On Monday, September 22, from the podium of the United Nations (UN) in New York, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that France was recognizing the State of Palestine, fulfilling the promise he made this summer.
Seeking to outline a "path to peace" set to be fraught with obstacles, Macron hopes to save the "two-state solution" that Israel is working to undermine in both Gaza and the West Bank, where settlement expansion is accelerating.
What could be the consequences of this diplomatic recognition? Could it have an impact on Israel's ground offensive in Gaza? Gilles Paris, a Le Monde columnist and former correspondent in Jerusalem and Washington, answered readers' questions on Tuesday, September 23, during a liveblog. Here is a translated selection of those questions and answers.
I would be inclined to agree with you if France's recognition of the State of Palestine, alongside other countries, were an end point and not a starting point. When Macron said in his speech on Monday that France and its European partners would "tie the level of its cooperation with Israel to the steps it takes to end the war and negotiate peace," he paved the way for questioning the impunity Israel has enjoyed for decades. The word "sanction" was not used, but it can be read between the lines. This challenge is essential for the credibility of those who have just reaffirmed, along with the overwhelming majority of UN member states, the importance of the two-state solution.
At the United Nations, Macron made the opening of an embassy in Palestine conditional on the release of the last Israeli hostages held in Gaza. Israeli threats of reprisals are likely to materialize after Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington. They could target France and its diplomatic missions in Jerusalem, which would inevitably call for countermeasures. Or Israel could annex all or part of the West Bank. Signatories of the Abraham Accords [a set of agreements that normalized relations with Israel in 2020], such as the United Arab Emirates, as well as some European countries, have already made it clear that this would be a "red line."
We may therefore witness the beginning of an unprecedented struggle between Israel and countries that have so far turned a blind eye to its creeping annexation policy in the West Bank, or have limited themselves to terse statements. The credibility of those who have just recognized the State of Palestine will be put to the test, and this test will also concern countries that have not yet taken the step, such as Germany, South Korea and Japan, who are committed to the two-state solution. For European countries, the association agreement with Israel, whose Article 2 highlights the importance of respect for human rights, will be more central than ever to the discussions.
The Israel-Palestinian conflict is one of the collateral victims of the collapse of the international order based on rules established by the US after 1945. In fact, this conflict has illustrated that collapse: Since the adoption of Resolutions 242 and 338 in 1967 and 1973, which are in the spirit of the two-state solution, the US has locked down the Security Council with vetoes on any condemnation of Israel. That Washington would undermine what it once set up is one of the great paradoxes, given how much it has benefited from this international order.
The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Gaza could only happen after a Security Council vote, unless the General Assembly decided to step in. This was done in 1950 regarding the Korean War, by extending the powers of the General Assembly in terms of maintaining peace. Back then, it was an American initiative to counter a Russian veto.
The deterioration of the international order reached a turning point after October 7, 2023: Israel called into question key UN agencies, as has been evident in Gaza. Circumventing these agencies through the misleadingly named Gaza Humanitarian Foundation – an Israeli-American instrument for controlling the people of Gaza – has created chaos.
The State of Palestine has been recognized, but its practical implementation has yet to be negotiated – first to end the current phase, and then to address the heart of the conflict. The 1993 Oslo Accords paved the way for an interim period during which the main issues of the Israel-Palestine conflict were to be settled. These issues are well known: the fate of the 1948 and 1967 refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the drawing of borders, and so on.
That phase ended in failure at the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000, but some outlines of a solution were sketched out. If a Palestinian state seems to be impossible today, it is mainly due to a lack of political will, on the part of both parties and those who can influence their decisions. One naturally thinks of Washington, which has powerful influence, but also, to a lesser extent, Europe. Donald Trump's administration has unfortunately been the most hostile in US history to Palestinian demands.
Palestine was not declared a state because the Arab side, according to UN terminology, opposed the plan, which they felt was unfair, and objected to the very idea of a Jewish state. It was declared later by Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), at the Palestinian National Council in Algiers in 1988, during which Resolution 242 was adopted – this implied recognition of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, which was a major concession for the PLO. The first wave of recognitions, mainly from what was then the Soviet and non-aligned camp, dates from that period.
An Israeli diplomat, Abba Eban, is remembered for saying that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. The problem is, that phrase can also be turned toward Israeli leaders who, by now rejecting the two-state solution, are dragging their country into a deadly spiral. The alternatives to the two-state solution are ethnic cleansing in Gaza, locking West Bank Palestinians into bantustans at the cost of international pariah status, or creating a binational state. Is that desirable for Israelis?
One could certainly argue that it is too late if we look only at the dynamics on the ground, the shift to the right in Israeli society that has intensified after the horrors of October 7, the intransigence of what remains of Hamas, and the sense of abandonment among Palestinians, who are now more divided and politically weak than ever. But are the other options mentioned above really desirable for either people? That is doubtful. Especially since many things are not set in stone – starting with US support for Israel, which is generally seen as unshakeable.
Israel's image in the US has worsened markedly in recent months, especially among Democratic voters and independents, but also among young Republicans. Dissenting voices about Israel can now be heard among MAGA influencers, sometimes out of isolationist reflexes tinged with antisemitism. This is the case with broadcaster Tucker Carlson, who made headlines after the death of Charlie Kirk by seriously pondering whether there was Israeli Mossad involvement in the criminal case surrounding the sexual abuser Jeffrey Epstein. The US is still far from rebalancing its position – even more so given Trump's stance, as illustrated by the scandalous and immoral "Riviera" project for Gaza – but this trend is worth watching.
Trump's position, which will be crucial for what comes next, does not stem from any historical or geopolitical learning. He is very far from Bill Clinton, who by the end of his second term [1997-2001] knew the ins and outs of the issue in minute detail. Trump alternated between talking about "one state" and "two states" during Benjamin Netanyahu's first visit to the White House in 2017 during his first term, which deeply unsettled conflict specialists.
His stance is shaped by a mix of family influences (in particular, his son-in-law Jared Kushner, who has close ties to Israel), his bias toward real estate, which makes him see the world as a series of lucrative development projects (he once mentioned the potential of North Korean beaches during his fruitless meetings with Kim Jong Un), and finally, his utilitarian view of the evangelical vote.
The American religious right, for vertiginous eschatological reasons, believes that a Greater Israel will hasten the return of Christ. A total lack of conviction on the subject could actually be an asset if other stakeholders – those who appeal to some of Trump's obsessions, particularly in the Gulf – decide to establish a new balance of power, with a view to regional stabilization that would benefit all.
Translation of an original article published in French on lemonde.fr; the publisher may only be liable for the French version.