Steve Witkoff’s rehash of past deals that created the current crisis isn’t a good model for Trump to follow if he desires a legacy of peace.
T he year is 2025, or is it 1994? Once again, the United States is meeting with Russia to discuss Ukrainian disarmament. Once again, Ukraine will be forced to subjugate itself in the name of global stability and peace. And once again, that peace will surely fail thanks to Russian oath-breaking.
Three decades ago, Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, surrendering its nuclear arsenal (then the third largest in the world) in exchange for security assurances from Russia. Time and time again, Russia has flouted those assurances. Yet, according to Steve Witkoff (U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East), the United States is working hard this year to get the Ukrainian government to sign another similarly structured and similarly ill-destined agreement: the Istanbul Protocol, which would leave “Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats or aggression,” according to the Institute for the Study of War.
While the Istanbul Protocol (drafted in 2022) will not be adopted without modification, the idea that U.S. officials would ever agree to use it as a “guidepost” is a serious reason for concern. For all the talk of bringing peace to Ukraine, the Trump administration seems more intent on giving proof to the maxim that “the only lesson we learn from history is that we do not learn from history.”
Under the parameters of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia made a series of commitments to Ukraine: Russia would respect the sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine, refrain from threatening or using force against Ukraine, refrain from economic coercion, seek U.N. action in the event of aggression against Ukraine, and not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Thirty years later, Russia has broken all of its promises to Ukraine save one — the promise to not go nuclear (though, significantly, Vladimir Putin loosened Russia’s protocols in 2024 against unleashing atomic Armageddon).
Perhaps the absence of a mushroom cloud is a sufficient silver lining for the Trump administration, which is eager to give Russia a mulligan on its broken promises. Or perhaps Putin’s rattling of the nuclear saber is cowing the administration into taking a deal with Russia prematurely.
Whatever the reason, the United States is rushing Ukraine into a half-cooked agreement. In the 2022 draft of the Istanbul Protocol, the Russians demanded that Ukraine disarm to below pre-war levels, eschew hosting foreign military personnel or weapons systems, and remove its commitment to NATO membership. In essence, Ukraine surrenders deterrence, the only thing that might prevent Russian aggression; Russia pinky-promises not to take advantage of the unarmed Ukrainians and instead to resolve disputes through the U.N. The Istanbul Protocol never passed muster because it sought peace through appeasement.
If Trump follows Witkoff’s guidepost, the United States will be kicking the can down the road, buying Russia time to rebuild its military while Ukraine reduces its own. Anything short of rock-solid security assurances from the West represents a cease-fire — not a peace treaty. Putin will gladly take the time to recuperate and rearm, waiting for Trump’s successor and the next major sign of American weakness to relaunch his invasion.
In fact, Putin’s major escalations all came roughly six months after America signaled weakness. In 2008, the Bush administration failed to give Georgia or Ukraine tangible paths to NATO membership, and about six months later, Putin invaded Georgia. In 2014, Obama failed to enforce his red line in Syria, and Putin took Crimea roughly six months later. Finally, in 2021, Biden left Afghanistan in chaos, and Putin invaded Ukraine (as you may have guessed) around six months later. While Trump likely won’t give Putin the occasion for the renewal of hostilities, some future administration almost assuredly will.
A wise man once said: When someone tells you what they are going to do, listen. Through his words and actions over decades, Putin has made his goals clear. The only path to peace with Putin is undeniable strength. Should Trump desire a legacy of peace, his administration must avoid repeating the age-old mistake of appeasement.
Rewinding to 1994 is not the answer, which leads us to ask: Mr. Witkoff, do you know what time it is?
John Shelton is the public policy director for Advancing American Freedom. Dean Meller is an Advancing American Freedom fellow.