One union should not have the power to put large segments of the economy on strike.
T he International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) almost brought parts of the U.S. economy to a halt in early October when it briefly went on strike at East Coast and Gulf of Mexico ports. Its decision to stand down only lasts until January 15, and one major dispute between the union and the ports remains unresolved: the ILA’s opposition to any further automation. The ILA has been firm in its insistence on this unreasonable demand, so another strike remains possible.
One way to head off any potential strike that would threaten the economy would be for Congress to put the ports under the authority of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the labor law that covers the railway and airline industries. The ports are currently under the authority of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which covers all other private–sector businesses.
The RLA was the first federal labor law, passed in 1926. Its purpose was to regulate labor issues directly related to interstate commerce. It is no stretch to say that ports are part of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, which is inherently interstate commerce. To place the ports under the RLA, Congress need only amend the definition of “carrier” to include ports.
The law’s purpose, according to the Federal Railroad Administration, was to “avoid any interruption of interstate commerce by providing for the prompt disposition of disputes between carriers and their employees.” The law allows the president to create “emergency boards” that can recommend new collective bargaining contracts. Congress can then vote on making the contracts binding, ending any strike.
The NLRA, first passed in 1935, doesn’t go nearly as far. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 amended the NLRA to allow the president to call for a cool-down period that would require workers to stop striking for 80 days. After that, a strike can resume.
The longshoremen’s strike threat revealed a larger problem. By stopping the ports and the flow of goods from them, the union can idle entire industries.
ILA President Harold Daggett neatly summed up the threat in a September message to his members. Because of the strike, he boasted, “Guys who sell cars can’t sell cars because the cars ain’t coming in off the ships. They get laid off. Third week, malls start closing down. They can’t get the goods from China. They can’t sell clothes. They can’t do this. Everything in the United States comes on a ship. They go out of business. Construction workers get laid off because the materials aren’t coming in . . .”
The ILA can, in effect, force other workforces to engage in what are called “secondary strikes.” This is a practice whereby unions that have no beef with their own management nevertheless go on strike to help a different union that is on strike. The idea is to bring the broader economy to a halt, thereby prompting others in the business community, as well as politicians, to put pressure on management to give in to union demands. Secondary strikes are formally outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act.
The ILA has found a way around that prohibition. They can force other businesses to shut down due to a lack of goods coming in. The ILA could make workforces that would otherwise prefer to keep working become idle anyway.
Putting the ports under the RLA is not an ideal solution. Federal intervention is not an instant problem solver. In the ILA’s October strike and a potential strike in 2022 involving the railway industry, we at the Competitive Enterprise Institute urged the Biden administration to give the unions and management more time to resolve matters on their own. Intervention should be a last resort.
However, so long as the RLA and NLRA remain the laws of the land, it makes more sense for the ports to be under the former rather than the latter. Ports are crucial to the nation’s commerce. One union should not have the power to put large segments of the economy on strike.