YEREVAN, Armenia — It is a nightmare scenario not only for the United States but also for countries bordering Russia. After blunting Russia’s initial assault and extracting hundreds of thousands of casualties from the Russian army, Ukraine is running out of steam. The conflict has frozen, and demography is on Russia’s side. Anti-Ukraine propaganda, Washington’s usual attention deficit disorder, and the White House's tendency to give Ukraine what it needs to fight but not what it needs to win combine to take a toll. In the U.S., strategic impatience and an unwillingness to sacrifice are our Achilles’ heel. For Russia, attrition and fear are given. Russians may resent the high cost of President Vladimir Putin’s folly, but they exert no democratic pressure on their ruler.
In Yerevan, the framing of the Ukraine war stood in marked contrast to debates in Washington. In the U.S., the discussion centers on the nature of the Ukrainian government. Is President Volodymyr Zelensky really a democrat? Is Kyiv hopelessly corrupt? Even if Ukraine’s defense has merit, does it distract from a more important focus on China?
Voicing a regional perspective, Armenian officials, especially those with service in the Soviet Union, are blunt: At stake in Ukraine is Putin’s desire to reconstitute the Soviet Union, in actuality, even if not in name. If Russia loses in Ukraine, the dream of Russian nationalists to reverse the “disaster” of 1991 is over. Reality will force Russia to live within its borders, and the other former Soviet states can finally be free.
The future is grim should Russia win. Confirmation of any territorial conquest will allow Putin to claim victory and justify the sacrifice. Americans may consider it a poor bargain, but Washington’s view is irrelevant. Most Russians will never know the full scope of their sacrifice, and Russian media craft a bubble of spin and nationalist pride.
A pernicious cycle exists in Russia. Putin distracts Russians from his economic failings by rallying them around the flag. He invades neighbors: first Georgia and then twice Ukraine, but each time, he must subsidize the conquered territory, further hemorrhaging his economy and necessitating more flag-waving. Victory in Ukraine will require speeding up the cycle of conquest. Moldova, also pivoting to the West, will be in his crosshairs. Georgia could be as well. Further east, northern Kazakhstan is ripe for the picking. Everything is small pickings after Ukraine.
Frankly, military force may not always be necessary. Over the past five years, Putin has transformed Azerbaijan, once the great Western hope, into a Russian proxy. Azerbaijani dictator Ilham Aliyev, the son of a former Soviet politburo member, launders Russian oil and hosts Russian troops.
Armenians are frightened. In 1999, the Kremlin orchestrated an attack on Armenia’s parliament that left the reform-minded prime minister and speaker dead, along with several colleagues. Putin never forgets, and he will not forgive Armenians for the 2018 revolution that saw the country turn toward the West. Russian support for Azerbaijan’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh was meant to cause a counterrevolution. Armenians rightly blamed Moscow instead. Russian agents then ham-handedly encouraged assassinations, leading to the roundup of those involved and sparking further anger. As several Armenians commented, Russia’s ability to turn popular opinion in what was one of the most pro-Russian countries against Moscow has been astounding. With a Russian victory, however, Armenia can expect an energy embargo and further efforts to destabilize.
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The ultimate prize for Dedushka (“Grandfather”), as locals call him, will be the Baltics. Too many in Washington consider this unrealistic. Would Putin really risk nuclear war by attacking NATO? Reality may never be so clear. Just as a decade ago, when Putin used men without insignia to launch his attack on Crimea, he might easily seek to bribe, cajole, and undermine without fingerprints. He may not risk an attack on Armenia, given how each attempt to pressure the country ends badly for Moscow, but he could try a 1999 Armenian parliament-style attack in Vilnius, Riga, or Tallinn.
Historians love to identify inflection points after the fact. Seldom are they so clear in advance. Much more rides on Ukraine’s victory than most Americans realize. At stake is not a return to the 1990s but rather the 1950s.
Michael Rubin (@mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential blog. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.