Authored by Prof. Ruel F. Pepa via GlobalResearch.ca,
At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, leaders representing over half of humanity signaled the rise of a multipolar world order. As China, Russia, India, and Central Asia push new financial and trade systems, the West risks being left on the sidelines.
When the leaders of China, Russia, India, and several Central Asian states gathered in Tianjin last week for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, the world should have paid far closer attention. Collectively, the countries represented at the table account for more than half of humanity, command immense reserves of natural resources, and increasingly drive a larger share of global GDP. This is not a peripheral coalition but a core pillar of the international system in the making.
Yet much of the Western press treated the gathering as little more than a diplomatic sideshow, overshadowed by domestic political debates or the latest updates from NATO. That was a mistake. What unfolded in Tianjin was not just another regional summit. It was the clearest indication yet that the unipolar world of U.S. primacy, which dominated the decades after the Cold War, is giving way to a new and contested multipolar order.
The symbolism was unmistakable. Beijing positioned the SCO as a platform for “equal partnership,” implicitly contrasting it with Western alliances built around hierarchy and U.S. leadership. Moscow emphasized strategic coordination in the face of sanctions and military pressure from the West. India, while carefully balancing its ties with Washington, underscored its role as a civilizational power charting an independent path. The Central Asian republics, long seen as geopolitical battlegrounds between outside powers, asserted their relevance as connectors of trade, energy, and security across Eurasia.
Beyond symbolism, the summit carried substance. Agreements on energy cooperation, cross-border infrastructure, digital technology, and security coordination point toward an increasingly institutionalized bloc. Taken together, they signal that the SCO is evolving from a loose forum into a framework capable of shaping the rules of the 21st-century world.
For policymakers in Washington and European capitals, the lesson is sobering. Ignoring the SCO or dismissing it as a talking shop risks overlooking the consolidation of an alternative power center that is steadily building legitimacy outside of Western institutions. For the rest of the world, particularly in the Global South, Tianjin served as a reminder that power is no longer concentrated in a single pole, but dispersed across multiple capitals with diverging visions of order.
The summit was therefore more than a diplomatic calendar entry. It was a milestone in the slow but unmistakable rebalancing of global power and a process that will define international politics for decades to come.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the SCO Summit. (GODL-India)
Chinese President Xi Jinping used the summit to press his vision of a world that renders Cold War mentalities a matter of the past. His remarks were not mere diplomatic pleasantries; they were a direct critique of the U.S.-led alliance system and its reliance on deterrence, sanctions, and bloc politics. Backed vocally by Vladimir Putin, Xi pledged to accelerate the creation of a multipolar order in which Western dominance would be checked by new centers of power across Eurasia and beyond [1].
What distinguished Tianjin from previous summits was that these calls were tied to concrete initiatives. Beijing unveiled a 10-year development strategy for the SCO, underwritten with billions of dollars in loans and grants earmarked for infrastructure, energy corridors, and digital connectivity projects [2]. This framework goes well beyond aspirational communiqués: it signals a deliberate attempt to institutionalize the SCO as both an economic and geopolitical force.
One of the boldest proposals on the table was the creation of a dedicated SCO development bank that poses an explicit challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the IMF and World Bank. Such a body, if realized, would allow SCO members to finance projects without the conditionalities often imposed by Western lenders. It would also complement other Chinese-led initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative, weaving them into a broader Eurasian financial ecosystem.
The implications are far-reaching. For decades, the global financial order has revolved around institutions headquartered in Washington and Brussels, shaping development trajectories in the Global South. By offering alternative sources of capital, Beijing and its partners are signaling that the monopoly of Western financial governance is coming to an end. The SCO’s proposed bank would not only fund railways, pipelines, and fiber-optic networks across Eurasia but also serve as a symbolic assertion of financial sovereignty.
The message from Tianjin was unambiguous: the institutions of the West will no longer go unchallenged. A parallel architecture emerging reflects the priorities of Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, and the capitals of Central Asia. It is not yet clear how cohesive or durable this architecture will prove, but its mere existence underscores that the world has moved beyond unipolarity. The battle is no longer over whether the West will be challenged, but over how rapidly alternative institutions can be consolidated, and how effectively they can deliver.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is increasingly positioning Central Asia as the backbone of the emerging multipolar world. Far from being a peripheral region, the Central Asian republics are becoming the crossroads of Eurasian connectivity and influence. Trade corridors linking Shanghai to St. Petersburg are facilitating the movement of goods, capital, and people across thousands of kilometers. Energy pipelines crisscross Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and beyond, ensuring that the region’s vast natural resources flow to both Chinese and Russian markets while integrating it into a broader strategic network. Meanwhile, digital “Silk Roads” are introducing Chinese standards for 5G, artificial intelligence, and telecommunications infrastructure, further embedding Beijing’s technological footprint across the continent [3].
