


President Vladimir Putin of Russia made clear his intentions 17 years before the first Russian tank crossed into Ukraine in February 2022.
Addressing the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin launched a scathing attack on the post-Cold War international order. Standing before Western leaders, Putin denounced American unipolarity, rejected NATO expansion, and demanded recognition of Russia’s sphere of influence. Putin’s threats fell on deaf ears.
Recommended Stories
- The real education crisis is not what you think it is
- Fiber broadband is the key to AI innovation
- No, assaulting ICE is not a winning issue
At NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Western leaders had a choice: provide concrete security guarantees to Georgia and Ukraine, or retreat in the face of Russian threats. The allies offered only thin rhetoric. Moscow saw this for what it was — a show of weakness. In August of that year, Russian tanks rolled into Georgia. The United States not only failed to impose any serious costs on Russia for that invasion, but the Obama administration went so far as to try to positively “reset” U.S.-Russia relations.
Putin learned that unilateral territorial revision carried minimal costs in return for maximum strategic value. Then followed the 2014 invasion of Crimea from Ukraine, and Ukraine’s southeastern Donbas region. Each step was calculated to test Western response for fait accompli. In 2022, when it came to all of Ukraine, Putin initially expected swift victory. Now he’s in for the long haul.
Yet Putin’s ultimate mission was never really just about Georgia or Ukraine. Neither is it about NATO expansion or security concerns. His No. 1 strategic objective is to undermine the power of the U.S. and the unipolar world America created after the Cold War. He wants to establish a multipolar world where Russia wields great power and authority.
Ukraine thus represents the critical battleground for Putin. He understands that no successful, Western-oriented states can exist on Russia’s borders if Russia hopes to challenge American dominance. This is why he also supports North Korea and backed Assad’s Syria and Iran.
Too many in the West assumed that economic integration and diplomatic engagement would somehow cool Russian imperial ambitions. They were wrong. The desire to revise the Cold War outcome has always been there since 1989. It’s just that the means weren’t. Russian leaders only played nice when they had no choice but to do so. Putin bided his time to gain more control domestically and become stronger internationally. He openly dreams of being Peter the Great, of restoring Russian glory and imperial reach. For the former KGB man, sovereign borders are defined at the intersection of imagination and coercive power.
Putin’s timing reveals his predatory instincts. He saw a strategic opening after Biden’s disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal, with isolationist sentiment growing in both parties in the U.S, and American public opinion war-weary. He detected weakness and moved to exploit it. Putin is a calculated risk-taker who strikes when he thinks he can succeed without excess cost.
Putin only yields to strength when directly confronted with it. When, in 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian military aircraft that crossed into its airspace, Putin exercised restraint. When the U.S. killed dozens of Wagner forces in Syria in February 2018, he backed down. When the Finns and Swedes joined NATO after Putin invaded Ukraine, he mumbled a few angry words.
The world is now watching to see whether President Donald Trump will be willing to show a similar conviction when Putin inevitably ramps up the pressure in the face of new sanctions or weapons supplies to Ukraine. But weakness only reinforces Putin’s confidence in his 2007 Munich thesis: that American power is declining and the multipolar world is emerging in its place.
Putin understands that Europe alone won’t stop him. He’s watched European leaders delay, discuss, and settle for symbolic gestures time and time again. And so far, despite three years of war, Europe’s response remains inadequate to the scale of the threat. It may offer money, statements, and sympathy, but it lacks the military capacity and political will to deter Russian aggression on its own. And while new defense spending commitments are welcome, they are way overdue and must be followed through.
STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY AGENCY SPLURGES $200,000 ON SYDNEY JUNKET
That means ultimate responsibility falls on the U.S., whether we like it or not. Putin will continue testing American resolve until he encounters costs that genuinely threaten him. We can either provide Ukraine with the means to inflict such costs now, or prepare to face his broader campaign against American power across multiple theaters.
Putin knows what he is fighting for. Do we know what we are defending?