The Middle East was but a “sideshow” of a great power war, the legendary World War I British officer T.E. Lawrence, “Lawrence of Arabia,” indirectly admitted nearly a decade after the Great War’s end. Yet Lawrence himself had been drawn mothlike to the region’s flame, optimistically — some might say foolishly — projecting his hopes and vision toward an area that his contemporary Winston Churchill called “one of the hardest-hearted areas of the world.” For decades, Western policymakers have been drawn to its quicksand, expending untold blood and treasure in the process.

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But once again, the Trump administration may have bucked both the trend and conventional wisdom.

The recent strikes against Iran’s nuclear program have been that rare thing: an American success story in the Middle East. Early returns suggest the administration and its key ally, Israel, succeeded in severely degrading, perhaps even ending, Tehran’s rush to the bomb. In so doing, the White House may have just demonstrated it is possible to carry out limited military action in the Middle East. This is no small thing.

The Trump administration may have shown a path toward achieving clear-cut objectives without getting overtaken and bogged down in a region that, in recent memory, has plagued scores of presidents, prime ministers, and other policymakers. In many respects, the region is America’s bad penny — it keeps turning up, proving that, to paraphrase Leon Trotsky, “you might not take an interest in the Middle East, but it takes an interest in you.”

Indeed, the aftermath of what the Defense Department dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer offers promise and peril. And the dust is far from settled.

On June 21, the United States attacked three facilities in Iran that were critical to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. A strike package of seven B-2 bombers and dozens of Tomahawk cruise missiles struck the uranium enrichment sites of Fordow and Natanz and another facility at Isfahan. President Donald Trump called the strikes a “spectacular military success.” He’s right, and the details hint at how remarkable the mission was.

In a June 22 press conference at the Pentagon, Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that Midnight Hammer “was planned and executed across multiple domains and theaters with coordination that reflects our ability to project power globally with speed and precision at the time and place of our nation’s choosing.” A large B-2 strike package was launched from the U.S., with portions of the package proceeding to the West and into the Pacific “as a decoy.” Simultaneously, seven B-2 bombers headed east while largely maintaining radio silence. During the 18-hour flight into the target area, multiple in-flight refuelings occurred. And “once over the land, the B-2s linked up with escort and support aircraft in a complex, tightly timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.” This was all done, Caine noted, “with minimal communications.” 

Shortly before the strike package entered Iranian airspace, a U.S. submarine launched more than two dozen Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles against key surface infrastructure targets in Isfahan. At nearly the same time, American warfighters “employed several deception tactics, including decoys,” and as the strike package approached Fordow and Natanz, the U.S. deployed “high-speed suppression weapons to ensure safe passage of the strike package with fighter assets employing preemptive suppressing fires against any potential Iranian surface-to-air threats.” 

Less than two hours after the Tomahawk missiles were fired, the lead B-2 bomber dropped the first Massive Ordnance Penetrator weapon at Fordow. Within less than half an hour, subsequent bombers dropped their payloads, with more than a dozen MOPs deployed. The strike package then left Iranian airspace to return to the continental U.S. As Caine pointed out, “Throughout the mission, we retained the element of surprise.” Indeed, “Iran’s fighters did not fly, and it appears that Iran’s surface-to-air missile systems did not see us.”

This merits emphasis: A significant U.S. military force left the U.S., flew a nearly two-day flight with massive ordnance, dropped more than 75 precision-guided weapons, and returned to America — not only without the loss of a single pilot or plane, but seemingly without significant detection or interference by Iran, heretofore a threshold nuclear power. By any standard, this is remarkable. It was, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth highlighted, “the longest B-2 Spirit bomber mission since 2001 and the first operational employment of the MOP, a massive ordnance penetrator.” As Trump noted, “No military in the world could have done what we did tonight, not even close.” 

American fighting men and women took out massive, highly fortified nuclear enrichment sites located in the heart of the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and, with a two-day turnaround, returned to have a well-deserved breakfast in Missouri. Such an accomplishment should be heralded. The president is correct: No other nation could have conducted a military operation on that scale without loss of life or equipment. 

The operation’s success was the result of America’s peerless military power, keenly demonstrating Washington’s edge in equipment, personnel, and training. And it was carried out without a hitch thanks to levels of operational security that are completely at odds with the salacious reporting that preceded Midnight Hammer. Previously, some news accounts had presented both the administration and the Pentagon as being riven with rivalries, infighting, and incompetence. This is the usual Washington reporting. And, as usual, it was wholly incorrect. Indeed, the opposite is clearly true. The Pentagon is as lethal as it is efficient. Just ask Iran.

The results speak for themselves, but some remain wedded to their preexisting narratives. 

