced.

Iran has far more to gain from quickly developing a weapon than it does by waiting. Especially if Donald Trump returns to office in January 2025.

One view is that if Iran goes nuclear, the Saudis will quickly pursue their own capability through a U.S. commitment or directly via Pakistan, thus negating Iran’s advantage. But if you’re Iran, you’ve proven that you can directly strike a nuclear-armed adversary (Israel) without serious threat of reprisal. The Saudis are far less capable than the Israelis, and if they’re reliant on support from the U.S., like Israel is, they will fail to establish a credible deterrent. No matter what, the Biden administration will always push its allies to de-escalate.

Hezbollah, Iran’s most formidable proxy, has been willing to ratchet up attacks against Israel without the cover of an Iranian nuclear umbrella. Should a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah break out, Iran could threaten nuclear retaliation against Israel before it could put Hezbollah out of the fight. Right now, the Israelis would bear significant but liveable costs from striking deep into Lebanon to neutralize Hezbollah. That changes if Iran can threaten nuclear retaliation to keep its proxy from losing.

States like Iraq and Qatar, which currently balance between the U.S. and Iran, would be forced to bandwagon in Iran’s direction under threat of nuclear blackmail. Tehran and its proxies would increase pressure on both countries to push U.S. forces out of their territory, with the aim of moving the U.S. entirely “offshore.”

Critically, Iran’s growing entwinement with China and Russia will make it less vulnerable over time to Western sanctions as a tool of punishment. According to data from United Against Nuclear Iran, as of May, Iran now ships nearly 90 percent of its oil to China, compared with roughly 50 percent in May 2020. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Tehran has provided Moscow with ballistic missiles and sophisticated missile-defense platforms — high-end systems it withheld in the past due to fear of Western pushback. No longer.

The basic picture is that the Middle East would become inhospitable to the U.S. and its allies when Iran goes nuclear. Israel would find itself isolated, with fewer options for deterring Iran or confronting its proxies. The Saudis and Emiratis would be forced into uncomfortable compromises.

Without a change in direction, the U.S. would be forced offshore sooner than we think. While some believe the U.S. can or should live with that, Houthi piracy on the high seas should dispel that notion. Houthi attacks have made the region’s waterways hostile to Western shipping while Western adversaries, namely China, transit unmolested. Roughly 30 percent of global trade now runs through the Malacca Straits, but at least 10 percent still runs through Suez.

Most worrying of all, interior lines connecting the economies and militaries of Eurasia’s three authoritarian powers — the nightmare scenario of U.S. military analysts going back decades, not even a reality during the Second World War — would be protected by a nuclear triangle. Axis blackmail and mutual support would make this emerging reality harder to dislodge in the event of a global conflict involving the U.S. and its allies.

So long as Biden is president, there is little that can be done to avoid this outcome. His policies all but assure it.

But if Trump makes it back into the White House before Iran gets the bomb, there might still be time to reverse course.

Any course reversal has to start by recognizing that the United States has entered the early stages of a global conflict in which the Middle East is set to be a main attraction, not a sideshow.

Directly or not, the U.S. is engaged in this conflict and has a significant stake in its outcome. In Europe, American and Western arms are the only things standing between Ukraine and its defeat at the hands of Russia. In the Middle East, American arms remain indispensable to Israel’s survival as it wages a defensive, multifront war against Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. In the Indo-Pacific, China has embarked on the greatest military buildup since World War II, its eyes set on Taiwan but ultimately U.S. primacy.

While Iran is the smallest of these three powers, China and Russia rely on it greatly for oil and weapons, respectively. Both rely on it as a tool to degrade America’s position in the region. Constraining Iran and preventing its nuclear breakout would keep waterways open for Western shipping and undermine a key node in the supply chain for China and Russia.

At a regional level, President Trump had the right idea with a doctrine of “maximum pressure” against Iran and a corollary of “maximum support” for U.S. allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Should he take office again in 2025 before Iran achieves nuclear breakout, Trump should bring this doctrine back, with a few twists adjusted to new realities. The objective should be to restore a credible military deterrent while forcing Iran into material trade-offs between its nuclear program and support for its allies and proxies.

The limiting factor for Israeli–Arab military coordination has been the Biden administration: Rather than putting its weight behind Israel and its Gulf allies simultaneously, Biden has tried to play them off each other — for example, dangling the prospect of Israeli–Saudi normalization in exchange for a cease-fire in Gaza and Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state, both of which are nonstarters in Jerusalem.

To deter Iran, Trump should work to expand the Accords into an alliance along the lines of AUKUS, a security partnership between the U.S., U.K., and Australia designed to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. Militarily, the promise of such a partnership was on display when Iran conducted direct strikes against Israel in April: The Saudis helped shoot down Iranian projectiles while Jordan allowed Israel to take defensive measures over its airspace. Like the Accords, the ingredients for a security partnership already exist; they just need to be encouraged and formalized. Similar to AUKUS, the Abraham Alliance could facilitate the exchange of key technology and weapons systems between the U.S., Israel, and Gulf allies. It could also serve as an informal mechanism for defensive and offensive planning against Iran.

In a global context, the Abraham Alliance would round out the historic Atlantic Alliance in Europe and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific, solidifying U.S. footholds in the three core theaters of great-power competition, or a future war.

With the necessary political will, Iran’s path to the bomb can still be stopped. But should it acquire the ultimate weapon, the U.S. and its allies must be ready for what comes next.