Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico is expected to survive following a Wednesday assassination attempt in the Slovakian town of Handlova. Slovakia‘s Interior Minister claims that Fico’s protective detail reacted “absolutely properly amid a rapidly developing emergency situation, and by doing so, saved his life.” But is that really true?

I’d argue that Fico’s life was saved primarily by virtue of luck rather than his security team. Indeed, that security team made a number of mistakes.

Fico’s protection is handled by the Ministry of Interior’s Office for the Protection of Constitutional Officials and Diplomatic Missions. Judged against most European security details, Fico appears to have a sizable shift complement assigned to him at any one time: at least and likely more than ten security officers in and around Fico’s person. This meets the minimum requirements for a protective detail in which every officer has an assigned role to mitigate key attack scenarios.

Still, key mistakes were made.

To review it as it happened: For a start, no officers are at the rope line before Fico walks up to it. Officers should be assigned here to ask members of the crowd to take their hands out of their pockets and to identify anyone showing suspicious behavior. Video of the shooting shows the moment when the shots are fired. But when that happens, the detail is spread in a poorly organized line alongside Fico. They should have a tight formation with all officers postured slightly in front of Fico with raised arms (the “hands ready” position). This tactic allows for rapid movement between a protectee and an attacker and intervention against the latter.

When the shots ring out, only the apparent head of the detail — the officer to Fico’s immediate right — reacts with immediate speed and aggression. His response is key in disrupting the attack before more shots can be fired. But the rest of the detail appears confused in the moments after the attack.

For one, Fico is left temporarily unguarded as he rolls wounded to his left and onto the ground. Officers appear unsure as to whether to cover him or support efforts to constrain the attacker. If the first assassin were a diversionary attacker, this would have been a big problem. Protective roles should have been pre-assigned by previously established responsibilities and the protective rule of proximity. Namely, those in proximity to an active attacker attempt to subdue the attacker while those in proximity to the protectee move to cover and evacuate the protectee.

Another failure comes from the officer assigned to monitor the crowd from within it. Rather than moving within the crowd in tandem with Fico’s movement, this officer (circled in red) stays outside the main crowd. While he reacts quickly once the shots are fired, he is too far away to be able to immediately subdue the attacker. Ideally, he may have been able to see the attacker’s weapon as it came out of his pocket and thus would have been able to intervene before the weapon was fired.

The next problem arises when Fico is carried to his car. The rear door to the car is not held open in anticipation of an attack. This is an important tactic always employed by the Secret Service in that an armored vehicle offers an immediate stronghold position in the event of an attack the scale and quality of which is unclear. It’s also unclear whether a driver is already present, ready to speed Fico away. In addition, as the officers carry Fico into the car, they again appear confused as to who should stay with him and who should return to the site of the assassination. This confusion is anathema to effective protective work.

Further problems arise as Fico is shown arriving at the hospital.

Here, none of Fico’s security officers appear to have their weapons drawn. Although the scope of the available video is limited, security on the periphery of the hospital also appears limited. These would be other protective failings in that security details are trained to anticipate follow-on attacks in the event that would-be assassins are unsure their first attempt has been successful.

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The Secret Service will conduct advance trips to hospitals in the locale of a visit in advance of any presidential visit, for example. It does this in part so that immediate security protocols can be introduced if emergency use of the hospital is later required. Instead, members of the media and various civilians are able to mill around close to Fico as he is stretchered into the hospital. This manifestly should have been a tightly corralled area.

Put simply, it’s positive that Fico has survived. But this experience underlines why effective protective security requires a lot of training (including that centered on “muscle memory” reflexive responses), resources and anticipation of the worst of the unexpected at all times. Their occasional failures aside, the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service are the best in the world at what they do because they revel in that understanding.