How far will Marshal Khalifa Haftar's flirtation with Russia go? The visit in late September of the "strong man" of Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) to Moscow, where he met Vladimir Putin, rekindled speculation about Russia's plans in Libya. What new form might the presence of the paramilitary Wagner group, which has had a significant – but unofficial – presence since 2018-2019 in eastern and southern Libya – regions controlled by Haftar, the supreme leader of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army – take? The frequent meetings between Russian officials and Haftar in recent weeks seem to indicate that plans are in the process of being hatched. In addition to his face-to-face meeting with the head of the Kremlin, the Libyan marshal met twice (on August 23 and September 17) with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, who was received in Benghazi itself, Haftar's stronghold.

The Russians are reportedly seeking to get the marshal to agree to sign an agreement providing for the supply of air defense systems and pilot training in exchange for the concession of air and naval bases in Libya, according to information circulated on the social network X (ex-Twitter) by Jonathan Winer, a well-informed former US ambassador to Tripoli (2013-2016). The Kremlin's aspiration to formalize certain activities that were previously conducted "covertly" by Wagner in Libya and across Africa under the Ministry of Defense's supervision is reflected in this new agreement. The "post-Prigozhin" era has also begun in Libya.

The relationship between Haftar and Moscow began in 2016 when the Libyan marshal sought foreign military expertise – from Russia, France and the United States – in his fight against jihadist strongholds in Benghazi and Derna. Russia saw this as an opportunity to regain a foothold in Libya – a country it had been ousted from in 2011 following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime. Over the years, Wagner's paramilitaries, the vehicle for this Russian "comeback," have put down roots in Cyrenaica (Sirte, Al-Khadim) and southern Fezzan (Jufra, Brak Al-Shati), close to lucrative oil sites.

If Wagner's support did not enable Haftar to conquer Tripoli – his assault on the capital failed miserably in 2019-2020 – it at the very least made the marshal's regional strongholds safe, now beyond the reach of his rivals in Tripolitania (west), allied to the Turks. In exchange for protecting its local ally, Moscow – through Wagner – carved out substantial strategic advantages in Libya, which has become a power projection platform towards the Sahel and potentially the Mediterranean. Wagner's troops number between 1,000 and 1,500, to which the support of some 1,000 pro-Damascus Syrian militiamen who frequently rotate between Benghazi and Syria must be added

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