"We will confront any possibility, and we are ready if the Israelis decide to enter by land." Can Hezbollah really stand up to the region's leading military power, as its Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem reaffirmed on Monday, September 30, on the eve of the start of this ground phase by the Israeli army in Lebanon, so far announced as "limited?"
The pro-Iranian Shiite movement has just suffered a series of unprecedented setbacks and humiliations, the most resounding being the death of Hassan Nasrallah, killed on Friday night in his ultra-protected compound in the southern suburbs of Beirut, after 32 years as its leader. The Israeli air force and intelligence services had previously succeeded in decimating the senior hierarchy of the Radwan force, the movement's elite unit, and wreaking havoc in its communications system, demonstrating both their technological superiority and the extent of their means of action. What military resources does the Shiite militia have if it hopes to resist, or even recover from, such an offensive?
If it is often presented as one of the leading non-state military powers, Hezbollah owes this primarily to its vast arsenal. But it can also count on a troop strength worthy of a regular army, with four decades of experience, meticulous organization and a perfect knowledge of a terrain largely prepared for a new confrontation, after the "divine victory" it considers it achieved in 2006.
At least 50,000 fighters
The figure of 100,000 fighters put forward by Nasrallah is certainly an overestimate, but the movement, whose armed wing is the only one to have escaped dismantling at the end of the civil war (1975-1990), can probably count on 50,000 men, half of them reservists, which nevertheless leaves it far behind its Houthi allies in Yemen (200,000 men, according to the CIA) and even further behind the Israeli forces, whose reservists alone are almost ten times that number.
In addition to its manpower, made up mainly of light infantry troops, and its long experience, Hezbollah can count on a high degree of mobility and decision-making autonomy designed to cope with the far superior firepower of the Israeli army. It also has a perfect knowledge of the terrain, particularly in southern Lebanon, which is ideal for so-called asymmetrical warfare thanks to its vast network of tunnels, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pointed out in a study published in March.
Its proven guerrilla warfare methods, of which it demonstrated mastery in 2006, Hezbollah's decisive participation in the Syrian civil war, alongside forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, gave it the skills of a conventional army, capable of carrying out coordinated operations under pressure, the former Lebanese general Khalil Hélou, now a geopolitical analyst, said. The effectiveness of its intervention has even convinced the Russian army, also working alongside Damascus, to review its historically centralized organization, he said. The movement's greatest strength, however, remains the absolute devotion of its fighters, according to the former officer. Convinced of the divine nature of their mission, they blindly obey orders, he said.
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