ISTANBUL — President Recep Tayyip Erdogan — emboldened by the Trump White House’s embrace of a more muscular Turkey — is racing to capitalize on the opening by settling scores, making deals and putting his country center stage in the Middle East
The Turkish leader’s actions, from reopening ties with Damascus to raising interest rates, reflect a strategy aimed at maximizing his leverage during what Mr. Erdogan sees as a four-year window created by President Trump’s second term.
Analysts say this is the most permissive international environment Mr. Erdogan has experienced in years, even as his government faces economic pressures at home.
Last year’s municipal elections marked the worst electoral setback for Mr. Erdogan’s party in two decades. Economic fatigue continues to weigh on voters.
Ihsan Aktas, chairman of the pro-Erdogan polling firm GENAR, writes in Daily Sabah that the Erdogan-Trump alignment is a “turning point,” arguing that Mr. Trump has abruptly replaced Washington’s cautious diplomacy with a more Ankara-focused foreign policy.
Mr. Aktas says Mr. Erdogan is now projecting Turkish influence from the Red Sea to the Caucasus. He characterizes Ankara not as an aspiring hegemony but as a practical partner in managing conflicts.
“This coordination unsettles adversaries like Iran and Greece,” he writes, “while providing reassurance to countries worried about instability in Israel and fragmentation in Europe.”
But not all analysts see Mr. Erdogan’s position as assured.
“It is sustainable,” Suat Kınıklıoglu, a former member of the Turkish Parliament and commentator, told The Washington Times. “But the West has largely accepted that Turkey is likely to be governed in an authoritarian way.
“Ankara remains vital to European security in part because of the millions of refugees it hosts,” he added, “and even more so now due to its expanding defense sector and role in Ukraine.”
Under the Biden administration, Ankara was sidelined. F-35 negotiations collapsed, U.S. relations with the anti-Turkey Kurdish militias deepened, and Mr. Erdogan’s mediation efforts were dismissed.
Mr. Trump’s second term, though, has opened doors.
“Ankara sees this as a window of opportunity, not a permanent realignment,” Omer Ozkizilcik, a researcher at the Atlantic Council, told The Washington Times. “There’s now a realistic chance the PKK (the Kurdish Workers’ Party) could be weakened, not just rhetorically, but on the ground.”
Mr. Trump also named longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria. Mr. Barrack quickly reopened the shuttered U.S. ambassador’s residence in Damascus and authorized Caesar Act waivers, allowing American and allied firms to engage in Syrian reconstruction.
At a summit last month in Istanbul, Mr. Erdogan joined Syria’s new president Ahmad al-Sharaa and Mr. Barrack for talks on borders, energy and Syria’s economic reintegration. Mr. Erdogan praised the U.S. shift as “bold and overdue.”
Markets reacted. Turkey’s central bank raised interest rates by 500 basis points on May 23, pushing the benchmark to 55% — a dramatic departure from Mr. Erdogan’s earlier resistance to rate hikes.
The Istanbul stock exchange recorded modest gains and the lira stabilized. Inflation remains high at 35.4% but has fallen from its peak of 75%. Unemployment sits at 8.6%, and while challenges persist, investors view Ankara’s return to conventional monetary policy as a signal of greater predictability.
Adding to Ankara’s strategic profile, Mr. Erdogan announced Wednesday that Turkey has signed its first export deal for the locally built KAAN fighter jet, with 48 units to be delivered to Indonesia. The agreement marks a new milestone in Turkey’s push to become a defense exporter and reinforces Mr. Erdogan’s bid for global relevance.
Turkey is also building its role as a regional energy hub.
Once seen as dependent on Israeli cooperation for energy access, Ankara has diversified. It is now tapping Black Sea gas fields, expanding pipeline links with Azerbaijan, and extending its energy reach into Central Asia and northern Iraq. The TANAP pipeline connects Turkey with Europe through a southern corridor.
Still, competition lingers.
“They view the Israel-Greece-Cyprus axis as a threat,” said Emmanuel Navon of Tel Aviv University. “Erdogan was deeply opposed to the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He even blamed Israel. Turkey is stronger now, but it hasn’t dismantled the Israeli-backed EastMed framework.”
The Eastern Mediterranean alliance — anchored by Israel, Greece and Egypt—includes historic rivals of Ankara. Despite Turkish efforts, the bloc remains a counterweight to Mr. Erdogan’s ambitions.