For decades, Central Asia was largely treated as a geopolitical periphery, a buffer zone caught between the lingering influence of Russia and the rising ambitions of China. Moscow maintained traditional security ties and economic leverage, while
Beijing cultivated trade and investment links primarily through infrastructure projects. Western powers, by contrast, engaged only sporadically, mostly through development aid or counterterrorism initiatives. The region’s strategic importance was recognized, but its potential as a hub of independent, multipolar influence remained unrealized.
That era is now coming to an end. With the SCO providing both institutional frameworks and concrete projects, Central Asia is transitioning from a passive periphery to an active strategic heartland of the new order. Its cities, railways, pipelines, and digital networks are not just local assets but the connective tissue of a Eurasian system designed to operate largely independently of Western-dominated institutions. By anchoring trade, energy, and technology in Central Asia, Beijing, Moscow, and their partners are effectively recasting the region as a central node in the global architecture of power.
The implications are profound. Central Asia is no longer a “backyard” for external powers; it is a linchpin of geopolitical strategy, economic integration, and technological standard-setting. As the SCO continues to consolidate its influence, the region’s rising prominence underscores that multipolarity is not merely a distant aspiration; it is being physically and institutionally constructed, rail line by rail line, pipeline by pipeline, and gigabyte by gigabyte.
Perhaps the boldest and most consequential development in Tianjin was Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call to expand the use of the yuan in energy settlements.
Analysts quickly dubbed the concept the “electro-yuan,” a system designed to link China’s digital currency with cross-border trade in oil, gas, and electricity. Unlike conventional trade settlements, which rely on correspondent banking in U.S. dollars, the electro-yuan would enable real-time, blockchain-enabled transactions directly between SCO member states, bypassing traditional financial intermediaries.
This is about far more than convenience or modernization. If widely adopted, the electro-yuan could significantly weaken the petrodollar system, which has underpinned U.S. financial dominance since the 1970s. The dollar’s centrality in global energy markets has long allowed Washington to exert extraordinary influence over international finance and foreign policy. By creating a credible alternative settlement system, Beijing and its SCO partners would undermine this leverage, diminishing the reach of dollar-based sanctions and reducing the United States’ ability to enforce geopolitical objectives through financial pressure.
The implications extend beyond energy. A robust electro-yuan network could accelerate the internationalization of China’s digital currency, the e-CNY, and provide a model for other nations seeking to hedge against the dollar. Coupled with SCO-led development projects and cross-border trade corridors, it represents a deliberate attempt to construct the “plumbing” of a parallel financial system that operates on terms favorable to Eurasian partners rather than Western institutions.
The ripple effects for global markets could be profound. If SCO countries begin pricing energy, commodities, and infrastructure projects in yuan rather than dollars, it could reduce demand for U.S. currency reserves, influence exchange rates, and reshape global investment flows. Commodity markets may see shifts in pricing benchmarks, particularly in oil and natural gas, as the electro-yuan provides a viable alternative to the dollar-based contracts that dominate today. For investors and multinational corporations, reliance on the dollar as the default currency for trade and finance may gradually diminish, introducing new risks and opportunities in hedging, capital allocation, and currency management.
For policymakers in Washington and Brussels, the message is stark: the rules of global finance may be shifting beneath their feet. A system that decouples trade and investment from the dollar would not only reduce the United States’ economic influence but also recalibrate global alliances, making financial sovereignty a tangible tool of statecraft for countries like China, Russia, and their SCO partners.
In short, the electro-yuan is more than a financial experiment but a strategic gambit, signaling that the SCO is not content merely to challenge Western hegemony rhetorically. It is building the infrastructure that could one day rival, and perhaps circumvent, the very foundations of U.S.-led global economic power, with consequences that extend to every corner of the global market.
The presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Tianjin summit lent the gathering even greater weight and global significance. Historically cautious about Chinese-led initiatives, India has often approached regional multilateral frameworks with skepticism, wary of being overshadowed by Beijing or Moscow. Modi’s participation signaled a subtle but meaningful shift in India’s strategic calculus that acknowledged engagement, rather than isolation which is essential in a rapidly evolving multipolar world.
Image: Xi Jinping meeting with Narendra Modi (GODL-India)
At Tianjin, New Delhi agreed to concrete measures aimed at rebalancing trade with China, loosening visa restrictions, and enhancing connectivity initiatives within the SCO framework [4]. These steps demonstrate a willingness to separate economic pragmatism from ongoing territorial and border disputes, particularly in regions such as Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. By compartmentalizing these issues, India is signaling that it can cooperate on economic and regional integration while maintaining its security concerns.
For India, engagement in the SCO is not a matter of siding with Beijing or Moscow. Instead, it reflects a strategic hedging approach: mitigating the risks posed by tariff threats from Washington, strengthening resilience against supply chain disruptions, and ensuring that it cannot be sidelined from emerging Eurasian trade and infrastructure networks. By participating actively, India secures a voice in shaping regional rules and norms rather than remaining a passive observer to a process that will define the geopolitical landscape for decades.
