Emmanuel Grynszpan, a journalist with Le Monde's international desk, spent two weeks in Ukraine with photographer Laurent Van der Stockt. They went to the Donbas, more precisely the Donetsk region; first to Pokrovsk and the surrounding area, then to Kramatorsk and its vicinity. They headed for Kharkiv as soon as they learned that a new front had been opened by the Russians, on May 10. Then, on May 11, they moved on to Vovchansk, a town almost on the Russian border, which has been heavily shelled and is now partially occupied by the Russians. The Russian army had already occupied this town for six months in 2022. Upon his return from Ukraine, Grynszpan answered reader questions in an online chat with Le Monde on Friday, May 24. Here is a summary of his responses:
There's no collapse on the Ukrainian side, but daily Russian attacks on a front stretching over 500 kilometers. In some places, the Russians are advancing but without making any breakthroughs and without really being able to upset the Ukrainian army, which is withdrawing and sometimes attempting counterattacks. The Russians have undoubtedly had the advantage for several months, thanks to their substantial numerical advantage, both in technical and human terms.
The risk of a Russian breakthrough is real, and the situation could deteriorate for Ukraine. Military analysts predict very difficult months ahead until the end of the summer. The arrival of new waves of Western military aid and fresh Ukrainian troops (currently in training) could turn the tide in Ukraine's favor this autumn.
I noticed the opposite, namely, general complaints about the lack of artillery, missiles and anti-aircraft defenses. After constantly referring to this problem, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did an about-face on May 16, declaring, "No brigade is complaining about lack of ammunition."
Once again, that's not what I heard. But, of course, I haven't spoken to all the brigades. I've since heard that one mechanized brigade received tank shells. Open-source experts still observe a fire ratio (the number of shells fired by the Russians compared to the Ukrainians) extremely unfavorable to the latter (from 8/1 to 15/1). As such, I conclude that Zelensky's statements do not correspond to the reality on the ground.
Troop morale is generally low, and soldiers are disillusioned. They don't understand why the promises of shells made several months ago have not materialized, nor why fresh troops have not arrived.
Many soldiers are furious to see that the rear is not sufficiently mobilized, and some are beginning to develop various theories. Some were dreaming of demobilization after two or even three years' service but the new mobilization law says nothing about this. This is demoralizing for some soldiers. Soldiers on the front line are extremely tired because, lacking sufficient reserves, they are sometimes unable to rotate to the rear.
In contrast, I haven't heard any soldiers calling for an end to the war and concessions to the Russians. This position undoubtedly exists, but it seems to me that the vast majority of Ukrainians mobilized on the front have no intention of laying down their arms.
I don't think the Ukrainians have any significant reserves of foreign-trained soldiers. I've met many fighters who have completed training courses in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, and the response is almost unanimous: NATO trainers "train for yesterday's war, not the one we're fighting." They're generally disappointed because these tactical training courses take no account whatsoever of the central factor: drones. Reconnaissance drones, FPV (suicide) drones, attack drones, which completely change the game in assaults, defense, refueling, movement and evacuation. Only one officer told me that his training had helped him in logistical matters.
Yes, and in other units. They are generally used for support, for one-off operations. I met some of them again last week. What do they represent in the larger body of Ukrainian soldiers? Not very much. There are a few hundred of them, from all countries, and their numbers seem to be decreasing rather than increasing. Their presence motivates the Ukrainians.
It is not related to the Kharkiv offensive, which, although it has not progressed since May 20, has achieved at least two objectives: Forcing the Ukrainians to thin out some units in the Donbas to plug the gaps north of Kharkiv, and causing great concern about the extension of the front, for example, in the Sumy region.
I've heard a lot of questions on this subject. On the whole, Ukrainian soldiers don't put much faith in it, but it remains a hypothesis that they appreciate, if only because the French stance has become more resolute toward Russia.
Quantity and mass are important, but they don't decide everything. The Ukrainians are not short of ammunition for firearms. They make extensive use of combat drones (even though they also have fewer of these than the Russians). These drones are very effective in defense, breaking up assaults. The Ukrainian army remains composed of highly determined soldiers, who are well-trained and using tried-and-tested tactics. On the Russian side, tactics remain fairly predictable, although some new strategies were used north of Kharkiv. The Russian army is clearly not capable of creating breaches in the Ukrainian defense, let alone exploiting them. For the time being.
Because of the serious human deficit on the Ukrainian side, the high command often opts for retreats if the position is too costly to protect. This is what I've heard from brigade and battalion commanders. However, there are still commanders trained in Soviet times who are less frugal with men. The contrast between the Ukrainian and Russian armies seems to be very marked in this respect.
There is total incomprehension on the Ukrainian side, sometimes raising doubts about Western leaders' real intentions.
Military experts often rule out the idea of a game-changing weapon (Wunderwaffe, German for "miracle weapon"). The F-16s are due to become operational in Ukrainian skies in early summer. Their main role will be to protect Ukrainian airspace by deterring Russian fighters and bombers, shooting down drones and missiles, and possibly destroying enemy radars. There are doubts about their offensive capability, to prepare or support a ground offensive.
I've heard Ukrainian military personnel calling for F-16s so that "the Russians stop terrorizing us with their glide bombs," dropped by bombers and capable of destroying the strongest fortifications.
I haven't seen this, but it's likely that faith in the country's governance will erode over time, given that everyone is now well aware that a rapid and favorable outcome for Ukraine is highly unlikely. Russian propaganda, which is very active through social media, is using devious means to demoralize the population. Not everyone is happy with the Zelensky administration's political decisions, and corruption scandals continue to surface. However, the political opposition represented in parliament remains discreet.
I'm not a sociologist, and I'm basing my opinion on 20 or so recent interviews with servicemen. Oleksandr Syrsky is clearly less popular than Valery Zaluzhny. Some (a minority) feel that Oleksandr Syrsky has introduced more discipline into the army's workings, and better coordination. Many feel that he is a conveyor belt for political power and does not sufficiently defend the army's interests vis-à-vis the rest of the country, particularly on the crucial issue of mobilization.
Military analysts were even more pessimistic at the start of 2024. The fact that the Ukrainian army is holding its own against a much more powerful army with a huge numerical advantage is good news in itself. If Western aid were more substantial, and the Ukrainian authorities better managed the mobilization problem, the situation on the front could turn around in Kyiv's favor. 2025 could be very different. However, hoping for a rapid end to the conflict, with a return to the 1991 borders, seems totally unrealistic today.
Translation of an original article published in French on lemonde.fr; the publisher may only be liable for the French version.