Ukrainian forces launched a surprise attack into Russia’s Kursk oblast on Wednesday. The incursion occurred from near to the Ukrainian city of Sumy in the country’s northeast. Ukrainian forces have pushed between 5 and 15 miles into Russia in some areas. The local governor decried a “difficult operational situation” on Wednesday evening.
The question is, why? Why did Ukraine do this? Beyond aggravating Russian President Vladimir Putin, what purpose does this action serve?
It’s a legitimate question because once Russian territorial defense forces consolidate they’ll be able to push Ukrainian forces into retreat. In turn, this is very likely a reconnaissance in force operation versus an operation to seize and hold territory. If Ukraine attempts to hold the territory it has taken, it will suffer heavy casualties with very little prospect of success. This is no small concern in that Ukrainian forces are already under significant pressure in multiple areas of southern and southeastern Ukraine. Russia’s far greater manpower reserves mean that Ukraine must choose very carefully where and how it conducts counteroffensives. Thus far, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has not explained what objective the incursion seeks. He says only that “details” will be provided at a later point.
Still, I can see a number of rationales that might explain why Ukraine did this.
First off, there’s the strategic benefit of undermining Russian confidence in Putin’s authority and his government’s competence. Alongside Ukraine’s targeting of fuel depots, factories, and logistics nodes inside Russia, this offensive allows Kyiv to bring home the war for Russians. The central foundation of Putin’s leadership narrative is his offer of stability and strength. This incursion shows anything but that.
Ukraine hopes that as the war goes on without a Russian victory, and that as the struggles of Russia’s economy grow alongside combat casualties, Russians will grow weary of the war. And that they will either mobilize against the war or that Putin will face an uprising. The Ukrainians know that Putin is now paranoid about his control over power subsequent to the aborted coup attempt by Yevgeny Progozhin.
While partly for domestic show, Putin’s fury was plain as he met FSB security service Director Alexander Bortnikov, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on Wednesday. All four men appeared sullen and embarrassed.
Ukraine’s second prospective rationale here is the desire to create what is known in military terms as “friction.” Ukraine may gain valuable intelligence for future operations by forcing Russians into panicked communication and mobilizations. But even when its forces withdraw, Ukraine’s attack will force Russia to divert forces to protect its borders from future incursions. Armored and anti-armored capabilities and better infantry forces will also likely be moved to defend the border. Those forces won’t be available for use inside Ukraine.
This attack will also increase the stress of higher-ranking Russian military officers, perhaps reducing their appetite to exploit Ukrainian defensive weaknesses in fear that doing so will create openings for Ukraine to again advance into Russia. No one in Putin’s Russia wants to be the person who gets blamed for this kind of incursion.
The White House neglects this friction opportunity. Because it wants gas prices to remain low before the presidential election, the Biden administration opposes Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics supplies such as fuel reserves. But it also opposes these actions for the same reason it opposes tougher action against Iran when its militias attack U.S. forces in Iraq.
Namely, because its impulse is to bend the knee to escalation threats. Underlining as much, national security spokesman John Kirby quickly offered thinly veiled disdain for this incursion. In part, the White House’s appeasement mentality is why Ukraine prefers British military advice to that of the U.S. military.
Finally, there’s the morale factor. Ukrainians have been on the hard-edged defensive front in 2024. This attack will force that concern out of mind, at least for a moment. In a sense, then, this offensive may serve as a Ukrainian version of the U.S. Doolittle bombing raid against Japan in April 1942. While limited in military effects, that raid rallied the U.S. population following the attack on Pearl Harbor and energized America’s mobilization toward victory.
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
This is not to say this incursion was the right course of action.
Only Ukrainian commanders know what forces they have in reserve and whether the costs of this action are commensurate with the political and military gains. But it would be a mistake to write off what Ukraine has done as plainly foolish. It may, in fact, turn out to be very clever.