This approach aligns with India’s broader foreign policy of “strategic autonomy” wherein flexibility is maintained to navigate between competing power centers while advancing national interests. At the same time, India continues to cultivate robust partnerships through the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia) and its growing bilateral ties with Washington. In practice, this means India is simultaneously engaging with China-led institutions like the SCO while strengthening security and technological cooperation with the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific bloc. This dual-track strategy allows New Delhi to hedge against uncertainty on multiple fronts: it ensures access to Eurasian markets and energy corridors without sacrificing strategic alignment with Western partners.
The Tianjin summit thus reflects a uniquely complex Indian strategy: neither confrontation nor unconditional alignment, but calculated engagement, ensuring that India remains both relevant and resilient as global power structures shift. By balancing its SCO participation with Quad commitments, India positions itself as a pivotal actor capable of bridging competing spheres of influence, maximizing strategic flexibility in an era defined by multipolar competition.
The Tianjin summit was a warning shot: the world is moving on, with or without the West. While Washington and Brussels continue to wield significant economic, military, and diplomatic power, their ability to unilaterally dictate global terms is steadily eroding. For decades, Western institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, NATO, and dollar-based financial systems served as the primary levers of influence, shaping trade, development, and security outcomes across the globe.
Today, however, alternative frameworks like the SCO are demonstrating that other nations can pursue prosperity and security without relying solely on Western guidance.
Across Eurasia, countries are increasingly prioritizing strategic autonomy over rigid alignment. They seek options that provide economic resilience, infrastructure development, and energy security without the political strings often attached to Western loans or alliances. From pipelines in Central Asia to digital connectivity projects extending China’s 5G standards, the SCO is offering practical alternatives that simultaneously advance regional integration and multipolar governance.
The message is clear: the rules and institutions of the West are no longer the only game in town. Nations that fail to recognize this realignment risk being left behind not just economically, but politically and strategically. Participation in emerging trade corridors, digital networks, and financial mechanisms will increasingly define influence in Eurasia and beyond. Those who ignore these shifts may find their voice diminished in global decision-making and their access to vital markets and resources constrained.
Moreover, the SCO’s rise signals a broader psychological shift. For decades, Western primacy framed global debates and set expectations of power projection.
Tianjin revealed a growing willingness among Eurasian states to assert their own terms, challenge Western norms, and pursue partnerships that align with their strategic interests rather than defaulting to U.S. or European approval. The West can no longer assume that its preferences will automatically shape outcomes; influence must now be earned, negotiated, and, in some cases, competed for.
In short, the Tianjin summit underscores a central truth of the emerging era: multipolarity is not a distant possibility as it is taking shape here and now. To remain relevant, Western policymakers must move beyond complacency and recognize that a world with the SCO at its center demands engagement on terms that are increasingly pluralistic, flexible, and contested. Ignoring this reality is not just shortsighted but a strategic liability.
What unfolded in Tianjin was not the birth of a new Cold War but the emergence of something far more complex and consequential: a multipolar future in which the West is no longer the sole arbiter of global norms, trade, and security. This is not merely a shift in power; it is a transformation of the architecture of international relations. Multiple centers of influence such as Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, and the capitals of Central Asia are actively shaping the rules, institutions, and economic flows that will define the 21st century. The West, powerful as it remains, is increasingly one participant among many rather than the default decision-maker.
The unipolar era of American dominance, which followed the Cold War, had its run, dictating the terms of finance, trade, and security for decades. The Tianjin summit, however, signaled that the next chapter will be written differently. The SCO is not simply a forum for dialogue; it is a deliberate effort to institutionalize an alternative framework for regional and global governance, encompassing trade, energy, technology, and finance. From the expansion of the yuan in energy settlements to infrastructure corridors across Central Asia, the SCO is constructing the material and institutional foundations of a multipolar order that can operate independently of Western-led institutions.
This new reality poses a strategic test for the West. Can Washington and Brussels adapt to a world in which their primacy is no longer assumed, and influence must be negotiated rather than imposed? Or will they risk being relegated to the sidelines, observing as new power centers define the economic rules, geopolitical alignments, and technological standards that will shape global affairs for decades to come?
Crucially, multipolarity is not zero-sum since it does not necessarily mean confrontation, but it does demand recognition that influence, leverage, and legitimacy are now dispersed. States and institutions that cling to a unipolar mindset may find themselves increasingly marginalized, while those capable of engaging with multiple power centers, hedging risks, and participating in alternative frameworks will thrive.
Tianjin was therefore more than a summit; it was a glimpse of the emerging world order in motion. The SCO, with its blend of economic initiatives, security coordination, and financial innovation, illustrates that the 21st century will be defined by complexity, interdependence, and competition among multiple poles of power. The central question now is whether the West will acknowledge and adapt to this new reality or allow others to shape the future on their own terms.
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