The Iranian Revolutionary Guards announced early on Wednesday, in a statement, that the leader of Hamas had been killed in Tehran. Hamas confirmed moments later the death of its head, adding that he had been killed in a "Zionist" raid. Ismail Haniyeh was in the Iranian capital to attend the inauguration of the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. On Tuesday, he met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Elected head of the Palestinian movement in 2017, Haniyeh was reappointed in August 2021. He succeeded Khaled Mashaal, who had held the post since 1996. Since 2019, he had been living in exile in Qatar.
What are the consequences of the assassination of this Hamas leader for his organization and for the Middle East? Xavier Guignard, a researcher at the independent research center Noria, answered Le Monde readers' questions in a chat.
Xavier Guignard: Israel is not in the habit of confirming the attacks it carries out outside its territory, be they bombings in Syria or targeted assassinations in Iran. The July 30 explosion was no exception. Given the likely consequences for Israel, with Iran and its allies threatening to retaliate on its own territory, we can imagine that if Israel wasn't behind this strike, it would make that known.
The regionalization of the conflict has been a reality since October 7. Israel has targeted Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iran. In return, armed groups in Syria, Iraq, Hezbollah, the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and Iran have bombed or threatened to bomb Israel.
What is at stake is the risk of escalation, in this dynamic of widening the conflict. Hezbollah and Iran have no interest in this, primarily because they are militarily weak compared to Israel. But the re-establishment of lines of deterrence, the preservation of the territorial sovereignty of these states and miscalculations bring us closer every day to the precipice of a full-scale, open confrontation.
Some in Israel's political and security establishment believe that the existential threat they face is not posed by Hamas, but by the presence of Hezbollah on the northern border. A major Israeli operation in Lebanon cannot be ruled out, even if it is likely to drag the whole region into the conflict – something Israel's allies, starting with the United States, are trying to avoid.
In a recent speech, Hassan Nasrallah (the leader of Hezbollah) threatened the territory of Cyprus. Military agreements between Cyprus and Israel allow for joint training, including on land – Cyprus has a topography similar to that of southern Lebanon. Although this threat now seems to have been averted, the intersection of theaters of war poses a major risk, beginning with Europe.
Iran, for example, could give in to Russian demands for the supply of certain types of weaponry, notably drones, as part of the invasion of Ukraine. The rhetoric employed by both camps (Israel on one side, Iran and Hezbollah on the other) is that this conflict is being played out for or with the support of the West. Beyond that, I don't see any alliances (Russia, China, India) capable of changing the course of the war, even if the resulting political landscape would be profoundly altered.
The families of Israeli hostages were the first to worry, and rightly so, about the repercussions. Negotiations were progressing very slowly, but with the assassination of one of Hamas's main negotiators, they are likely to come to a standstill. Qatar has made its position quite clear through the voice of its foreign minister: What's the point of organizing mediation if one side murders the other?
The clear priority of the Israeli government is not the release of the hostages, which we saw last November could be achieved through negotiation. The fact remains that Hamas is the only competent interlocutor if Israel wants to obtain their release, and it is with its new representatives that a compromise will have to be found sooner or later.
There are two facets to this question. Our colleague Amélie Ferey has worked extensively on the doctrines of targeted assassination in Israel, and her research shows the effort made to offer a veneer of legality. On the other hand, this assassination has a triple political cost.
Iran's territory is effectively violated in its sovereignty, and such a violation may result in an Iranian military response (legal or otherwise). Negotiations for a ceasefire and the release of hostages are undermined, and Israel is showing that Hamas's political, not just military, leaders are targets. From this point of view, it's hard to imagine that Israel's war cabinet really wants the successful conclusion of negotiations, to which it has just dealt yet another blow.
Hamas is included on certain lists of terrorist groups, notably by the European Union and the United States, but neighboring states continue to maintain links with the movement (Norway and Switzerland, for example). The lack of consensus as to the classification of Hamas as a whole stems from the fact that it is both an armed group that has committed war crimes (and potentially crimes against humanity), a political movement represented in the Palestinian parliament and the administration of an occupied territory, the Gaza Strip.
Ismail Haniyeh was a direct or indirect interlocutor with many governments and not the mastermind of the October 7 attacks. Statements from the various diplomatic bodies are still awaited, but the risk of a regional conflagration probably explains the low level of enthusiasm for this operation attributed to Israel.
Israeli public opinion is divided. Part of the population considers it a victory, in a war that sorely lacks success and clarity. This assassination is part of a long tradition of targeting Palestinian leaders (Islamist, nationalist or left wing), without their death having the slightest effect on public denunciation of the occupation. On the contrary, security leaders, some sectors of the societal protests of recent years and more recently the families of the hostages see an immediate danger to the possibility of negotiating a way out of the conflict.
Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran have already carried out external operations to target interests considered to be Israeli. Within the range of possibilities, targeting key figures (ambassadors, leaders) abroad is a credible option. The targeting of civilians (nationals or dual nationals) less so, if we are to believe Iranian declarations, which rule out at this stage any reaction that is not directed at military or political targets. We don't have to believe them, though.
But the logic of a response designed to underpin Iran's deterrence suggests that civilian targets should be ruled out, since they would have no effect other than unequivocal condemnation and a demonstration of relative operational weakness.
Hamas elects leadership bodies at its councils. For the time being, Ismail Haniyeh is likely to be temporarily replaced by a member of the political bureau, with the names of Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzook and Khalil al-Hayya circulating. In the coming months, a vote is expected to confirm this provisional appointment or replace the leadership. If there are obvious fault lines within the party (on political and military strategy, alliances, normalization of the party, etc.), it would be very bold to imagine that they will lead to a schism following Haniyeh's assassination.
Hamas leaders know they are under threat: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was assassinated [in 2004]. Haniyeh and Meshaal had been targeted in the past. The question of the balance of power between supporters of a political solution and those committed to a military confrontation with Israel will not be upset by Haniyeh's death.
The absence of a political outlook, Israel's explicit determination to oppose any Palestinian state and the authoritarian hardening of Mahmoud Abbas's government are much more important factors in understanding the current "radicalization" within Hamas and beyond.
The mirages of gradual normalization with Israel have given way to the reality of violent polarization and increased conflict in the region.
In this context, Jordan has to contend with a number of major weaknesses: Its tourism economy has been reduced to nothing since October; criticism is mounting among its population (partly of Palestinian origin, but also from Islamist parties and certain tribes in the south of the country); and Iran is denouncing Jordan's role in supporting Israel's defense. On this last point, although Jordan has refused to communicate anything other than the protection of its airspace, it seems certain that Israeli and American aircraft have used Jordanian skies.
The kingdom's short-term safeguard is linked to its alliance and alignment with the United States. But in the medium term, domestic and regional pressures, as well as the cooling of its relations with Israel, could prompt the Hashemite monarchy to secure its regional foothold rather than position itself as an American auxiliary.
Translation of an original article published in French on lemonde.fr; the publisher may only be liable for the French version.