

Maps: Evaluating six months of Israel's war in Gaza
NewsThe Israeli army's technological superiority has so far failed to neutralize Hamas, which continues its operations from the shelter of a vast underground tunnel network.
Has the time come for Israel to change its strategy? The military-only approach, aimed at taking over the entire territory of Gaza in stages, then killing or arresting Hamas units, before establishing a control structure to prevent the Palestinian movement's resurgence, has shown its limits. The indisputable superiority of the Israeli army has enabled it to severely damage Hamas's capacities. Yet it has not been able to destroy it, not least because of the network of tunnels the Palestinian fighters use to move around, hide and store logistical resources at depths of up to 50 or even 70 meters. The Hamas leaders, along with the majority of the 134 Israeli hostages, have thus remained out of reach.
The exclusively military approach does not, therefore, guarantee a clear-cut victory in the short term. Moreover, it has led to the deaths of so many Palestinian civilians and the destruction of so much infrastructure, including hospitals, that the humanitarian cataclysm it has created has become a source of concern to even Israel's staunchest allies, most notably the United States. The human death toll – over 32,000, including a majority of women and children – could keep rising in the event of a large-scale operation in Rafah, where 1 million displaced persons are currently sheltering on the Egyptian border.
The Israeli army has claimed to have killed or arrested more than half of Hamas's fighters – out of a total it had estimated at around 30,000 men before October 7, 2023. This claim is impossible to verify. Furthermore, underground infrastructure is more difficult to destroy than above-ground buildings. Segments of tunnels are neutralized with explosives, flooded with seawater or plugged with concrete, without the gigantic multi-story "Gaza metro" network appearing to be significantly affected.
Hamas avoids direct combat engagements – which it has no chance of winning – and has preferred harassment operations: Small groups, usually of two or three men, emerge from the tunnels; fire an opportunistic shot (often with a Yasin-105 rocket launcher, made in Gaza) at Israeli infantrymen or armored vehicles; and then disappear back into the tunnels. Specialized Israeli units occasionally operate underground, but the Israeli army knows it will never make a difference in these tunnels that don't allow large-scale combat.
As Israeli forces have advanced in the south of the Gaza Strip toward Rafah, they have continued to carry out operations in the north, as demonstrated by their attack on Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, at the end of March. Their return to this area, four months after a previous assault in November, highlights the resilience of Hamas's units. Although weakened, they have retained the capacity to reoccupy areas that the Israeli General Staff thought it had purged of their combatants. The last "intact" Hamas units, according to the Israeli army, are concentrated in Rafah, where tunnels provide access to the outside world, in the Egyptian Sinai.
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