SEOUL, South Korea | U.S. efforts to unite partners and allies across Asia in a strong anti-China alliance is itself proving divisive.

While staunch Anglosphere allies Australia and the United Kingdom appear firmly in sync with U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific, several other regional democracies courted by Washington are far more conflicted.

Amid a regional arms race, the conventional strategic wisdom — beef up deterrence against the emerging superpower rival — carries collateral peril, topped by the Increased risk of accidental clashes and a subsequent escalatory spiral into open conflict.

And with China-U.S. bilateral relations currently dire, the risk for smaller regional players is magnified by a lack of communication channels and mechanisms to calm down a crisis.

Those doubts and concerns were on display at the recent Seoul Defense Dialog, which brought policymakers, military officials and analysts from around the region and beyond to South Korea’s capital.

Choosing sides

“The global rules-based order is under enormous pressure,” Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles told the gathering. “And as great-power military competition plays out, there is a very significant build-up of military capabilities.”

While China muscles up in all domains, notably through a rapid expansion of its navy, North Korea is expanding its nuclear assets and adopting new, more aggressive doctrines for unleashing them. In response, South Korea and Japan are acquiring new missile forces and developing home-grown stealth fighters, while Australia recently reached a landmark deal with the U.S. and U.K. to field its own nuclear submarine fleet.

One concern, given the hot wars consuming the Biden administration’s attention and budgetary plans in Ukraine and the Middle East, is a fear that Washington will lack the bandwidth to sustain its presence in the Indo-Pacific as well.

“We will continue to encourage the U.S. to be as engaged as possible in the East Asia time zone,” said Mr. Marles. “We see that as really important to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.”

Britain’s Minister of State for Defense, pointed the finger at Beijing for the region’s rising divisions.

“China is an epoch-defining competitor and no longer observes fundamental tenets such as freedom of navigation,” said the baroness, who sits in London’s House of Lords.

Some 60 % of global trade passes through Indo-Pacific waters. While China to date has not interfered with maritime commerce, its construction of air-sea bases on disputed reefs in the South China Sea and the sometimes aggressive behavior of its fishing fleets have alarmed its neighbors.

London deployed a carrier strike group — with U.S. F35 fighter jets on deck — to Indo-Pacific in 2021, and will repeat the exercise in 2025. A group destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait, irking Beijing.

“The UK has indicated that aggressive behavior toward Taiwan is not acceptable,” Ms. Goldie said. “If there is disruption and instability at the end of the day, it does not help anybody.”

Echoing U.S. defense officials and local commanders, she said it was vital to preserve a deterrent strength to check Chinese aggression. “If you want peace, prepare for war,” she said. “That is a fundamental wisdom that has endured down the ages.”

But that is not a unanimous view, with skeptics saying the strong deterrence stance carries its own risks.

“There are two paths to conflict in this region — one state against another and [by] accident,” warned James Crabtree, executive director of the Asia offices of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. “Reinforced deterrence arguably increases risk of accidents.”

Hedging bets

The region is complex. The clear security alignments in Northeast Asia — where Japan, South Korea and the U.S face off against China, North Korea and Russia — are not replicated elsewhere.

“Northeast Asia is unusual, almost unique, in that every player in the region knows what side it’s on,” said Mr. Crabtree. “That is not true in the [rest of the] Pacific, where most countries seek not to choose.”

China’s military might and economic clout both argue for more caution and balance, some officials say.

“ASEAN simply cannot afford to choose sides,” said Singapore’s Senior Minister of State for Defense Chee How Heng, referring to the alliance of 10 Southeast Asian countries. “The U.S. has a longstanding presence in the region and the region has prospered under that security umbrella, but China is the largest trading partner of every ASEAN country.”

ASEAN as a bloc would rank as the world’s fifth largest economy, and much of its prosperity depends on access to Chinese markets and suppliers.

“It’s a balance between security and economics: Both are important,” said Mr Heng. “Sovereignty is important, friendship is important. … ASEAN does not want to be forced into a position of taking sides.”

His plea was echoed at the conference by a smaller player located in an emerging hot spot, the South Pacific, where Beijing and Washington are vying openly for influence.

“It is hard for us to choose and we do not want to choose,” said Fijiian Minister for Home Affairs and Immigration Pio Tikoduadua, spelling out the agony of small states caught between mightier powers.

“We do not have much flexibility, we don’t possess capabilities, but we are principled,” he said. Fijians “… expect the world to carry its own weight in terms of looking after us.”

Above all, Indonesia’s Mr. Heng urged, the Indo-Pacific must “remain open and inclusive.”

At a time when many in Washington are talking of trying to “de-couple” from China and creating new alliances to restrain its growth, Mr. Heng argued that “substantive cooperation will be a win-win, and will motivate the right behaviors.”

The deconfliction dilemma

“Any concept of security that does not include mitigation is no security at all,” said Mr. Tikoduadua.

That is easier said than done.

The IISS’s Mr. Crabtree said that then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 Taiwan trip, a visit that sparked an intense intimidation campaign against Taipei by Beijing,  was not deterrence, and most Southeast Asian nations did not see it as helpful.”

But China, too, is at fault, he suggested.

“There are lots of measures that could be taken but not many signs, especially on the Chinese side, that they see utility in opening channels of cooperation,” said Mr. Crabtree.

At the June IISS forum in Singapore, then-Chinese Defense Secretary Li Shenfu declined to meet U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who nevertheless approached Mr. Li and shook his hand at a dinner.

The Pentagon said at the time that it believes “in maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication with [China] — and will continue to seek meaningful military-to-military discussions at multiple levels to responsibly manage the relationship.”

Australia’s Mr. Marles endorsed that approach.

“It is really important that the quality of dialogue and diplomacy —   the guard rails — is as excellent as it can be,” he said. “We need the greatest possible communications between the U.S. and China so there is no miscalculation or mistake.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.