"The front is 700 kilometers long. The Russian army is advancing, but it's a matter of infantry advancement, not a war of movement," said Emmanuel Grynszpan, a Le Monde reporter who just returned from a trip to Ukraine in early July.

Is there a real Russian advance, or is the front frozen? What about the long-range missiles delivered to Ukraine? He answered questions from our readers in a chat on Tuesday, July 23, 2024. The Russians do not appear to be in a position to exploit gaps, for example to encircle and destroy Ukrainian pockets. So the front is moving, according to Grynszpan, but very slowly, with losses three or four times heavier for Russia than for Ukraine.

European citizen: From what you've seen on the ground, have American and European weapons finally arrived on the front line?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: Weapons supplied by Western allies regularly reach the Ukrainian armed forces. There was a hiatus for a few months at the beginning of the year on artillery ammunition and air defense missiles. According to what I heard at the beginning of July, during my last trip to Ukraine, the ammunition supplied by the Western allies is back, but in insufficient volume. The fire ratio observed in the spring was extremely unfavorable (up to 10 Russian shells fired for every Ukrainian shell); it is now less unfavorable, at around five to one.

Pinthon: Do you know whether the F16 aircraft promised to the Ukrainian air force have arrived on Ukrainian soil? Will the pilots trained to fly these aircraft be ready, and can these fighters change the phase of combat?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: There is no visual evidence of F-16s in Ukrainian skies. If they are already deployed at one or more Ukrainian bases, they are carefully camouflaged, because Russia is constantly bombing the airfields most likely to host them.

I'm in no position to judge the suitability of Ukrainian pilots, but neither the F-16 supplier countries nor Kyiv have any interest in sending insufficiently trained pilots on missions. Serial failures with the F-16s would be a huge disappointment for the Ukrainians and their allies. Losses are inevitable, however, as Russian air defense remains formidable.

The consensus among aviation experts is that the F-16s will be able to rebalance control of the skies, inflict significant losses on Russian radar and anti-aircraft devices, fend off Russian bombers to reduce guided glide bomb strikes and perhaps even participate in the hunt for Russian attack drones and cruise missiles that regularly strike the rear of the front. Few, if any, believe that the F-16 is a single weapon capable of turning the tide of war.

Olivier: Is Zelensky's desire to see Russia take part in peace talks an admission of weakness given the situation on the front line? Do the Russians have the slightest interest in taking advantage of this opening to start talks with Kyiv?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: Volodymyr Zelensky probably wanted to demonstrate to the West as well as to the countries of the Global South that he remains open to negotiation. It's more a posture at this stage than a concrete proposal. The fact that the Russians were not invited to the first peace conference (in Switzerland) was badly perceived by diplomatic powers such as China and Saudi Arabia. Ukraine now needs to put things right.

Moscow is also in a declarative "peace-loving" posture, but with demands akin to Ukrainian surrender. Vladimir Putin believes that time is on his side. He believes that the Western united front will unravel, and is counting on a Donald Trump victory in November, which could lead to an ultimatum for Kyiv: immediate ceasefire, territorial concessions or a halt to arms deliveries. The positions of both sides are maximalist at present, and an agreement seems a long way off.

Erwan: Is a Ukrainian counteroffensive on the ground still a possibility? In Crimea? Or are we heading for a diplomatic solution involving the cession of territory?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: A full-scale Ukrainian counter-offensive is out of the question in the coming months. There aren't enough resources in ammunition or armor, nor are there fresh, trained assault troops available. The Ukrainians are in a defensive position on all fronts. This does not mean that there are no Ukrainian attacks, but they are small-scale operations to harass Russian forces.

It's not out of the question that the situation will change in favor of the Ukrainians next year, mainly if the mobilization campaign succeeds in recruiting enough men and forces of good quality and determination. Western material support will also have to increase significantly (thanks to the ramping up of the European and American defense industries). As for the Russians, their immense human and material resources are suffering severe attrition, so it's not impossible that weaknesses will appear on their side. War is the most unpredictable of human activities.

JST: What about the long-range missiles delivered to Ukraine? Is Kyiv using them?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: According to my information and the images published on both sides of the front, Ukraine is using medium-range missiles (150 kilometers). However, to the best of my knowledge, nothing has been delivered to enable deeper strikes (like the German Taurus). The Ukrainians are designing and producing drones capable of striking up to 1,000 kilometers behind Russian lines.

ELOI92: What's the mood among the younger generation, especially in Kyiv? Are they mobilized or resigned?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: On the whole, young Ukrainians are showing their patriotism, which is far from always going as far as a commitment to take up arms. Some are content to wear a T-shirt in the Ukrainian colors, others donate money to funds equipping the army. The most committed work as volunteers in a myriad of organizations helping the army. And finally, the most determined join the army voluntarily, or join integrated paramilitary formations under the command of the general staff.

I've also noticed the resignation of some young people. I hear more and more frequently the opinion that this conflict is going to last for a very long time, that it's impossible to take back the Donbas by force of arms, and what's the point if it's destroyed? It's a growing trend, but only a poll can determine its weight in public opinion.

Young men are recurringly terrorized by the idea of being drafted into the army against their will, and staying cooped up at home. Everyone knows such cases personally.

Sébastien: I've read that the Russian army is suffering heavy losses on a daily basis, and has been for months now. We're talking about 1,000 dead a day, a lot of equipment destroyed and rudimentary assault tactics (motorcycles, golf carts from China). Conversely, Ukrainian losses are said to be much lower. What's the truth?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: The Ukrainian General Staff does indeed publish such statistics on a daily basis, but it's impossible to put a precise figure on casualties on the other side of the front. We can deduce from the images published on both sides that Russian assault tactics (dismounted infantry and advancing unshielded over open ground for dozens of kilometers, sometimes even without body armor) are suffering very heavy losses.

But Russian firepower is far superior, thanks in particular to guided gliding bombs of up to 3 tonnes capable of destroying any bunker, and will no doubt inflict heavy losses on the Ukrainians too. Cross-checking the estimates of several experts, I'd guess that the casualty ratio is from 1:3 to 1:5, to the detriment of the Russians.

Maz: Would you say that the Russian army is now more efficient in tactical terms, or is it still old-school, Soviet-style?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: Every army benefits from the experience of war to improve its tactics, weapons, technologies and command. At the very least, a warring army has a large mass of fire-trained soldiers. Many Ukrainian soldiers have told me that the Russian army has come a long way since 2022, despite the fact that the 200,000 men sent out to attack then were all professionals. Experience in the line of fire is fundamental, and the Russian army has an over-trained army whose dangerousness should not be underestimated.

Justin: You talk about a mobilization campaign, but haven't all the potential recruits already been found since the start of the conflict? Is there really still a significant reserve among the population? Isn't the future of this war also at stake here?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: The Ukrainians most determined to fight are probably already in the army. The current mobilization is certainly aimed at people who are less motivated, but who can still fight provided they are properly trained and equipped. There is undoubtedly a reserve of men and women in a population of 30 million or more. You're right, it's also a fundamental parameter of warfare, but we don't know its value. Today, it would be premature to say that Ukraine no longer has any prospect of victory simply because the second wave of mobilization is inferior in quality to the first. The same problem applies to Russia.

Narratives: Do you think it's still too early in the story to talk about the cost of this war to the European economy other than through the mouths of enemies of our ideas?

Emmanuel Grynszpan: It would be strange not to want to assess our own capabilities in economic, demographic and other matters when we're facing a war on the European continent. The cost of war for the Ukrainians is incomparably higher than for us. This does not prevent them from resisting.