A combination of mutually reinforcing causes is at the root of the questioning of France's military presence in Niger, a questioning precipitated by the coup against an elected president. Nevertheless, the new uncertainty can be analyzed as the latest defeat in the "war on terrorism" and proof of the inadequacy of a primarily military response to the specificities of the jihadism in West Africa that the French army has come up against.
France's initial success in blocking a militia's advance toward Bamako, during the 2013 Operation Serval (which became Operation Barkhane later) in Mali, was short-lived, even though it considerably boosted France's prestige in Washington. The coincidence with what was at stake at the same moment in Iraq and Syria, namely a jihadist resurgence that would eventually be swept away by the hubris of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State organization killed by American special forces in 2019, was a lure. Across a gigantic region, the Sahel, which has its own adversaries and its own logic, the former colonial power slumped toward a stalemate.
The French military was able to confirm, after many others already had, that the regular decimation of combatants could not break the complex mechanisms behind the resilience of armed groups, which were highly motivated to fight the French, especially after the failure of Barkhane. Their resilience first fed the frustration, then the anger, of part of Mali's population, in the face of continuing insecurity. This was blamed mainly on France, to some extent unfairly, and it has fed conspiracy theories according to which Paris was said to have maintained self-interested connections with these armed organizations.
The same causes produce the same effects, and the rejection of France then spread to Burkina Faso. The pursuit of military cooperation, despite its apparent respect for Niamey's sovereignty, is now in question in Niger.
This situation has become even more perilous for Paris, especially considering that military deployments have constituted France's main engagement with Africa in recent years – trade has been modest, despite the allegations of supposed neo-colonial plunder. Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu's revealing phrase in November 2022 that "Africa was part of our strategic depth" attested to this.
The military failure in the face of jihadism in the Sahel is accelerating a rejection of France, in a race in which Paris always seems to be one step behind. The choice to reposition troops in Niger after their evacuation from Mali, and the limits of intelligence services, which failed to anticipate the coup in Niamey, are cruel reminders of this.
This fragility makes France's contradictions even more untenable, as it shows itself to be concerned with constitutional order in some countries, while accommodating itself to crude arrangements in others. Born of a failure in terms of security, the questioning of France's role is profound. France seems to have the greatest difficulty entering into the history that is being written today on this part of the African continent. Yet the urgency is manifest.
Translation of an original article published in French on lemonde.fr; the publisher may only be liable for the French version.