Historically, the delivery of Russian S-400 missiles to Turkey in 2019 represented a double strategic gain for Moscow. First, the presence of these missiles effectively ruled out any future delivery of US Patriot or French-Italian SAMP/T missiles. And second, the potential activation of Russian missiles led Washington, in 2020, to impose sanctions on Turkey – a cancellation of Turkey's order for 120 Lockheed Martin F-35 and F-35B stealth fighters, and an exclusion of Turkish industry from F-35 production.

From Moscow's point of view, the result is positive: The southern interface between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been "cleared" of two of the most advanced air systems.

This change in military relations between Ankara and Moscow has cast doubt on the reliability of a NATO member that has long been the Atlantic Alliance's stronghold in South-East Europe. Ankara explained that the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the game, but Turkey is keen to retain its role within NATO. It is also actively pursuing its goal of strategic autonomy and arms exports.

Since February 2022, these doubts have intensified with Turkey's refusal to join the sanctions against Russia and the significant development of energy and financial relations with Moscow (discounted gas payable in rubles, advance on royalties linked to the Akkuyu nuclear power plant). These factors played a role in the Turkish presidential election in 2023, and oil transactions enabled Russia to circumvent certain Western sanctions.

The Russian war in Ukraine could escalate considerably, and new flashpoints could involve Turkey due to their geographical proximity. For example, the need to step up the protection of civilian cargo ships used for Ukrainian exports and imports or a potential weakening of Moldova by Russia. As a result, Turkey's strategic ambiguity would become more visible: it would either have to clearly associate itself with NATO operations in Eastern Europe, or openly abstain.

Numerous pressure tactics

Russia's attitude toward Turkey will be closely watched. As has been the case since 2019, Moscow could continue to push Ankara toward lasting political and military antagonism with the rest of NATO, in line with Hungary's desire to differentiate itself from the rest of the European Union. Moscow's means of pressure on Ankara are numerous: gas supplies (prices, volumes, profitable transit to Southeast Europe); crude oil processing; new offers of military equipment; opposition to Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation on military aviation; acceptance or rejection of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's offers of mediation; and the authorization or prohibition of Turkish operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria.

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