O n Sunday, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, widely referred to as the “Butcher of Tehran,” died in a helicopter crash alongside his foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and several other senior officials. This incident has sent shock waves through the nation, raising urgent questions about the immediate and long-term implications for the country and the region. The sudden vacancy in leadership has prompted speculation about Raisi’s presidential successor and, ultimately, the identity of the next supreme leader.
The Iranian political system is complex and opaque, making conjectures difficult. The president is in charge of the state government and its bureaucracy, while the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls the parastatal domain, complete with huge enterprises in virtually every branch of the economy. The supreme leader is said to be the ultimate decision-maker and arbiter of the various state and parastatal interests.
Raisi was a former student and protégé of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many viewed him as a potential candidate for the position of the supreme leadership after the death of the 85-year-old and frail Khamenei. However, the notion that Khamenei groomed Raisi to become his successor may be far-fetched, given that he was a very unpopular president accused of further ruining the economy.
Even so, Raisi’s premature demise presents the regime with the unpleasant task of finding a new president in a new election said to take place in 50 days. There should be few surprises here, since the electoral process was hollowed out of any meaning by the extremely restricted list of candidates approved by the Khamenei-chaired Guardian Council.
After the official five-day mourning period for Raisi, several men are expected to announce their candidacies. These include Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani (all former presidents); Mohammad Mokhber (vice president); Mohammad Javad Zarif (former foreign minister); Ali Larijani (former speaker of the Majlis, the Islamic parliament); Ali Shamkhani (former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council); Saeed Jalili (former nuclear negotiator); and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (current speaker of the Majlis).
It is anticipated that the Guardian Council will immediately disqualify Khatami, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Zarif, as has occurred on previous occasions. Shamkhani has a tarnished reputation due to allegations of family corruption and embezzlement. He was dismissed from the Supreme National Security Council, possibly due to his alleged ties to Alireza Akbari, who was executed on charges of espionage. Jalili and Qalibaf have a chance of being approved.
Judging by the previous election, the new ballot is not expected to create any excitement or portend change. If anything, the new voting round may attract even fewer voters than the previous one in 2021, which had a turnout of 48 percent. In the second round of the twelfth parliamentary elections on May 11 in Tehran, the turnout was only 8 percent.
Raisi’s death created a vacancy on the “three-man committee” of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis Khebregan) charged with choosing the next supreme leader, which Khamenei would have to fill. As opposed to the emasculated presidency, the new leader is crucial to the future of the Islamic Revolution. There is little doubt that Ayatollah Khamenei would do the utmost to preserve his hard-line legacy, most likely by promoting his son Mojtaba Khamenei. At the moment, Mojtaba is a lower-ranking cleric hojatoleslam, or “authority on Islam,” with a day job of teaching Koran in the Qom and Tehran seminaries. However, he controls the IRGC intelligence and the paramilitary Basij and is said to be the power behind the throne.
One fashionable theory among Western commentators postulates that Ayatollah Khamenei is opposed to emulating a “hereditary monarchy” by appointing his son. It is not clear where this notion originated, as the Farsi media did not raise the issue. To the contrary, Iranian media have used the title “ayatollah” — a high rank in the Shia clerical hierarchy — to refer to Mojtaba. Mojtaba’s unmerited “promotion” has been seen as part of Ayatollah Khamenei’s plan to make his selection more palatable to a position that requires the rank of ayatollah.
However, Mojtaba’s future as the successor to his father is not totally guaranteed. Most problematic is Mojtaba’s lack of popularity among the population. He has been widely blamed for the Basij crackdown during the Green Revolution in 2009 and the protests of 2019–2021. The slogan “Die Mojtaba, may you never achieve leadership” is very popular among Iranians. Mojtaba would also face fierce opposition from a group of younger leaders associated with the hard-line Paydari party, which holds a majority in the Majlis. Unlike the older generation, which considered a modicum of accommodation with the West to be prudent, these “young Turks” are totally dedicated to the vision of Ayatollah Khomeini, the first founding father of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, of a Middle East free of the “Little Satan,” Israel, and the “Great Satan,” the United States. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a radical conservative and a member of the Council of Guardians, is rumored to be their preferred candidate.
For those hoping for a moderating change, the scenario does not look encouraging. In the short term, Iran is expected to continue its current policy of using proxies and its goal of achieving a nuclear capability. In the long run, the regime could become more aggressive if the ultra-hard-line faction prevails in electing a supreme leader in its own image.