The Constitution entrusts questions of war, defense, and foreign policy to the federal government, not to state courts or parish juries.
T he U.S. Supreme Court will soon hear Chevron v. Plaquemines Parish, a case that could determine the proper forum for Louisiana’s sweeping environmental lawsuits. At their core, these suits seek to punish a handful of energy companies for oil production carried out under federal wartime orders, arguing that dredging, which occurred during World War II, is to blame for the state’s coastal erosion crisis. The question before the Court is whether the state’s claims — rooted in national directives intended to support Allied forces — should be adjudicated in federal or state court.
Brought by the state of Louisiana and a number of its parishes, the lawsuits creatively try to pin decades-old blame on energy companies for changes to Louisiana’s fragile coast. But the defendants’ production activities at the time were part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s campaign to effectively nationalize the petroleum industry, and those activities operated under the strict and direct control of the federal government. The Petroleum Administration for War gave orders that were not requests; they were commands aimed at supplying Allied forces with the resources needed to defeat Germany and Japan. From refinery schedules to output quotas to the exact facilities used, Washington dictated the details.
High-octane aviation fuel — avgas — was the most critical product of the war, giving Allied aircraft the edge in the skies. But avgas depended on crude oil, making the Gulf Coast, and Louisiana in particular, a vital hub for wartime production. When Washington ordered more avgas for bombing runs and Pacific campaigns, it meant more crude from Louisiana fields. The surge in production was not corporate discretion but federal mandate.
The contracts that bound the companies leave no doubt about the federal role. They gave the government the right to increase fuel demands, expand refineries, seize raw materials, and commandeer resources. And the government exercised that control, repeatedly ordering industry to scale up production. These companies were not free agents on the open market. They were instruments of federal wartime policy. To treat them now as independent actors subject to punishment in local courts is to distort both the law and history.
Congress wrote the federal officer removal statute to address exactly this kind of scenario. The statute ensures that those carrying out federal duties cannot be dragged before state courts bent on second-guessing Washington’s decisions. And Congress has steadily broadened the statute’s reach over time. What began in the earliest days of the Republic as a safeguard for federal customs officials has been extended again and again to make sure private parties assisting the federal government have access to a neutral federal forum. In 2011, Congress reaffirmed that suits are removable when they merely relate to actions taken under federal direction. Producing crude oil needed for wartime avgas fits comfortably within that definition.
The Fifth Circuit failed to apply this clear standard when it sent the erosion cases back to the state courts. The result has been predictable. Earlier this year, a Louisiana jury ordered nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars in damages under the state’s Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978, despite the fact that the law itself expressly exempts pre-1980 conduct. That verdict underscores the danger of leaving cases like this in parochial venues animated by local agendas.
The broader implications are enormous. Half of all federal contracts today touch national defense. That includes not just traditional defense contractors like shipbuilders, but also cutting-edge industries building satellites, semiconductors, AI technologies, and energy systems that underpin military readiness. If Louisiana can punish federal contractors today for obeying orders from Washington in the 1940s, then tomorrow another state could haul modern defense manufacturers into local courtrooms for complying with Pentagon directives. The result would be chaos and uncertainty for the very industries on which national security depends.
The Constitution entrusts questions of war, defense, and foreign policy to the federal government, not to state courts or parish juries. By holding that federal officer removal applies here, the Supreme Court can ensure that defendants are not penalized for following federal directives, especially those received during a war that ended thanks to a national mobilization eight decades ago.