Turkish state companies are also expanding electricity infrastructure into northern Syria, presenting themselves as postwar stabilizers. With sanctions eased, Ankara has more room to maneuver economically and diplomatically.
Mr. Erdogan has also tried to assert a mediating role in the Ukraine conflict. In early June, Turkey hosted high-level talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials in Ankara. Though the negotiations yielded no breakthroughs, Turkish officials emphasized their neutral posture and the strategic importance of the Black Sea.
Analysts say the talks reinforced Mr. Erdogan’s bid to remain indispensable to both NATO and Moscow.
Diplomatic style has also shifted. Former U.S. President Joseph R. Biden’s ambassador to Turkey, Jeff Flake, clashed with Mr. Erdogan by meeting opposition leader Kemal Kılıcdaroglu.
Mr. Erdogan publicly declared his doors closed to Mr. Flake.
Mr. Barrack, in contrast, is seen in Ankara as someone who aligns with Mr. Erdogan’s preference for personal deal-making.
Yet political analysts caution that foreign policy gains don’t always translate into domestic political strength. “Inflation and job market pressures still shape politics, especially among young voters,” Mr. Ozkizilcik noted.
The 2024 municipal elections saw the opposition CHP retain control of Istanbul and Ankara, and make gains elsewhere. In March 2025, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoglu—widely seen as Erdogan’s most credible challenger — was arrested on corruption and terrorism charges. The timing, one day after a Trump-Erdogan call, triggered public protests and drew criticism from civil society groups.
“I think Imamoglu’s arrest is a serious sign of weakness,” Mr. Kınıklıoglu said. “Erdogan seems to recognize that winning through elections is increasingly uncertain.”
“There’s an irony,” he added, “given how Erdogan rose to national prominence after serving as Istanbul’s mayor and serving a brief prison term in 1999.”
“He is vulnerable, as much of the public sees the charges against Imamoglu as politically motivated,” he told The Washington Times.
Mr. Kılıçdaroglu resigned from CHP leadership in November 2023, months after losing the presidential race. His departure left the opposition without a clear successor, even as Mr. Erdogan intensified pressure on local leaders.
Mr. Erdogan continues to emphasize diplomacy to expand Turkey’s reach.
At a Pakistan-Turkey-Azerbaijan summit in the Lachin corridor — a strategic mountain pass between Armenia and Azerbaijan that has become a focal point of post-war regional integration — he declared, “We may be three different countries, but we are one nation,” reaffirming Ankara’s growing alignment with post-Soviet Muslim states.
Symbolism has played a role, too.
At the European Political Community summit in Tirana, Mr. Erdogan turned a handshake with French President Emmanuel Macron — whose government has repeatedly clashed with Ankara over its support for Armenia and criticism of Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus — into an awkward power play, gripping Mr. Macron’s finger for more than 10 seconds and refusing to let go.
The viral exchange captured Mr. Erdogan’s comfort with confrontation and disregard for diplomatic choreography.
His posturing resonates with governments skeptical of Western leadership. With Mr. Trump advocating a reduced U.S. role in the region, Ankara is positioning itself as a preferred intermediary.
Still, Mr. Erdogan’s rhetoric remains divisive.
On October 25, 2023, after a bloody week in Gaza, he told Parliament, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization; it is a liberation group, waging a battle to protect its lands and people.” The statement drew condemnation from both Washington and Jerusalem.
“Israel is pushing for deeper U.S. involvement,” Mr. Ozkizilcik told The Washington Times. “Turkey wants Washington to scale back and let regional actors take responsibility.”
That divergence reflects Trump’s reciprocity diplomacy. “Trump doesn’t care about human rights or democracy; he cares about utility,” Mr. Navon told The Washington Times. “Erdogan plays both sides. But Turkey is in NATO. You can’t ignore him.”
“He’s had a free hand, especially in Syria, which worries Israel,” Mr. Navon added. “But Israel’s strategic partnership with the U.S. runs deeper.”
“If betraying the Kurds suits his agenda, Trump will do it,” Mr. Navon said. “He doesn’t know who they are or care.”
“Turkey has expanded its energy map,” he acknowledged. “But it hasn’t dismantled the EastMed bloc.”
“Syria remains shattered,” he added. “Trump easing sanctions may be an experiment to see if Assad can survive economically — and whether that could lay the groundwork for future normalization with Israel. It’s speculative, but consistent with the administration’s deal-driven thinking.”
“Being a mediator is always risky,” Mr. Navon concluded. “If Erdogan miscalculates in Ukraine or Syria, it could backfire.”