French President Emmanuel Macron shocked his allies and adversaries by announcing the dissolution of the Assemblée Nationale during a televised address on the night of Sunday, June 9. This followed his coalition's disastrous results in the EU elections. On Monday morning, one of Le Monde's deputy editors, Nicolas Chapuis, answered readers questions in an online chat:
John: The idea of a dissolution was said to have been in the pipeline for a long time. Are we to believe that, when the president spoke on June 6, the die had already been cast, or did he still believe in a new beginning? How should we view his statements in hindsight?
This morning, we reported in several articles, including this one, that a small team was working at the Elysée on the option of dissolution. They were a dozen or so people who kept the secret to the very end. Macron's allies (Edouard Philippe, François Bayrou...) had not been brought into the loop, nor had Prime Minister Gabriel Attal.
The presidential camp was hoping for a surge from the list headed by Valérie Hayer [their lead candidate in the European elections] and considered dissolution only as a last resort, in the event of a very large gap, which was the case. At least, that's what they claim.
Quentin: What effect does the dissolution have on the exercise of government? Will the ministers continue with their reforms until the elections are over?
Political time has been suspended. Ministers remain in place to carry on with current affairs. For some, it's a chance to rest; for others, things are getting tougher. I'm thinking in particular of the Interior Ministry, which has to organize the elections in three weeks, while keeping the Olympics in its sights. They are facing a Dantean task.
But as far as reforms are concerned, everything has been put on hold, or even abandoned. The law on the end of life, for example, which the Assemblée Nationale was starting to examine, is now at serious risk.
tuturdu28: What would Macron do for the next 3 years in the event of a "cohabitation"? Would he retreat to dealing with European, international and defense issues? Who would go to the European Council?
There is a clear distribution of powers between the Elysée, the president's office, and Matignon, the prime minister's office, in the event of cohabitation, and Macron would not be left with much power. (Cohabitation is the term used in France when the president and prime minister come from opposing political camps.) He would continue to represent France at the European Council, and in major international affairs. But he would be forced to coordinate with the prime minister's office.
There are two existing models: Stay and adopt symbolic postures as guarantor of the country's foundations, as did François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac (who had ambitions to run again, which Macron cannot do); or leave, as President Charles de Gaulle did in 1969 (despite having won the parliamentary elections following the dissolution).
Hugs: Isn't the president trying to use this dissolution to create an electoral shock to mobilize the 50% of French people who abstain from voting?
Macron is certainly trying to remobilize his electorate, which has not turned out to vote very often. But who can say today that a higher turnout will benefit him? In an interesting analysis published last Monday in Le Monde (in French), Pascal Perrineau (Cevipof Sciences Po) analyzed who the abstentionists are and estimated that it constituted today a reservoir of votes for the Rassemblement National (RN).
driso: Isn't the big winner Bardella, who now has the opportunity to eclipse Marine le Pen and emerge as the presidential candidate?
RN lead candidate Jordan Bardella is obviously the winner of the election evening, and there was no wavering, with RN senior figures saying directly that in the event of victory in the parliamentary elections, the position of prime minister would go to him.
Interestingly, after Macron's speech, it was Marine Le Pen who took the floor, with Bardella relegated to the background. This sent a very clear message: She is still the leader. Should the RN take power, however, her role would be complicated to define, and there is a risk that she would be sidelined by Bardella's omnipresence. The contenders for the 2027 election should keep a close eye on this. But betting on a break-up of the far right (which has shown great ability in this area in the past) is a risky gamble.
Xalop: Who can imagine today that the left could come together in less than 3 weeks?
I need to slightly correct your question: Who can imagine the left coming together in a week? In reality, the deadline is the one for the nominations, which is expected to be set fairly quickly for next Friday. Negotiations over the next two or three days are therefore crucial. The possibility of an alliance that would bring together the left, from Françoise Hollande to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, seems unthinkable today, after the rifts of recent months, notably over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The question is instead: Where exactly is the fracture? The faction behind Mélenchon in La France Insoumise (LFI) is calling for the reformation of the NUPES coalition on the same basis as in 2022. Obviously, nobody believes this is a credible prospect (not even them). Why would the Place Publique - Parti Socialiste alliance, who came out on top for the left on Sunday, line up behind Mélenchon again?
On the other hand, part of LFI (the rebels around MP François Ruffin in particular) is now calling of the formation of a "popular front" against the far right. This kind of rhetoric is more easily digested by the rest of the left, and the Parti Socialiste's Olivier Faure has used the same terms. But to say that there will be a grand alliance between the PS and the rebel wing of LFI seems highly uncertain. And let's not forget the role of the Greens, who were wiped out in these elections, and will have a hard time getting back on their feet and making their presence felt in the discussions.
