With the exception of select weapons systems that must be prioritized for Taiwan, U.S. support for Ukraine should be generous and sustained. It is in the U.S. national interest that Ukraine succeeds in defeating Russia's invasion and forcing Moscow to the negotiating table on Kyiv-preferable terms. Still, we should be wary of the contention by some that the United States is letting Ukraine down amid questions over future aid.
First off, there is significant unity in Congress in favor of future aid provisions to Kyiv. This unity will likely persist even after the November 2024 elections. More importantly, why is the European Union getting a free pass on what I would argue is the political union's inadequate support for Ukraine?
RUSSIA'S OVEROPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF US TENSIONS OVER UKRAINE AID
Take the media reaction to a visit by EU foreign ministers to Kyiv on Monday. NBC News contrasted the EU's "historic show of support after the passage of a U.S. funding bill that included no new aid for Ukraine and left future support for the war with Russia in the balance." Like many other media publications, the Washington Examiner included, NBC News relies on the Kiel Institute's data on financial and military support to Ukraine. And the data show that as of July 31, U.S. and EU support for Ukraine was generally comparable. Where the U.S. had provided far greater military materiel support to Ukraine, the EU had pledged far greater financial support. When the data include subsequent commitments, however, the Kiel Institute's analysis becomes problematic.
To start, we should note that the Kiel Institute has a direct interest in suggesting that the EU is doing more for Ukraine than the U.S. Reversing the Kiel Institute's strategy of following the money, we learn that it is funded by the EU's largest economy and most powerful political entity: Germany. Then there are the budgetary devils in the details.
The Kiel Institute asserts, for example, that "total EU commitments [up to the present day] are now almost double those of the U.S." But while the Kiel Institute notes that the EU has now pledged funding for Ukraine through the year 2027, it ignores the fact that U.S. funding is being authorized on more regular timetables. The claim "total EU commitments are now almost double those of the U.S." is thus about as practically accurate as the phrase "China is happy with its relationship with Taiwan." When all is said and done, the U.S. is nearly certain to have provided comparative and perhaps even greater levels of support to Ukraine than that which the EU has provided.
Next, the Kiel Institute buries down its webpage the fact that the U.S. has disbursed 78% of what it has pledged to Ukraine toward budgetary support. In contrast, while the EU has pledged much greater budgetary support, it has only provided 24% of that pledged. It shouldn't need stating that pledged money cannot be spent. Pledged EU arms supplies have been even slower to be delivered.
All of this matters for two reasons.
Reason one: The EU should be providing the vast majority of international support for Kyiv. Not just the most — the vast majority. The strategic and moral ramifications of the war in Ukraine are, after all, far more proximate for the EU than they are for the U.S. or any other nation. While Ukraine is 3,990 miles from the United States, it borders four different EU member states. Put simply, if the EU cannot find the funding to defend its supposedly most sacred principle — the preservation of peace and democratic sovereignty on the European continent — what does that say about the EU's longer-term viability?
Reason two: Ukraine aid is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to European security. Let's return to the source of the Kiel Institute's funding. This matters because Germany continues to neglect its NATO obligations. The latest NATO figures estimate that Germany will spend just 1.57% of its gross domestic product on defense in 2023. Other major EU economic powers, including Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, are similarly deficient.
This is a big problem made most obvious in the inability of EU member states to provide military materiel to Ukraine. But the problem is also obvious when it comes to defending the alliance's eastern flank. Here it is the U.S. military that is the overwhelming source of refueling, intelligence, and high-end deterrence aircraft in Europe. This is expensive work that drains critical assets from readiness for China-related contingencies. The "pledged" versus delivered factor also bears renewed attention here.
Take the military stance of the EU's second-largest economy, France. While Paris recently approved significant boosts to defense spending, it remains reluctant to deploy its military on NATO missions. Consider the example of a recent NATO exercise that simulated the response to an invasion of Germany. Where the U.S. deployed 100 aircraft for that exercise, France deployed just one aircraft. Unveiling the thin core of French President Emmanuel Macron's EU "strategic autonomy" narrative, this 100 and 1 example also encapsulates the EU's excess reliance on the U.S. for its security.
Again, it's a big problem. As U.K. Deputy Defense Secretary James Heappey noted on Tuesday, "When it comes to the alliance, the U.S. is increasingly looking east and west, and I think justifiably our colleagues in Congress need to see the European powers are spending their 2% to resource NATO equitably."
U.S. support for Ukraine is very important. But the notion that the EU is somehow distinguishing itself by carrying the weight of Ukraine's support is patently absurd. Indeed, if the U.S. is forced into war with China in the coming years, the EU's self-congratulation may be proven a disastrous delusion. The EU should be doing far more for Ukraine and far, far more than the U.S. is doing.