


It takes more than 200,000 suppliers to produce the advanced weapon systems for the U.S. military. However, it remains a mystery whether components are manufactured in the U.S., by allies or even adversaries like China, according to a just-released report by the Government Accountability Office.
The January 2024 National Defense Industrial Strategy identified the U.S. dependence on adversarial sources for goods it procures as a mounting national security challenge.
“These suppliers may cut off U.S. access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways,” the GAO report stated.
Analysts with the congressional watchdog agency studied 2020-24 procurement data, reviewed Pentagon documents and interviewed Defense Department officials and contractors while preparing their report. Last year, China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium — two elements critical for military-grade electronics.
Last October, Defense Department officials said supply chain visibility was essential for the military to ensure operational readiness and strategic advantage over the enemy. It would be a “major component” in improving production and supply chains.
The Pentagon said “greater visibility” will help it identify supply chain disruptions, such as those related to foreign dependence, and manage the risks more effectively, according to the report.
Defense contractors that offshore their operations or accept foreign investment can help the Pentagon save money and gain access to additional technology. However, drawbacks exist, the GAO analysts noted.
“A globalized supply chain can also make it harder for [the Defense Department] to get what it needs if, for example, other countries cut off U.S. access to critical supplies,” they wrote. “This has made it more difficult for DOD to identify sources that may present a risk, particularly at the lower levels of the supply chain, which includes materials and small electronic components.”
The F-35 Lightning II is a fifth-generation fighter created to replace a range of aging aircraft in the military services’ inventories. The Federal Procurement Data System identified the U.S. as the country of origin for 114 out of 115 F-35 contracts.
“According to Defense Department officials, FPDS does not include information on the subcontractors that the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, enters with suppliers that provide subsystems, components and raw materials for the aircraft,” the GAO report stated.
The Defense Department found that magnets on some F-35s originated from China, according to the report.
Pentagon officials are also concerned that commercial microelectronics, such as computer memory chips and sensors, that are used in Defense Department goods are coming from non-U.S. sources.
The military purchased $1.3 billion worth of electronic microcircuits from 2020 to 2024. According to Defense Department estimates, 88% are manufactured overseas, primarily in China, Taiwan and South Korea.
The Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Contract Management Agency have data systems that include information on suppliers. “However, like FPDS, the systems are not intended to provide supply chain visibility,” the GAO report said.
The Defense Department told GAO analysts that it was pursuing “several visibility efforts” to improve its ability to identify risks of what it calls foreign dependency. The Pentagon has made progress in gathering supplier information for major subsystems and components.
“However, these efforts are uncoordinated and limited in scope and provide little insight into the vast majority of suppliers, including those that provide raw materials and parts,” the GAO report stated.
• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.