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
One of Ukraine’s key battlefield successes against Russia has been its employment of “deep strike” operations. That is to say, operations against targets deep behind Russian lines. As first reported by the Washington Examiner, Kyiv’s strategy here is heavily influenced by British special forces in Ukraine.
Deep strike operations seek to target an enemy’s command and control apparatus, airfields, bridges, railways, or key logistics nodes such as fuel and munitions depots. A successful deep strike action often has the added benefit of throwing an enemy off balance psychologically and forcing his diversion of resources to better protect other potential deep strike targets against future attacks. But the results in Ukraine are clear: Deep strike operations have allowed Kyiv to pressure Russia’s high-value military capabilities and its energy sector and undermine Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic credibility. The Russian Black Sea fleet has lost numerous high-value warships to Ukrainian deep strikes, for example. But Ukraine’s success also carries a lesson for Western militaries: Deep battlespace operations remain critical. Recognizing Russia’s rising challenge and the potential distraction of U.S. military forces by a war with China, America’s closest allies need to take up the mantle here. They must do so beyond special forces.
One positive development, then, would be for the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force to reconstitute its famed Bomber Command. The RAF merged its Bomber Command with its Fighter Command in 1968 to form Strike Command. Today, the RAF has only one unified command for air combat operations: Air Command. This stands in contrast with the U.S. Air Force, which operates both a fighter-focused Air Combat Command and a bomber-focused Global Strike Command.
Fortunately, the RAF has an emerging thematic grounding via which to restore Bomber Command. The RAF’s new commanding officer, Sir Rich Knighton, has outlined an “Air Operating Concept,” which takes a key lesson from Ukraine’s brutal attrition warfare. The lesson is that “we do not want to fight like that.” Knighton views integrated warfighting with allies and across domains of air, cyber, and space as critical to his service’s future success. The arrival of the F-35 fighter jet across NATO air forces will help facilitate this integration via its extensive sensor suite. The RAF has also benefited from close cooperation with the United States in terms of developing so-called “loyal wingmen” of unmanned drones that will join manned aircraft in future operations. And over the medium term, the U.K. is developing a new sixth-generation stealth fighter jet alongside Japan and Italy.
Yet as the U.K. government now pledges to spend at least 2.5% of GDP on defense by 2030, a spending target that the Labour Party opposition, which is likely to take office later this year, appears to share, London would do well to think about using some of these funds to boost its deep strike reach from the air. How to do so?
Due to security concerns of technology falling into Chinese hands, a concern Israel has let the U.S. down with, the U.S. is unlikely to export its newest bomber aircraft, the B-21 Raider, to any allies. Still, befitting the special relationship, the U.S. might be persuaded to sell the RAF four or five of its B-2 bombers at reduced cost. These aircraft would bring a potent added element to British striking power. Bomber Command’s restoration would also offer valuable integrated research efforts with the USAF Global Strike Command. But the key point is Russia. More specifically, the RAF must be able to operate independently of the U.S. Air Force (in the event that the U.S. were simultaneously involved in a conflict with China that forced its long-range stealth bomber aircraft to the Pacific) in holding the highest-value Russian targets at risk during war.
Strategic messaging and associated deterrent interests also matter.
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After all, Bomber Command’s heritage in helping to grind the Third Reich into dust is well-understood in Russia. Putin has prioritized the deployment of new weapons that bolster his long-range missile/hypersonic vehicle strike potential. In any war with NATO, the RAF would have a key role in targeting the delivery systems for these weapons. While a simultaneous NATO-Russia war and U.S.-China war is unlikely, Sino-Russian military and political cooperation mean it absolutely cannot be discounted.
Top line: If the U.K. wants to retain a leading role in NATO amid escalating global insecurity, it needs an RAF with crews and aircraft that can penetrate deep and survive to deliver lethality before returning home. The restoration of Bomber Command and B-2 bombers realigned to “Strike Hard Strike Sure” would surely carry potent strategic weight.