Accordingly, it was unsurprising when some news outlets latched on to a preliminary intelligence assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency asserting that the strikes set Iran’s nuclear program back by mere months, if at all. “Early U.S. intel assessment suggests strikes on Iran did not destroy nuclear sites, sources say,” one CNN headline blared. The usual suspects — the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Guardian, and others — duly echoed these claims. But as usual, the sourcing was both anonymous and replete with omissions. 

Regrettably, this isn’t the only instance of politicized intelligence relating to Iran’s nuclear program. For example, a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate asserted that Iran had ceased its bid to obtain nuclear weapons. Portions of that NIE were selectively leaked, and despite skepticism of its claims, it was widely cited by both the press and those policymakers who supported rapprochement with the regime. Yet the 2007 NIE was debunked when, in 2018, Israeli operatives carried out a daring mission in Iran, taking off with thousands of documents, later authenticated by the U.S., showing that Iran had not only lied about its nuclear program but was hiding it during negotiations with the U.S. and others. An analysis of those documents by the Institute for Science and International Security found that “Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts did not stop after 2003.” Iran’s nuclear program, the documents revealed, “carried on in a more research-oriented fashion after 2003, aimed at eliminating scientific and engineering bottlenecks in developing nuclear weapons, increasing know-how about them, and maintaining valuable expertise.” The NIE’s 2007 assessment, the institute observed, was inaccurate. 

Many news reports also failed to note that the DIA’s leaked battle damage assessment was wholly at odds with other intelligence assessments. Indeed, by its own admission, it was a “low confidence” assessment. Retired Adm. Mark Montgomery pointed out that the battle damage assessment was but one of three that usually follow strikes, with an analysis delivered after 24 hours, 96 hours, and then two to three months. “Ninety percent of the time,” Montgomery noted, the initial assessment is labeled “low-confidence,” and “that low-confidence report is exactly that.” In short, many in the media were deeply irresponsible in regurgitating a leaked top-secret document without providing this missing context. As Cliff May, the founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, argued, by running with the leaked DIA report, the media were “attempting to establish the narrative” that the strikes “didn’t work out.” But that narrative has fallen short.

In fact, subsequent analysis, and much of the available evidence, indicates that the strikes likely set Iran’s nuclear program back by two years or more. This might not seem like much, but some reports indicate Tehran was mere weeks away from weaponization. This takes on added significance given that the Islamic Republic is the leading state sponsor of terrorism, with numerous links to U.S.-designated terrorist groups, many of which would love to have a so-called dirty bomb. 

Utilizing commercial satellite photography, David Albright and Spencer Faragasso, noted experts on Iran and nuclear proliferation, concluded that the operation caused “massive damage” that set the country’s program back “significantly.” Meanwhile, Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission assessed that “the American strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, combined with Israeli strikes on other elements of Iran’s military nuclear program, has set back Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons by many years.” While the full scope of the damage is, and may remain, unknown, it seems clear that it was substantial. Indeed, were it otherwise, “the clerical dictatorship that runs Iran would be staging guided tours of their nuclear facilities,” as Mark Schneider, a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, pointed out. 

For years — long before he was on the campaign trail, much less in the Oval Office — Trump has been clear that Iran can’t be permitted to have nuclear weapons. American actions now substantiate his words. 

Moreover, Tehran will face significant hurdles should it attempt to rebuild. Estimates vary as to how much Iran has spent in its bid for nuclear weapons, but some experts, such as Karim Sadjadpour, believe that the regime has expended hundreds of billions of dollars while also facing sanctions and international opprobrium for its ambitions. These are now sunk costs, and the ruling mullahs must now reckon with the wrecking of their crown jewel, which they foolishly linked to both their own legitimacy and national prestige. 

It is entirely possible that Iran could decide to end the foolhardy and costly pursuit. After all, the government of Bashar Assad, Syria’s former dictator, never restarted its nuclear weapons program after Israeli strikes on the reactor in Deir el Zour in September 2007. Iraq, however, offers a different case study. Israel took out Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program in 1981, but the Iraqi dictator never fully gave up his ambition of obtaining nuclear weapons. Some analysts, such as Seth Cropsey of the Yorktown Institute, have warned that, absent U.S. leadership, Iran’s rulers will rebuild their program. These warnings should be heeded. In a July 3 statement, Iran’s deputy foreign minister told NBC News: “Our policy has not changed on enrichment.” The U.S. and its allies currently have an advantage and should press it, Cropsey argued in the Wall Street Journal. 

