On June 23, 2025, President Donald Trump raised the specter of regime change in Iran in a Truth Social post.

“If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn’t there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!,” he said.

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While Trump’s team clarified that regime change was not a war aim, speculation remains rife in Iran, especially given Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s continued absence. While videotaped statements offer proof of life, Khamenei’s cowardice and absence have raised Iranian speculation that his days are numbered and that he fears rivals more than even the Israelis.

The notion that regime change could come has reinvigorated opposition groups, at least those outside the country. Reza Pahlavi, the former crown prince, spoke repeatedly from Europe to beseech Iranians to rise up and defect, and huddled with politicians in the British Parliament. Legacy opposition groups operating in Iranian Kurdistan issued statements but also did little to prove their efficacy. Green Movement’s silence has affirmed the group’s loyalty to the Islamic Republic; it may seek reform, but it fears the regime’s complete demise. Meanwhile, after its initial silence, the Mujahedin al Khalq Organization, a cult-like group ordinary Iranians despise for its role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, its terrorism, and its defection to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, said it had carried out 3,000 acts of resistance this year, a figure created from whole cloth to appease the gullible.

Ali Safavi, the Mujahedin al Khalq’s public relations face, sought to establish his legitimacy in Iran not by pointing to Iranian public support but rather because thousands of politicians worldwide have endorsed the group’s leader, Maryam Rajavi.

Safavi raised an important point. Many former government officials have signed statements endorsing Rajavi and her organization; few if any have signed corollary statements on behalf of the late shah’s son or Kurdish federalism. However, what Safavi omitted is that their embrace is not altruistic. It comes after they receive hefty honoraria worth tens of thousands of dollars for a five-minute speech or an even briefer photo-op. This is why relations with the Mujahedin al Khalq and its various proxy groups have become such a barometer of corruption.

But as Iranian opposition groups maneuver around Washington, London, and Paris, seeking predominant, if not exclusive, support, it is time for Western policymakers and Iranians to demand full transparency.

Each group should detail their outlays: How much money do they pay in salaries to their staff? If Congress can detail the salary of every single employee, why shouldn’t Iranian groups who talk about democracy but face an even more cynical public? Have these movements hired public relations firms, donated to think tanks, paid academics, or journalists? Do any Iranian Kurdish groups that have taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan receive subsidies from Iraqi Kurdish political parties? Has the Mujahedin greased its supposed thousands of endorsements from politicians in several dozen countries with honoraria, first-class plane tickets, or other perks, or have these former leaders stood for Iranian freedom on principle? How do any of the opposition groups raise capital?

While there is no difference between hard-line monarchists and Mujahedin al Khalq flunkies in sycophancy and self-defeating polemics, the two organizations differ in their approach to Washington and Europe. Pahlavi pays no one for support; Rajavi must pay everyone. As policymakers seek to separate the wheat from the chaff, this suggests a metric. Those who pay the most lack true legitimacy, while those who win attention absent promises of cash exist on their merits and true grassroots support.

WHAT WOULD VICTORY LOOK LIKE FOR ISRAEL OVER IRAN?

Pahlavi’s organization may be a mess, and his own caution may be self-defeating, but he does have real support inside Iran; he does not need to pay people in Washington, London, or Paris to pretend. Kurdish movements derive ideological support across their region, even if other Iranians denounce federalism with separatism. Meanwhile, Azeri advocates in the West seem to exist on the dime of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic. The Mujahedin al Khalq is the most opaque and makes the most grandiose claims.

Iranians need freedom, not rent-a-mobs; no legitimate group should fear transparency.

Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner‘s Beltway Confidential. He is the director of analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.