What is certain is that calls from civil society for a grand alliance on the left are likely to multiply, putting the political apparatuses under pressure. But, in the past, this hasn't stopped them from sticking to their petty partisan calculations.
Someone who wonders: Isn't the dissolution a political strategy to show the French that the RN is incapable of bringing about change, with the aim of ensuring that the RN doesn't come to power in 2027?
Since yesterday, political journalists have been tearing their hair out, trying to understand the reasons behind this decision. It's not impossible that what you mention may have crossed the minds of the strategists working for the ruling majority, but I can't say for sure.
On the other hand, for those who would follow this logic, it's worth remembering this truth: History teaches us that the theory of the far right briefly coming to power, breaking its teeth, before a return to classic democratic life, is a figment of the imagination. Things don't happen that way. When the far right comes to power, it does everything it can to keep it, to the detriment of democracy.
Abiva: What was the point of Macron dissolving the Assemblée Nationale? Were there too many risks for him or his successors not to do so?
We're at the stage of conjecture. Let me give you one: Macron calculated that dissolution was inevitable, that the next budget vote would be fatal, with a motion of no confidence on the horizon. He's taking the lead, rather than being at the mercy of the opposition. He's betting on a lightning campaign, leaving no time for the left to unite and the right to organize, to provoke a series of RN/Renaissance second rounds across the country. He is betting on the voters to have a republican reflex, particularly those on the left, the same reflex that enabled him to win in 2017 and 2022. He is confronting the country with this choice: If you don't choose me, you'll have the far right in power.
The peril of this strategy is that the power of the republican reflex is inversely proportional to the frequency with which it is used. And that Macron, after saying "this vote obliges me" on the evening of the second round of the presidential election, felt above all obliged to the right of his electorate.
Surprised: Since last night, I have been surprised by the position of the members of Renaissance who have attacked LFI to try to divide the left, hoping to make an alliance with the Greens and the PS instead of directly attacking the RN. What do you think?
I think that the campaign has begun and that in such a short space of time it's as much about uniting the troops as sowing division among the others. Renaissance doesn't believe for a second in the possibility of a union with the PS left. But by drawing a line between LFI and the rest of the NUPES, they hope to prevent a grand coalition (which, as explained above, is unlikely to happen anyway).
Nico: Do we already have a poll on a seat projection? Can the RN envisage an absolute majority?
The first polls will be out soon. Those carried out before the European elections gave the RN the possibility of winning an absolute majority. But I'm wary of opinion polls based on fictitious questions. At the time this question was asked, the dissolution had not taken place.
SebSeb: What effect would Bardella as prime minister have on the conflict in Ukraine and the French position?
It would all depend on the scale of his victory and the width of his majority. What is certain is that last night's result must have been greeted with great pleasure by Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. My colleague Benoît Vitkine, Le Monde's Russia correspondent, noted last night that in the Moscow polling station for French votes, four far-right lists came out on top: those led by Bardella, François Asselineau, Marion Maréchal and Florian Philippot.
Fraewin: What would force Macron into a cohabitation with the RN? It's not fully clear to me how cohabitation works.
Don't worry, you're not the only one having to review the rules of cohabitation since last night. The prime minister represents the majority current of the Assemblée Nationale (from 289 ministers), whether it is in the hands of a party or a coalition (as is currently the case).
If the RN wins an absolute majority in the Assemblée Nationale, Macron will have no choice but to appoint Bardella as prime minister (or to resign). If the RN comes in first but without an absolute majority, the situation becomes more complicated: Either the RN manages to build a coalition with other groups of ministers to support its prime minister, or the other parties join forces against the RN and find a consensus prime minister, or it's a total deadlock.
Gégé: Don't the French media have to take a share of responsibility for favoring quips, sterile polemics and hubbub over constructive debates based on well-developed ideas?
We certainly have a share of responsibility in the current situation. We are not outside democratic life, beyond the reach of criticism. I'm only speaking for Le Monde, as the other media have their own editorial lines. We have tried to cover the European election campaign in the best possible way, with reporting, analyses of all the sectors affected by the European Parliament's choices, and special days on the website. We have tried to provide our readers with the keys to understanding this election. You only have to scroll down our "European elections" section to see the profusion of in-depth articles, beyond the political polemics (which also need to be reported).
What's certain is that voters had a late surge of interest in these elections, with a very strong revival of interest in articles on the candidates' programs (or even articles on "who are the candidates") in the home stretch, not to say on voting Sunday.
We think things will be different for the upcoming legislative elections. And we'll do our utmost, despite the short time available, to offer you a complete range of articles to help you form your own opinion.