At what point does a war become a vast military operation with no end in sight? For four months, the 98th Israeli army division had been carrying out the last major deployment of troops against Hamas in Gaza. On Sunday, April 7, it withdrew from the southern town of Khan Yunis "to recuperate and prepare for future operations." A single brigade now remains in the territory: These men, attached to the 162nd division, are responsible for maintaining a corridor that isolates the largely depopulated Gaza City from its southern outskirts and serves as a point of entry for army raids.
On Sunday, six months after the Hamas attack in southern Israel, Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi presented the long-awaited withdrawal as a temporary reconfiguration. "The return of the hostages is important and urgent, and its timer is different from the timer of the other goals," he asserted, following an initial statement to this effect on April 3, during a visit to the troops at Khan Yunis. "We have a moral duty to them and the IDF will know how to withstand even a difficult price [for their release], and will also know how to come back and fight with strength," he said, as talks were due to continue in Cairo on Monday.
Israel's American ally, whose only aim in this conflict is the facilitation of such an agreement, is signaling its willingness to become more directly involved and is asking Israel to show flexibility. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday evening that this pressure "is only causing Hamas to harden its positions." The Islamist movement is calling for the withdrawal of troops, an end to the war, the return of civilians to northern Gaza and the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel in order to free a first contingent of hostages. The Israelis see a ceasefire only as a means to an end.
Israel intends to pursue a long war, lasting several years. This involves remobilizing troops as needed and increasing the number of raids it says are "targeted," requiring fewer men, in order to continue eliminating Hamas's military and government structures. General Halevi reiterated this on Sunday, stressing that the army intends to remain in control of the timing of this war.
Military press correspondents today are increasingly comparing the current situation to the operations of the second Intifada (2000-2005). They point out that in the space of six months, the army has allowed itself "operational freedom" in 90% of Gaza, just as it did during the first two years of the last major popular Palestinian uprising, when it wiped out the insurgent strongholds of the Nablus and Jenin refugee camps in the occupied West Bank. The army then continued its operations for over three years, only to see a decline in suicide bombings in Israel.
You have 64.12% of this article left to read. The rest is for subscribers only.