President Donald Trump‘s first foreign trip of his second term is underway. The president is visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. But Trump will not be visiting Israel. The exclusion of America’s historic Middle Eastern ally from Trump’s itinerary is a marked example of Trump’s declining sympathy for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. In contrast, Trump appears ecstatic at his evolving relationship with Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Mohammed bin Salman.

Senior members of Trump’s administration, including U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, diplomatic envoy Steve Witkoff, and others, insist that there is no daylight between Trump and Netanyahu. But this rhetoric plainly doesn’t stand up to reality. The fact that Trump is not visiting Israel on this first trip is evidence enough of some discord. But there are also more specific examples of Trump and Netanyahu being in disagreement.

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For a start, Israel is manifestly opposed to Trump’s diplomatic effort to secure a new nuclear agreement with Iran. Instead, Netanyahu, supportive Washington think tanks such as the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and Republican allies such as Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) have pushed for immediate joint U.S.-Israeli military action to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. They fear that Trump will negotiate an agreement that fails to end Iranian nuclear enrichment and covert weapons research. They worry that Trump will accept a deal that leaves the door open to future Iranian nuclear enrichment. But Trump appears to believe that an imperfect agreement is preferable to the use of military force. And even if there is little reason to think it possible, Trump seems to believe a nuclear deal will facilitate a broader political rapprochement with Iran.

Israel is similarly concerned by Trump’s recent agreement with the Yemen-based Houthi rebels. In return for their suspending strikes on U.S. and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Trump has ended U.S. military action against the Houthis. Still, the Houthis are continuing to launch ballistic missile attacks on Israel.

Then there’s Israel’s confrontation with Hamas in Gaza. Distant are the February days in which Trump suggested forcibly relocating the Palestinian population of Gaza, and turning the Mediterranean Sea-facing territory into an American-run resort city. Today, Trump is increasingly comfortable pursuing negotiations with Hamas independent of Israel. That led to this week’s release by Hamas of dual American-Israeli citizen Edan Alexander. The Times of Israel reports that the Trump administration told Hamas that it would pressure Israel to agree to a 90-day ceasefire/10 hostage release deal in return for Alexander’s freedom. The newspaper also reports that Witkoff has told the families of Israeli hostages that Netanyahu wants to sustain the war even though Trump wants a negotiated settlement.

Trump’s recent social media posts also suggest he wants an end to Israel’s war against Hamas. And the Sunni Arab monarchies and the vast majority of America’s international allies certainly want the war ended. But Netanyahu wants to maintain the offensive. The prime minister has an obvious moral interest in imposing maximal damage on Hamas following its Oct. 7, 2023, atrocity. Perhaps more importantly, however, Netanyahu knows his fragile coalition government will collapse if he agrees to end the war in return for the release of the remaining hostages.

This issue-centric discord is exacerbated by Israel’s inability to match the Sunni Arab monarchies in dangling financial investments to earn Trump’s favor. And the scale of investments Trump is securing on this Middle Eastern trip is eye-watering.

On Tuesday, Trump and bin Salman announced a plan for $600 billion in Saudi investments in the United States. The UAE has previously said it will invest $1.4 trillion in the U.S. over a ten-year period. Qatar used Trump’s visit to announce $243 billion in new U.S. defense, energy, and technology contracts. The figure includes a vast aircraft purchase from Boeing, following Qatar’s earlier offer to Trump of a $250 million jet to replace the aging Air Force One aircraft.

Lubricating these investments is an Arab pageantry of extraordinary scale and opulence. From red carpet ceremonies to mobile McDonald’s restaurants, bin Salman has spared no effort in treating Trump as American royalty. Bin Salman and his fellow monarchs in the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain recognize that the surest way to win Trump’s favor is twofold: by investing heavily in the U.S., and by flattering Trump’s person. They hope to secure Trump’s fundamental commitment to their security. Bin Salman also hopes Trump will then pressure American businesses to support the crown prince’s modernization project to turn Saudi Arabia into a world-leading center for entertainment, tourism, and business investment.

Again, Israel cannot match these investments. And far more than other American presidents, Trump tends to view foreign policy through the prism of immediate transactional opportunities rather than that of historic partnerships. Joe Biden, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush would likely all be far more reticent to tolerate Qatar’s funding of various jihadist groups were they in power in 2025. But even in terms of Israel’s traditionally most prized offering to the U.S.: its assurance of stable democratic governance and exceptional intelligence services, Israel has limited means of wooing Trump.

After all, while the relationship between the U.S. and Israeli intelligence services remains very close, Saudi Arabia and Jordan can also point Trump to the critical activities of their own intelligence services in the fight against ISIS. This limits Netanyahu’s ability to earn Trump’s unique favor from acts such as Israel’s elimination last year of numerous terrorists responsible for killing Americans. At the same time, Netanyahu has risked Trump’s anger by conducting Israeli intelligence operations on U.S. soil and by sharing high-end Israeli technology with China.

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Trump may now be more inclined to listen to bin Salman’s advice, or that of Qatar’s emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, than he is inclined to listen to Netanyahu’s advice. We saw an example of this dynamic in Trump’s announcement on Tuesday to drop all sanctions on Syria. Israel wants President Sharaa’s government to yield to a de facto Israeli right of military action against whatever targets inside the country it decides to target. But by Trump’s establishing a new relationship with Sharaa, Israel will have to consider U.S. interests before taking future military action. This is a complicating rather than complementary U.S. intervention into Israeli-Syrian relations.

Netanyahu will fear that Trump’s Arab agenda may now lead to escalating pressure to end Israel’s military action in Gaza. Or perhaps even Trump’s unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, a key ask of bin Salman in return for his willingness to join the Abraham Accords. But it’s clear that the Arabs are getting far more access to and impact on Trump’s open ear than Israel would like.