Indeed, Iran’s top military commanders are dead, and the country’s leadership is decaying and in disarray. Thanks to Israeli efforts that preceded Midnight Hammer, the regime’s air defenses have been obliterated. The U.S. and Israel have the leverage — and decisively so. Both nations can carry out additional strikes inside Iran. They’ve demonstrated the capability and the will to do so. By contrast, Tehran’s responses so far have been limited to face-saving measures, including a signaled attack at a U.S. base in Qatar and imprecise, albeit deadly, launches from what is, by all accounts, a dwindling supply of ballistic missiles.

Midnight Hammer is a win for America and its allies. The U.S. has restored deterrence to the Middle East while signaling to other foes that this is a president unafraid to use military power to achieve concrete foreign policy objectives. This has the bonus of reassuring key regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others, that Washington shares their concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and, more importantly, is willing to do something about it.

Moreover, by standing with a key ally like Israel, the U.S. has helped advance peace in the region. Midnight Hammer and its aftereffects, to include declining Iranian power, will likely make it easier for the Trump administration to broaden initiatives such as the Abraham Accords. The Trump administration was able to achieve previous agreements between the Jewish state and its Muslim and Arab neighbors by recognizing that a close and strong U.S.-Israel relationship was essential to peace. This stands in stark contrast to the approach of the Obama administration, which believed that “daylight” between the two nations was ideal. That approach was tried and found wanting. By fully supporting Jerusalem, Washington signals both Israel’s permanence and the permanence of the alliance. To many foreign observers, the U.S. has shown that it will back its allies in their time of need. This will shore up alliances far beyond the Middle East, including Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Indeed, the strikes can be used to America’s advantage in other theaters. The Pentagon considers Beijing to be its “sole pacing challenge” and peer competitor and is rightly worried about China invading Taiwan. The Trump administration seeks to prevent this. Many top policymakers are concerned that expending munitions in other arenas, be it in Ukraine or the Middle East, could detract from the means to deter China. Such concerns are not misplaced. America’s defense industrial base is in crisis, and there is a severe shortage of key arms. In fact, China’s increased support for both Russia and Iran can be seen as part of a strategy to distract the U.S. and deplete its munitions. This helps explain why China recently sent missile fuel material to Iran, its foremost regional ally.

Yet the strikes can give the U.S. and its own foremost regional ally, Israel, leverage that can be used in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere. China is heavily reliant on Iran for its energy needs. By some estimates, an astounding 90% of Iran’s oil is imported into China. Iran’s lack of air defenses and its precarious security situation mean that Washington, via its capable allies, now holds some extra cards to deter Chinese aggression in East Asia and beyond. Importantly, for years, Iran has also been supplying Russia with drones and other weapons for its invasion of Ukraine. Iran might find itself more unwilling, or unable, to fulfill future orders to the same degree.

With Iranian power declining, others will fill the vacuum. Fortunately for the U.S., Israel will be one of the powers stepping into the void. Another will be Turkey, a NATO member with a complicated history with the U.S. Ankara’s economic and military power has been growing over the past two decades, and Turkey has become more assertive of its own interests. The U.S. will have to find ways to deal with a country that can be useful in countering China, Russia, and Iran but that has also hosted Hamas and other designated terrorist groups. This will be no easy task and will require skillful statesmanship. Few problems will be more vexing for American policymakers confronting a changing Middle East. 

As importantly, both the limited nature and success of the strikes may help exorcise America’s ghosts in the region. For years after Vietnam, American policymakers were haunted by its aftermath. Numerous administrations declined to use hard power and carry out expanded military operations, fearing they would be bogged down in another protracted and unpopular conflict. It took Operation Desert Storm, another successful U.S. undertaking with limited objectives, to restore American confidence. Midnight Hammer might do the same for a nation still contending with the unsatisfactory conclusions to Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the run-up to the second Iraq War, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell had what he called his “pottery barn rule” — if you break it, you buy it. This notion preceded nearly two decades of failed state-building, and its residue has imposed constraints on U.S. policymakers, with both a public and a military that are war-weary. It could very well be that the recent strikes put a decisive end to such thinking. You might just be able to break it and leave it in shards. Maybe.

BANNING THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 

Henry Kissinger famously observed that statesmen often face choices, not between good and evil but between bad and less bad. Trade-offs are par for the course in national security, and anyone saying otherwise is selling fantasies, not a sustainable foreign policy. The aftereffects of Midnight Hammer present American policymakers with both problems and opportunities. The trick, as always, is seeing through the sandstorm and discerning what is a mirage and what isn’t. And the history of American foreign policy, in the Middle East and elsewhere, illustrates that this is easier said than done. But in a war with many battles and few clear-cut victories, this is, unambiguously, a win.

Sean Durns is a senior research analyst for CAMERA, the 65,000-member, Boston-based Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis.