Further shaking up the Russian defense ministry, President Vladimir Putin fired four deputy defense ministers on Monday. These personnel changes underline the two key governing concerns for Russia’s leader. First, his interest in ensuring a better return on defense spending amid the war in Ukraine. Second, his interest in ensuring more personal loyalists control levers of power.
Competence over corruption is one priority.
Former Deputy Finance Minister Leonid Gornin has been appointed to one of the vacant deputy defense minister slots. His arrival follows the recent appointment of Andrey Belousov, another financial specialist, as defense minister. This promotion of fiscal specialists comes amid a defense sector corruption crackdown that has seen numerous high-ranking civilian and military officials arrested. While corruption and the skimming of state budgets/contracts is a fundamental lubricant of Putin’s power structure, Putin has apparently decided that the defense ministry needs wholesale leadership changes. He knows that as Russian casualties in Ukraine rise, any growing perception of widespread corruption will pose an escalated risk to Putin’s popular credibility. Stability is traditionally prized by Russian leaders with sometimes paranoid interest.
When it comes to personnel changes, however, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted June 2023 coup attempt is even more of a factor than fiscal responsibility. It remains inexplicable that the Wagner Group leader believed he could charge Moscow, suddenly stop, and then flaunt his survival after so publicly moving against Putin. (Putin had Prigozhin killed alongside an innocent private flight crew in August 2023.)
Putin wants to avoid a similar occurrence in the future. And while the Russian leader remains highly popular at home, he knows that the longer and bloodier the war in Ukraine, the greater the risk that a faction might move to replace him. This is especially relevant now since Putin’s move to purge otherwise powerful figures in the defense ministry. Filling the Kremlin with dynastic loyalists, especially in the defense ministry, offers a way to mitigate this concern.
Dynastic loyalty explains why one of the newly opened deputy defense minister spots will be filled by Anna Tsivileva, the daughter of Putin’s late cousin. Tsivileva’s husband already serves as energy minister. The couple has become extremely wealthy via their politically enabled stakes in the coal extraction industry. But Tsivileva is just the start. Another new deputy defense minister is Pavel Fradkov. A former FSB officer, Fradkov formerly served as a staffer in Putin’s administration. But Pavel is also the son of Mikhail Fradkov. A former prime minister and SVR foreign intelligence service director, the elder Fradkov is a close and early Putin ally.
The dynasty focus goes further. Consider the appointment of Dmitry Patrushev to a deputy prime minister position. Russian deputy prime ministers are responsible for coordinating the activity of federal ministries and authorities. Of key note: Patrushev is the son of Putin’s arch-hawk ally and de facto national intelligence director, Nikolai Patrushev. The younger Patrushev’s rise thus allows Putin to inculcate further the Patrushev security network in support of his own interests. This is no small benefit in that Nikolai Patrushev is a master of the Russian dark arts, feared even by the highest ranks of business and politics.
Yes, it’s a cultural custom of powerful Russian figures to use their positions to bolster friends, family, and valued subordinates in varied ways. Ascendant FSB first deputy director Sergei Korolev, the likely successor to FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, has used his position to bolster his son’s prospects as a technology entrepreneur, for example.
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Still, Putin’s boosting of familial dynasties in more direct political support of his court is striking. It shows that Putin values loyalty as the preeminent concern above all others. Were Putin primarily concerned with improved government, even if only in relation to the war in Ukraine, he could have plucked the best technocrats out of obscurity and into higher office. But post-Prigozhin, the assurance of court loyalty is absolutely paramount.
In turn, while Putin’s position appears stable at present, Putin’s own sense of stability is plainly not as great as he would have us believe.